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ABSTRACT 
This study explores how one of the most talked about regulations in the 
internet policy domain was drafted. The General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) has been widely regarded as one of the most lobbied pieces of 
legislation in the history of the European Union (EU). This raises two 
questions: What policy alternatives were put forth by the EU institutions in 
the course of the GDPR’s legislative process, and how did they correspond to 
the ideas, issues and frames promoted by interest representatives? What does 
the influence of organized interests and stakeholders in GDPR decision-
making reveal about the democratic legitimacy of the process?  
Drawing on new institutionalism, this research traces the evolution of the 
GDPR, comparing the different EU institutions’ iterations of the new law with 
the positions of interest representatives, and simultaneously situating the 
GDPR in the history of data protection policy.  The results reveal that business 
groups dominated the public consultations prior to the Commission’s draft 
proposal, but the Commission’s approach was more closely aligned with the 
positions of civil society. Members of the European Parliament were, on the 
contrary, highly susceptible to the influence of business interests, until public 
salience of information privacy increased owing to Edward Snowden’s 
revelations of governmental mass surveillance by the National Security 
Agency. These revelations made it possible for policy entrepreneurs to push 
for stronger rules on data protection.  
However, public salience would not have a significant impact on the 
Council, which was mostly aligned with the interests of businesses and 
concerned with maintaining public interest exceptions. The final GDPR was 
more reminiscent of the Council’s position than the Parliament’s first reading, 
demonstrating that in many instances, business interests prevailed. This result 
should not be understood as mere resistance to policy change, but rather that 
a big data paradigm, which encourages the collection, processing and 
exchange of personal data in the name of progress, security and innovation, 
structured and constrained the available policy options. Therefore, the answer 
to the second question is that the institutionalized inclusion of stakeholders in 
the early stages of the process did not negatively impact its legitimacy, but the 
opaqueness and overall tendency to support business interests in the Council 
critically challenge the democratic legitimacy of the GDPR’s legislative 
process. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The use of data processing in all areas of life has exploded in the 21st century 
owing to the advances in both computing and networking. The increased 
processing power of computers and the introduction of social networking 
sites, cloud computing and the internet of things has contributed to an ever-
increasing pile of data ready to be processed, in real time. The use of so-called 
big data promises efficiency and predictability, providing businesses, states 
and citizens the tools to technological innovation, new businesses, and 
solutions to climate change, urban planning, and medicine.  
Barocas and Nissenbaum (2014, p. 46) identify big data not as a particular 
technology, but as a new paradigm for decision-making and knowledge 
production. It is connected to the quantification or datafication of all aspects 
of society (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013) and used to inform both public 
and private bureaucracies in their daily operation. In contrast, the expanding 
databases of personal information have raised significant concerns, prompting 
legislators to create new rules regulating the use of personal data. Critical 
examinations of the online advertising economy and vendors of personal 
information encouraged the European Commission to initiate reform of the 
European Union’s (EU’s) data protection legislation. The goal of this 
dissertation is to explore the events that led up to the General Data Protection 
Regulation (2016/679) (GDPR), the EU’s new data protection law that entered 
into force on May 25, 2018.  
The notable presence of lobbyists during the GDPR’s legislative process has 
been thoroughly documented,1 and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
have demonstrated that many Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
were highly susceptible to the suggestions made by lobbyists (Lobbyplag, 
2013, 2016). The question of whether these lobbyists were ultimately 
successful in shaping the final regulation has not yet been conclusively 
answered by earlier research.  
The GDPR’s legislative process is an ideal case for analysing the legitimacy 
of EU policy and regulations for a number of reasons. First, many policy 
insiders have claimed that the lobbying surrounding the GDPR was extremely 
aggressive (Fontanella-Khan, 2013). What is less certain, however, is how the 
legislative process as a whole was affected by interest representatives. Previous 
                                                  
1 German broadcaster ARD even aired a documentary about the legislative process called Democracy – 
Im Rausch der Daten (Democracy-film, 2018). 
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research on the GDPR has mostly focused on the impact of the Snowden 
revelations on the process (Rossi, 2018; Laurer & Seidl, forthcoming; 
Kalyanpur & Newman, 2019), but notably less scholarly attention has been 
devoted to examining to what extent interest representatives were influential. 
Second, the GDPR is the latest regulation in a series of legal instruments 
aimed at regulating different aspects of the datafication of society. Therefore, 
its legislative process is instrumental in examining whether historical 
trajectories and path dependence have made data protection policy 
sufficiently rigid to withstand both political conflict and exogenous pressure 
caused by the rise of social media, the National Security Agency (NSA) 
revelations, and the overall ubiquity of online tracking and surveillance.  
Third, the GDPR has already had an outsized impact on a wide variety of 
industries, forcing actors to oversee their data-handling practices to avoid 
sanctions associated with non-compliance. Furthermore, many countries have 
been inspired by the EU’s approach and adopted or plan to adopt similar 
legislation, partly in order to enable unhindered data transfers from the EU.2 
The extraterritorial application of the GDPR also means that it has generated 
a lot of interest outside the borders of the EU. Thus, it is a suitable case study 
for examining the role foreign influence can have on the EU’s legislative 
processes, which has not received much attention in interest group research.  
In sum, this dissertation aims to find out whether interest representatives 
were able to influence the contents of the different versions of the GDPR as 
presented by the EU institutions. The study will focus on the extent to which 
the interests of stakeholders are represented in the different versions of the 
GDPR, dating back to the first Commission Communication (2010a) on the 
protection of personal data. Whose voices were heard in the process, and how 
did the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament take conflicting interests 
into account in the drafting of the GDPR? How was the right to privacy 
operationalised, and which information privacy applications that stakeholders 
suggested ended up in the different draft Regulations? Can the legislative 
process be perceived as legitimate, given the extensive lobbying involved? 
Thanks to a determined effort to increase the transparency of the EU’s 
legislative process, alongside the position papers submitted to the public 
consultations, lobby position papers submitted to MEPs were made available 
during the legislative process (Lobbyplag, 2013). These papers and the EU 
institution’s respective draft regulations will serve as the main sources on 
which this study is based. Thus, the position papers will serve as a valuable 
source depicting how stakeholders advocate for different policy applications, 
                                                  
2 See CNIL (2019) for a comprehensive list of national data protection laws. 
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and show how data protection regulation affects different spheres of activity. 
Therefore, their value is not simply connected to this particular legislative 
process, but to normative questions of privacy and data protection in general.  
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The GDPR is unquestionably one of the most influential information and 
communication technology (ICT) laws that have been drafted because it aims 
to govern not only European companies, institutions and organisations but 
also actors from other continents that offer services to Europeans. Moreover, 
the GDPR introduced fines for violating privacy provisions up to four percent 
of the annual turnover of the violating party. Such severe sanctions have 
previously only been found in the sphere of competition law. For these reasons 
(and others) national public authorities, NGOs, trade associations, companies 
and private individuals have tried to influence legislators via official 
consultative procedures and more targeted lobbying.  
The big data paradigm is inherently connected to discourses of 
competitiveness, productivity, and the future. In technology, there is a 
dominant narrative that openness and sharing of data will foster economic 
growth and provide new means of producing value to the greater good of 
society. Regardless, the big data paradigm is often critically at odds with 
fundamental rights such as the right to privacy. New technologies have always 
challenged not only existing regulation but also existing social norms of 
privacy, on which laws are based (Tene & Polonetsky, 2013), but the challenges 
associated with the big data paradigm are manifold. First, digital technologies 
produce, as a rule, a trace. Whereas the imperfection of memories and human 
record-keeping enabled privacy rights in practice, digital records are designed 
to persist over time. Moreover, the nature of data is highly different. Social 
networking sites, fitness apps and smart smoke alarms lack historical 
equivalents because the data they provide is significantly richer and more 
frequently updated.  What happen when information that used to be intimate 
is stored on the servers of private companies? Who ‘owns’ the information, 
and how may it be used? Is the automatic mining of keywords on an instant 
messaging app comparable to someone reading a private conversation? Do 
intellectual property rights trump privacy rights? Is online tracking 
comparable with tracing someone in person? This is sometimes referred to as 
the ‘variety’ of data that constitutes a defining element of big data. In sum, it 
is not only the sheer volume but also the richness of data that has changed. 
Introduction 
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Second, the velocity of data is amplified – not only in speed of the collection 
of data from a variety of sources but also in terms of actual transfers of 
databases. Data changes hands and crosses borders at an intensifying pace. 
This makes it increasingly difficult to trace where the information is going and 
for what purposes. Therefore, a central problem is the lack of transparency 
surrounding the use of personal data. A report on U.S. data brokers by the 
Federal Trade Commission (2014) noted that nine data brokers collectively 
register data on hundreds of millions of users worldwide and add billions of 
new records each month. While this problem is endemic to the U.S. where no 
federal law on privacy protections exists for consumer relationships, many of 
the companies also operate in Europe. Importantly, there is still little oversight 
of how personal data is transferred and merged into different databases. As 
Pasquale (2015, p. 21) points out, we do not know ‘how data from one sphere 
feeds into another … [but] [w]e do know that it does’. With social networks, 
smartphones and countless smart devices there are now more data sources on 
citizens than ever before, and the number of connected devices will only 
increase.   
To some extent, our privacy has in practice become something to barter 
with: we agree to access a service by sacrificing privacy (van Dijck, 2013, pp. 
170-1). People readily accept the terms that service providers present as a 
condition to access their services, but it is unclear to what extent consent is 
given consciously. It is this balance of data utility and protection that 
legislation tries to strike, but finding the appropriate level of protection 
without undermining legitimate uses of data is challenging (Ohm, 2010, pp. 
1704-1705). On a societal level, this might mean that better services, medicine 
or products are made available, and it is often difficult to see when the sacrifice 
is proportionate to the gains – the sacrifice might be invisible to people, and 
the consequences might not materialise until several years after the data has 
been collected. The Cambridge Analytica scandal is a case in point. The users 
of the Facebook app ‘This is Your Digital Life’ could hardly imagine that their 
and their friends’ data would be used for micro-targeting in the U.S. 
presidential election in 2016 and lead to a massive privacy scandal (Hern & 
Cadwalladr, 2018) forcing Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg to testify in front 
of the U.S. Congress3 and answer the European Parliament’s questions. 
Internet services in the 21st century have one defining characteristic: they 
are often connected to central databases, i.e. ‘the cloud’, that not only store 
data on their users but also provide their owners with an ample supply of data 
                                                  
3 Some questions were answered in two documents submitted almost two months after the hearings 
(Facebook, 2018a, 2018b). 
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which can be mined for intelligence. The 21st century information society is 
based on collecting and processing data to acquire actionable intelligence 
(Gandy, 2012). Although this process seldom includes the physical monitoring 
of people, it is nonetheless a form of surveillance. While surveillance triggers 
negative connotations, its etymological origins are neutral: to watch over.4 It 
is perhaps for this reason that several terms have been used to designate 
different forms of surveillance: consumer monitoring, intelligence gathering, 
spying, supervising, observing, auditing and tracking, depending on the 
context – sometimes different terminology implies different legal obligations. 
The one who surveils might have the best of intentions, but the constant 
tracking of the movements and communications of people opens for abuse and 
risks. 
Legal loopholes and unanswered questions are abundant. Law is slow and 
code is fast, which means that regulation always lags technological 
development. Legal reforms take years to process, especially in the EU, 
whereas new software can be deployed instantaneously with a disrupting 
impact. For this reason, laws are often either too far-reaching or simply 
ineffective (Ohm, 2010, p. 1736). However, laws should still reflect social 
perceptions of privacy and not the technological development of surveillant 
instruments. The availability of sensitive personal information, such as sexual 
preferences through dating apps, should not lead to the conclusion that this 
data can be exploited without considering individuals’ sense of privacy. The 
expansion of big data analytics and behavioural marketing should not lead to 
an apologetic privacy regime that fails to offer Internet users a reasonable level 
of data protection.  
Legislators strive to regulate the use of data through various data 
protection instruments. European governments have valued information 
privacy long before big data was a concept, whereas the U.S. approach has 
been marked by laissez-faire and self-regulatory instruments. The 
governments of France, Germany, and the UK already adopted rigorous data 
protection rules in the 1970s (Newman, 2008a), concurrently pressuring the 
European Community to adopt its first Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) 
that eventually entered into force two decades later. The above-mentioned 
developments have, however, forced the EU to reassess its data protection 
legislation.  
                                                  
4 The historical origins of the English use of the word are, however, less neutral: the word came to English 
from the Terror in France where ‘surveillance committees’ were formed in 1793 to monitor suspected 
persons and dissidents (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2014). 
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The GDPR aims to not only clarify data protection rules and address 
loopholes in the law but also advance the single market. By harmonising the 
data protection rules across the Union, the EU institutions hope to achieve a 
better level of protection for citizens and clearer and consistent rules for 
businesses that operate in the region. On the one hand, the right to privacy of 
citizens is a primary concern. On the other hand, the new legislation affects 
both private and public use of big data and challenges business models and 
surveillance schemes on a wider scale. Regulation which advances the 
interests of citizens might be unfavourable for marketing companies or 
research institutions.  
1.2 AIMS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Data protection legislation is inherently complex, and it can be difficult to 
balance privacy, security, property rights, and business interests. Stricter data 
protection rules do not always favour citizens because they might outlaw 
useful applications. Bearing this in mind, it is important to examine not only 
if the views expressed by interest groups are reflected in the policy output of 
the EU institutions but also if the structural imbalances of participation among 
different interest representatives during the process have an impact on the 
outcome. Given the big data paradigm encouraging the collection and 
processing of personal data, how susceptible are the EU institutions to the 
influence of actors involved in these activities, and what effect does the 
inclusion of stakeholders in the legislative process have on the outcome? Thus, 
the main, overarching focus of this study can be divided into the following 
research questions:  
1. What policy alternatives were put forth by the EU institutions in the 
course of the GDPR’s legislative process, and how did they correspond 
to the ideas, issues and frames promoted by interest representatives?  
2. What does the influence of organised interests and stakeholders in 
GDPR decision-making reveal about the democratic legitimacy of the 
process? 
The first question relates to how problems associated with the data protection 
domain are defined by interest representatives and what solutions the EU 
institutions propose to remedy the identified issues. To quote Campbell (2004, 
p. 107), ‘how do ideas affect institutional change?’ To answer the question, I 
need to look outside the legislative process of the GDPR. I will not only focus 
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on specific events but also on discourses on surveillance and privacy. I use 
Pinizza and Miorelli’s (2013, p. 303) post-structuralist conceptualisation of 
the term: ‘discourses involve political struggles to inscribe and partially fix the 
meaning of a term within a certain discursive chain to the exclusion of others’.   
To provide the necessary context for the evolution of data protection policy, 
I draw on both surveillance studies and socio-legal theories of privacy to 
explain the development of data protection regulation. Surveillance studies 
are a decidedly broad and multidisciplinary field composed of political 
economy scholarship, sociological and historical accounts, as well as more 
philosophical work. Common to most of these approaches is a broader 
perspective on the structures that enable surveillance in society. Therefore, 
they are more apt at describing where ideas come from than the policy studies 
literature.  
In contrast, socio-legal theories of privacy are much more focused on the 
individual and often draw on psychological studies. While this dissertation 
does not seek to present a theory of privacy, I will demonstrate how the 
perceptions of privacy have guided information privacy regulation. At this 
point, it is also worth noting that public disclosures of private information are 
generally outside the scope of this dissertation, and the dichotomy between 
freedom of expression and the right to privacy will only be touched upon in 
connection to information privacy legislation. The right to private life is not 
the focus of this study but information privacy and the legal concept of data 
protection are. 
The second question is focused on the role of institutions. It is theoretically 
grounded in the field of EU interest group studies and focuses on the 
democratic aspects of the GDPR’s legislative process. First, this study aims to 
examine how different concepts of legitimacy can be used to evaluate the 
process. Here I draw mainly on Scharpf’s (1999) input–output legitimacy 
model focusing on the input by citizens on the one hand and the output of the 
EU institutions on the other and Schmidt’s (2013) concept of throughput 
legitimacy, which mainly looks at the process.  
A question which undoubtedly arises is whether the legislative process 
must include a deliberative element (Habermas, 1999) or whether other 
procedural elements can be used to overcome the democratic deficit of EU 
policy-making. I also aim to address the question of influence, drawing on both 
new institutionalism as well as interest group studies in the EU to inform my 
methodological choices and support my analysis (cf. Peters, 2012; Zahariadis, 
2008; Coen & Richardson, 2009). The primary method applied in this study 
is process tracing, which entails analysing evidence of the different stages of 
policy to infer causal relations (Collier, 2011). My aim is to demonstrate 
Introduction 
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influence by studying the different iterations of the GDPR and comparing 
them to the regulatory applications promoted by interest groups and other 
advocates.  
 While process tracing is often associated with historical institutionalism, 
there are notable connections to discursive institutionalism where policy 
discourses and ideas have a central role (cf. Peters, 2012, p. 112; Schmidt, 
2008; Schmidt, 2010). Historical institutionalism is useful for understanding 
how institutions maintain the policy equilibrium, whereas discursive 
institutionalism is more apt at explaining policy change by looking at the 
agency of policy actors and the role of ideas and discourses (Schmidt, 2006; 
Schmidt, 2008). In the case of data protection policy, both approaches are 
valuable. The aim is to provide a contextually rich study that not only focuses 
on the internal aspects of the legislative process but also emphasises how 
broader societal structures impact concrete policy applications.  
Finally, it is worth reflecting on how data protection regulation sits in the 
broader framework of media and communication policy. Media and 
communication policy studies in the European context have traditionally 
focused almost exclusively on either the broadcasting or telecommunications 
policy (cf. Donders, Pauwels, & Loisen, 2014; Simpson, Puppis, & Van den 
Bulck, 2016; Freedman, 2008; Michalis, 2007; Harcourt, 2005; McQuail & 
Siune, 1998) while leaving questions of information privacy regulation to legal 
scholars. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to introduce 
information privacy into the field of media and communication policy studies. 
The digitisation of both the media and communication means that the very 
provision of such services is dependent on processing vast quantities of 
personal data.  
The major impact of social networking sites and the rise of behavioural 
advertising as the dominant model of revenue accumulation for media 
industries mean that data protection is no longer a peripheral question of 
media and communication policy but at its very core. From a critical political 
economy perspective, the role of data has already been detailed by scholarship 
focused on so-called datafication (van Dijck, 2014, 2018, p. 33). The term 
originates from the book by Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013, p. 77) on 
big data and signified transforming qualitative elements into quantitative data 
points, but other scholars, such as van Dijck (2014, p. 198), have used the term 
in a narrower sense as ‘the transformation of social action into online 
quantified data, which allows for real-time tracking and predictive analysis’ 
(see also Hintz, Dencik, & Wahl-Jorgensen, 2018; Lupton & Williamson, 2017; 
Couldry & Hepp, 2018). To not confuse the concepts, I will refer to the big data 
paradigm when addressing the general societal trend to quantify, record, log, 
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and use large datasets to inform decision-making and refer to datafication 
when discussing the quantification of social action. Therefore, datafication is 
a key component of the broader big data paradigm and also inherently 
connected to data protection. Datafication has been conceptually addressed 
within the field of media and communication studies, but these studies have 
generally been limited to political economy approaches and not looked at how 
the big data paradigm informs and impacts policy. It is this critical connection 
that this study aims to explore. 
1.3 STRUCTURE AND SCOPE 
Examining the GDPR’s legislative process in isolation of the development of 
the Internet and surveillance technologies would clearly not result in an 
adequate answer to the research questions stated above. Because the first 
research question relates to the influence of interest groups and other 
advocates, it is also necessary to address the societal power that data industries 
wield. At this stage, it is important to note that almost all industries are, on 
some level, data-intensive. Therefore, the approach here is to refrain from the 
temptation of focusing on some of the key players in the online economy and 
instead discuss the wider framework of surveillance. The theoretical 
underpinnings of the second chapter are mainly drawn from the work of 
surveillance scholarship that can be traced back to two schools of thought: 
(neo)Foucauldian accounts focusing on societal control and critical political 
economy theories of communication. As demonstrated below, a combination 
of the two is better suited at providing an explanation of the material and 
ideational building blocks that have contributed to the big data paradigm.  
The third chapter is focused on the evolution of data protection policy in 
the EU. The order of chapters two and three is not a coincidence. All important 
developments in the field of privacy law were preceded by significant 
technological changes. The law of privacy would likely not have been codified 
unless new technologies and their implementation had radically challenged 
pre-existing normative conceptions of publicity and privacy. The position here 
is that data protection cannot be seen as a separate legal domain that is only 
related to the broader concept of privacy but rather a more operational concept 
that is on a lower level of abstraction than privacy. Moreover, I discuss the role 
of path dependence and policy entrepreneurs to historically contextualise 
policy equilibrium and change in the EU and what role both played in the 
development of European data protection policy and regulation. 
Introduction 
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After addressing the societal shifts that serve as the context in which the 
GDPR was drafted, I will address the question of legitimacy of EU policy and 
specifically the inclusion of stakeholders in the legislative process. To this end, 
it is imperative to provide an overview of the influence of interest groups in 
the EU in general to shed some light on the particularities of drafting 
legislation in the data protection policy domain. Chapter four outlines the 
policy environment in the EU and focuses on providing both the theoretical 
rationales for the inclusion of third parties in the legislative process and more 
empirical accounts on what lobbying in the EU looks like. My approach is 
influenced by EU policy studies on the three levels of democracy legitimacy: 
input, output, and throughput legitimacy. Each of these concepts will be 
further explored and connected to the context of data protection legislation 
below.  
The methodological approach heavily draws on empirical policy studies on 
lobbying and is further outlined in chapter five. While it might be tempting to 
revert to either a deep reading of some of the proposals using discourse 
analysis or a quantitative content analysis of all the documents, the method 
applied here, process tracing, uses mainly qualitative document analysis to 
draw causal inferences from documentary sources. There are two main 
reasons for taking this approach. First, a more in-depth approach would 
clearly result in a more detailed reading of some of the aspects of information 
privacy, but a more limited sample would mean missing important details that 
contribute to the larger narrative that is the goal of process tracing. Moreover, 
as position papers can be quite limited in scope and are mostly focused on 
advancing specific interests, they are not as suitable for discourse analysis as 
other, more strategic policy documents. Second, although quantitative content 
analysis would enable a full analysis of the entire material provided in the 
legislative process, there are some issues that undermine the utility of this 
approach. The position papers do not represent all lobbying positions, 
meaning that even the results from a study of all position papers submitted 
could not necessarily be representative of all possible industry interests. 
Moreover, it would be difficult to address more normative issues without 
looking at the position papers’ complete line of argumentation. Therefore, 
there are no apparent benefits to using an exclusively quantitative approach, 
but some quantitative elements have been incorporated to provide additional 
context to the qualitative analysis. 
The results are presented in chapters six and seven, focusing on examining 
the GDPR’s legislative process from a legitimacy perspective and outlining the 
discursive ideas that shaped the EU institutions’ proposals. The questions are 
answered through a chronological review of the different steps of the 
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legislative process, expanding on the background provided above and filling in 
details on how the legislative documents evolved over time. The findings can 
be categorised on three different levels. On the first level, I provide a detailed 
description of the different parties to the legislative process and their 
respective agendas. On the second level, I outline how the interests and 
agendas are represented in the EU institutions’ proposals. On the third level, 
I discuss the differences between the EU institutions’ proposals and what the 
finalised GDPR means for citizens, businesses, and the public sector.  
Finally, I will conclude by assessing to what extent the GDPR was shaped 
by interest representatives, and what this means for the legitimacy of the 
process. After summarising the results of the study, I will discuss how the 
GDPR’s legislative process relates to the general societal development of 
datafication. What will be the consequences of the GDPR in the short-term, 
and will it be able to challenge the current trend of data maximisation on a 
wider scale?  
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2 CONCEPTUALISING THE BIG DATA 
PARADIGM  
Ultimately, it’s important to remember that data protection is about 
power. Anyone who has ever tried to access their data quickly 
recognizes the profound informational asymmetries that characterize  
today’s data economies. 
Frederike Kaltheuner, Privacy International (Kaltheuner, 2018). 
The policy initiative to amend the EU’s data protection legislation cannot be 
understood simply in terms of a regulatory void created by technological 
advances. Rather, it is a reaction to a wider paradigm shift that relates to 
surveillance and how decision-making is rationalised. According to Campbell 
(2004, p. 94), ‘paradigms are cognitive background assumptions that 
constrain decision making and institutional change by limiting the range of 
alternatives that decision-making elites are likely to perceive as useful and 
worth considering’. Following Campbell (2004) and Schmidt (2008, p. 307), 
data protection policy has elements of both cognitive ideas that aim for 
concrete policy solutions and normative ideas that ‘attach values to political 
action and serve to legitimate the policies’. These ideas form part of what can 
be determined as the big data paradigm.  
A few societal trends are decisive in understanding both the cognitive and 
normative ideas that shape data protection policy. The first change is the 
increased bureaucratisation of society that builds on progressively granular 
record-keeping. Uses of personal information are not only limited to the 
bureaucratisation of the nation state but also increasingly serve commercial 
bureaucracies. Data matching and sorting technologies traditionally used for 
public services and administration may be repurposed for security policy and 
practice if there is political will to do so (Webster, 2012, p. 317). Moreover, 
commercial data brokers often have public authorities among their clients, 
resulting in data being transferred between private and public bureaucracies. 
This, in turn, means that the data collected on individuals is increasingly 
granular and used for a wide variety of purposes (van Dijck, 2014). The second 
change is that the purpose of surveillance has evolved from discipline to 
discipline and prediction. The third change is connected to the first two 
developments: big data has become the epistemic standard of knowledge 
production. Policy, action, and decision-making are increasingly reliant on the 
analysis of massive datasets (Barocas & Nissenbaum, 2014, p. 46). As boyd 
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and Crawford (2012, p. 14) suggest, ‘[t]here is a deep government and 
industrial drive toward gathering and extracting maximal value from data, be 
it information that will lead to more targeted advertising, product design, 
traffic planning, or criminal policing’. A natural consequence of this is the 
commodification of personal data, resulting in the creation of a market for 
personal information that is most pronounced in the field of advertising but 
serves other uses as well.  
The following chapter will outline three constitutive elements of the big 
data paradigm: the bureaucratisation of society, datafication of social action, 
and market for personal information. Data protection regulation cannot be 
addressed merely from a perspective of privacy but must consider the contexts 
where personal information is used. Therefore, this chapter aims to provide a 
theoretical framework for understanding privacy as a legally recognised 
exception to data-driven bureaucratisation. The very purpose is therefore to 
explore the limits of this relative fundamental right before turning to how it 
has been operationalised in chapter three. 
2.1 BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL, DISCIPLINE AND 
PREDICTION 
The history of surveillance traces two curves – the development of the modern 
nation state and the development of record-keeping in various forms. As the 
two are inherently intertwined, significant technological advances have both 
marked a shift in society at large and surveillance at the same time. Tracing 
the prehistory of surveillance, Lyon (1994) highlights census records in 
ancient Egypt as one of the earliest examples of state surveillance. For Lyon, 
drawing on the work of Innis (1951), a prerequisite for surveillant 
administration was the development of writing and thus record-keeping. 
Much later, the invention of the printing press would speed up the 
development of modern governance. Similarly, Mayer-Schönberger and 
Cukier (2013, p. 78) define datafication as ‘humankind’s ancient quest to 
measure, record and analyse the world’.  
The 19th century scholars such as Karl Marx, Frederick Taylor, and Max 
Weber have already established the link between bureaucratic efficiency and 
surveillance. During this time, the bureaucratisation of nation states 
intensified and included personal documentation (Lyon, 1994, p. 31). For 
Weber, the efficiency of management and thus bureaucracies was dependent 
on surveillance that stems from both record-keeping and direct supervision 
(Dandeker, 1994). In Weber’s view, the nature of bureaucracies was both 
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productive and destructive at the same time – enabling the efficient 
management of people but trapping individuals in an iron cage of bureaucracy 
that renders them into cogs in a soulless machine (Weber, 1978).  
For French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault, the development of 
the modern bureaucracy is connected to when surveillance superseded 
violence as the primary disciplinary tool in the 18th century. In his landmark 
work Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison, Foucault (1977) outlined 
how the modern nation state stopped using corporal punishments and started 
incarcerating and monitoring its subjects instead. One of Foucault’s key 
theoretical contributions is the concept of panoptic surveillance. The term 
refers to 18th century philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s model prison, the 
Panopticon. Bentham’s Panopticon was a prison which is built like a circle 
with cells facing the inner prison yard. A guard tower occupies the heart of the 
yard, allowing the guards to see into each cell in the prison. The prisoners are 
always in the guards’ line of sight, yet they are never certain of when they are 
being surveilled. The prisoners simply must assume that they are being 
watched, and this assumption guides their behaviour. Surveillance is thus used 
to discipline populations. This is not to say that the importance of violence had 
receded. The threat of violence was (and is) of course a constitutive element of 
the disciplinary nature of surveillance. According to Foucault, the panoptic 
model was eventually applied in principle in society at large, although 
Bentham’s architectural vision was not widely employed. This transition is 
what constitutes the panoptic diagram, a society organised by discipline 
through surveillance. Although most subsequent scholarly accounts on 
surveillance have focused on this aspect of Foucault’s work, Foucault himself 
also stressed that the purpose behind surveillance was often to increase the 
productivity of the subjects of surveillance, be it students in schools, soldiers 
in the military or patients in the hospital. In other words, Foucault’s panoptic 
diagram is highly inspired by Weber’s vision of societal bureaucratisation. 
Although Foucault’s panoptic diagram serves as a starting point in 
understanding the function of surveillance in society, modern day surveillance 
has evolved (Lyon, 1994, p. 78). The fragmented yet continuous collection of 
data from a multitude of sources has been termed panspectric surveillance 
(De Landa, 1991, p. 180). 5  For example, commercial surveillance has 
traditionally used four ‘surveillance streams’: customer records from 
                                                  
5 While panspectric surveillance refers mainly to signals being transmitted on the electromagnetic 
spectrum, most contemporary surveillance is focused on digital streams of data, and the technical 
delivery – a network cable or radio frequency – is of secondary importance compared with what platform 
was used to intercept the data. 
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companies, direct marketing companies, credit bureaus, and government 
(Schneier, 2015, pp. 51-2). Internet surveillance is a fifth stream that partly 
includes all of the above. The collected data is subsequently filtered and 
analysed by computers to produce actionable intelligence that can be used to 
guide decision-making (Gandy, 2012, p. 125).  
Whether one calls it ubiquitous surveillance, post-panoptic surveillance or 
the panspectric diagram, it differs from the panoptic diagram in that the 
purpose of surveillance is not to influence the behaviour of the surveilled but 
to collect as much information as possible to identify security threats (Brown 
& Korff, 2009, p. 124), recognise customer patterns (Pridmore & Zwick, 2011, 
p. 272) and predict future behaviour (Zwick & Knott, 2009, p. 234; 
Hildebrandt, 2006, p. 548). In most cases, present day surveillance is, in other 
words, less about discipline and more about omnipresent record-keeping and 
prediction (Gandy, 1989, p. 63). This applies equally to both public and private 
bureaucratisation (Dandeker, 1994, p. 61; Gandy, 1993, p. 47). To mark this 
shift, surveillance scholars have used concepts such as dataveillance (Clarke, 
1988), ubiquitous surveillance (Andrejevic, 2012, p. 92), the panoptic sort 
(Gandy, 1993), superpanopticon (Poster, 1990), panspectron (Braman, 2006, 
p. 315) or panspectric diagram (Palmås, 2011, p. 350). A defining feature of 
contemporary surveillance is that individuals are monitored on numerous 
levels by several actors and data collected in one context is frequently used in 
another, a practice which has been labelled function creep (Lyon, 1994), 
surveillance creep (Bogard, 2012) or mission creep (Christl, 2017). The 
collection of data is usually rendered permissible in one policy domain and 
subsequently moves into other areas.  
The shift from Foucault’s terminology signifies that the primary objective 
of surveillance is not the threat of watchful eyes but the promise of preventing 
undesirable individuals from acting or predicting the life choices of individuals 
(Gandy, 1989, p. 64). In a perfect post-panoptic state, discipline is not 
necessary because predictive technologies prevent all forms of crime from ever 
occurring. However, the quintessential democratic problem with such 
surveillance is that it is fundamentally opposed to the principles of the 
Rechtsstaat, such as transparency of decisions, due process, and non-
discrimination.  
Video monitoring equipment is, of course, still used extensively for the very 
purposes Foucault envisioned, suggesting that the shift from discipline to 
prediction is not complete. However, it must be underlined that modern 
surveillance is more about the information surveillance provides than about 
the behaviour it shapes. New developments in machine learning and, 
especially, facial recognition technology mean that video surveillance will 
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become an integrated part of the predictive surveillance apparatus, focusing 
less on the disciplinary effects of being watched and more on the data that can 
be drawn out of the images. In China, the disciplinary and predictive elements 
of surveillance have now merged with the launch of China’s ‘social credit 
system’. Presently, the social credit system logs the offences, awards, and 
volunteer work that can directly affect people’s ability to travel within the 
country and obtain a mortgage (Mistreanu, 2018). The social credit plummets 
only for breaking the law, but it is easy to see how the system can be abused in 
a country where fundamental freedoms are frequently trumped in the name of 
social order. Although the exact parameters of the final social credit system 
are not yet known, the system has been envisioned to not only include criminal 
offences but also evaluate networks of friends, consumer data, and social 
media activity similar to the Alibaba-affiliated social credit system Sesame 
Credit (Botsman, 2017).6  
A key point raised by Gandy (1989, p. 64) is that surveillance, while often 
automatic, is usually triggered by the data subject7 themselves – either by 
accessing a website, using a credit card, or signing up for a loyalty programme 
or life insurance. These actions are superficially consensual because 
individuals trade their privacy for goods and services. According to Gandy 
(1989, p. 66), organisations also collect more information on people than is 
‘socially optimal’. Moreover, because each isolated piece of information might 
seem trivial and come with a small privacy cost and keeping track of the big 
picture is nigh impossible, ‘individuals are incapable of acting in their own 
interests’. Cohen (2016) has coined this as ‘the participatory turn of 
surveillance’. This is not to say that this action would be an expression of free 
will – it is precisely the type of disciplinary system that Foucault envisioned 
would make us obedient subjects or, in many cases, consumers. The freedom 
of choice is heavily influenced by two factors: the lack of meaningful choice 
and the penalisations (either social or economic) involved in refusing 
surveillance. Sometimes the loss is highly tangible, such as in the case of 
                                                  
6 A prerequisite for the Sesame credit system is that data collection is highly centralised in China, where 
WeChat, the everything app, reaches 850 million citizens. The data collection practices involved in 
creating the social credit system are unquestionably pervasive, but it remains to be seen if the 
consequences are more severe than what is already achieved through regular credit rating systems that 
also draw from a variety of data sources. 
7 Data subject is a legal term which refers to the individual whose personal data is being processed. It 
should not be conflated with ‘user’ or ‘consumer’ because data subject status is not contingent on having 
a customer relationship with the entity that processes the data. It should also not be equated with ‘citizen’ 
because citizen status is frequently irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes and mere residence or even 
current location may be enough. 
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various retail loyalty programmes where members shop at a discount, whereas 
sometimes the loss is more intangible, such as missing invitations to parties 
because one does not have a Facebook profile. It is this unequal relationship 
in combination with the ‘spread of the computerisation throughout the 
bureaucratic infrastructure’ that strengthens the bureaucratic enterprise’s 
power over the individual (Gandy, 1989, p. 65). Therefore, information 
inequality between data subjects and data collectors is best explained through 
the inability of the individual to have a say – the power of the bureaucratic 
organisation is congealed by its institutional structures rather than pure 
hierarchical relationships between individuals (Gandy, 1989, p. 62). Take, for 
example, the Cambridge Analytica scandal – Mark Zuckerberg’s profile data 
was found among the information that was shared with the notorious data 
broker. Not even the CEO, founder, and biggest share-holder could shield 
himself from bureaucratic control of his own creation. 
Innovations during the past 150 years have radically improved the 
surveillant assemblage or in Rule’s (1974) terminology, the surveillance 
capacity of nation states and private bureaucracies. The mid-to-late 19th 
century and the 20th century innovations such as the electric telegraph, 
photographic film, telephone, radio, personal computer (PC), satellite 
communications, and Internet have not only radically sped up 
communications but also impacted how private communications can be 
intercepted and populations can be monitored. These technological changes 
have also triggered regulatory change. 
As communications have become digitised, the data has become richer as 
well. Datafication relies on the availability of behavioural data, which is 
inherently connected to how technologies of communication have evolved. In 
the end of the 1980s, Gandy (1989, p. 67) wrote that the spread of PCs in the 
workplace represented ‘temporary loss of … surveillance potential’ because the 
data was handled locally but predicted that the use of local area networks 
would remedy this in the future. Gandy’s prophecy was right, but he failed to 
realise the scale. According to Cisco (2018), one of the world’s largest 
networking equipment providers, 94% of all workloads will be processed in 
the cloud by 2021. From the perspective of surveillance, this means that data 
which were previously accessible locally are now frequently stored externally 
in data centres across the world. From a jurisdictional perspective, it means 
that data previously contained within one jurisdiction now crosses borders 
and might leave the owners of the database without necessary legal safeguards. 
I will now illustrate how this availability of communicative and behavioural 
data contributes to the creation of profiles.  
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2.2 DATAFICATION AND THE DATA SUBJECT  
The first parts of this chapter dealt with the evolution of the present 
surveillance society and connected the technological developments with a 
greater societal trend to track, analyse, and predict people’s behaviour. I will 
now turn to how datafication produces data subjects and how it relates to the 
big data paradigm.  
The underlying logic of surveillance has not changed radically from the 90s, 
but the scale of data collection and the availability of data have reached a 
different scale, which lead to the widespread usage of the term big data since 
the early 00s. The definition of big data tends to vary, but the definitions tend 
to include the following characteristics: there are large quantities of data, it is 
collected in real-time and changes quickly, and the data is high in complexity 
owing to an extensive range of data types and sources (see e.g. Kitchin, 2014; 
Laney, 2001; Franks, 2015, p. 4, 24).8  The meaning of big data has somewhat 
expanded from referring to what the datasets contain to including also the 
inferences and analysis of said data. This definition can be compared with 
Rule’s (1974, pp. 37-40) four factors explaining the growth of ‘surveillance 
capacity’: (1) the size of files, (2) the degree of centralisation, (3) the speed of 
information flow, and (4) the number of contacts between administrative 
systems and subject populations.  
A key aspect of the big data paradigm is that everything is logged in the odd 
event that the data might at some point be useful (Schneier, 2015, p. 19). Big 
data thrives in an environment of data maximisation because present day data 
collection cannot predict future correlations. As Pasquale (2015, p. 32) 
explains, causal relationships do not have to be established because 
‘correlation is enough to drive action’. According to Athique (2018, p. 65), big 
data is nothing but numerology,9 as the lack of interest in causality constitutes 
an explicit departure from the epistemology of science. Kitchin (2014) makes 
the important point that while a paradigmatic shift is underway, it is worth 
distinguishing between big data analysis in the form of completely inductive 
empiricism and data-driven science which is more firmly rooted in the 
scientific tradition of deductive reasoning. While the second category of 
science is certainly more epistemologically sound, it is at the same time 
influenced by the data maximisation paradigm. Although data maximisation 
                                                  
8 The industry usually refers to the three to five V’s of big data: volume, velocity, variety, variability and 
value. An oft-quoted simplified definition is ‘data too big for an excel spreadsheet’. 
9 The Oxford English Dictionary defines numerology as ‘the branch of knowledge that deals with the 
occult significance of numbers’. 
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is unproblematic for non-personal data, it becomes controversial when 
applied to personal data. As Athique (2018, p. 62) points out, ‘For the purposes 
of the computational process alone, it is fundamentally irrelevant whether this 
information being unitised is about people or brightly coloured rocks’. For the 
people whose lives are impacted by the decisions influenced by statistical 
inferences, the lack of established causality is more problematic. The idea that 
anything can be solved with sufficient data is further facilitated by the lowered 
costs of retaining data. The cost of computing power and storage have 
decreased immensely in the previous decade and essentially removed any 
economic incentive to delete data that previously limited data collection and 
surveillant practices (Schneier, 2015, p. 24). Therefore, such incentives must 
be created with the help of regulation. 
Corporate actors log billions of transactions worldwide to create consumer 
profiles for various purposes. Insurance companies create risk profiles to 
determine appropriate premiums (Bouk, 2018), and credit rating agencies rate 
individuals’ creditworthiness based on past transactions (Lauer, 2017). Online 
advertising networks generate detailed profiles based on online behaviour, 
and data brokers aggregate data from all of these sources (Schneier, 2015; 
Christl, 2017). Security agencies like the U.S. NSA or the British Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) gather information to create security 
profiles (Greenwald, 2014). Although these profiles have been critiqued with 
terms such as dividual (Deleuze, 1992) or data double (Haggerty & Ericson, 
2000, p. 606), the critique often focuses on different tools of surveillance but 
ignores how these profiles are constructed in practice.  
What is important to note is that objective data points, such as age, sex, 
income, births, and deaths, have always been part of the modern bureaucratic 
state (see above and, for example, Giddens, 1985). The difference is that 
behavioural data points, such as what people like to read, what people are 
searching for online, whose social media profiles they look for, and other 
interests, are significantly easier to map than before (cf. Bolin, 2012; Bolin & 
Andersson Schwarz, 2015; van Dijck, 2014, p. 201).  
While these events produce objective data points, they are used to infer 
subjective elements such as interests, psychographics, affective states, and 
behaviour. More than that, the subject is ‘reproduced’ in advance (Bogard, 
2012, p. 35). The consequence is that a clear distinction between objective data 
points and subjective elements is no longer possible.  
From a profiler’s perspective, the challenge does not lie in tracking people 
– these technologies are already quite advanced. The challenge lies in applying 
the appropriate weights to a wide variety of indicators to make the right 
assessments of people’s traits. Some tend to disregard demographic data 
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altogether and trust the inferences instead – why keep track of a person’s 
sexual orientation or marital status if it can be inferred from their behaviour, 
networks of friends or browsing habits? In 2002, Canadian Tire executive J.P. 
Martin came up with the idea to not only use past credit payment behaviour 
to predict whether a person was likely to pay their debt but also incorporate 
purchasing data in the predictive model. His analysis showed that people who 
bought felt pads for their furniture, carbon monoxide detectors for their home 
or branded motor oil were less likely to default on their loans (Duhigg, 2009).  
A psychological study by Kosinski, Stillwell and Graepel (2013) 
demonstrated that Facebook likes could be used to accurately predict a range 
of personal attributes such as ‘sexual orientation, ethnicity, religious and 
political views, personality traits, intelligence, happiness, use of addictive 
substances, parental separation, age, and gender’. Sensitive data is often not 
needed to make sensitive inferences (for a wide range of practical examples, 
see O’Neil, 2016). Facebook does not, for example, offer targeting based on 
race, religion, disability or sexual orientation (despite asking many of these 
things when signing up) but does offer ‘multicultural affinity segments’ for 
people whose activities on Facebook ‘suggest they may be interested in content 
related to the African American, Asian American, or Hispanic American 
communities’ (Facebook, 2018a, p. 2). Another trend in profiling is the use of 
sentiment analysis to infer affective states. One of the more prominent 
examples is Spotify’s ‘mood data’ that it infers from its users’ listening 
behaviours and preferences. Since 2016, Spotify has shared this data with the 
WPP’s Data Alliance, which means that a broad range of advertisers have 
access to the data (WPP, 2016). Spotify users may themselves suggest moods, 
indicating that Spotify is partly informed by users’ own, active choices. 
From a commercial perspective, the main goal is to define and find the 
most attractive customers, usually in the top 20% (Turow, 2006, p. 95). 
Advertising networks argue that through extensive profiling, people will be 
shown the ads most relevant to their needs. The truth is a bit more sinister 
because the most valued customers are the ones that buy the most. 
Discrimination is not an unwanted by-product, it is the product. Gandy (2009) 
has demonstrated how the uses of data are often discriminatory by nature. He 
underlines how geographical data can be used as proxies for racial data and 
thus be used to discriminate against populations without explicit collection of 
ethnographic data (Gandy, 2009, p. 80). By combining census data and 
clustering models, U.S. ZIP codes could be turned into lifestyle clusters that 
could then be exploited in marketing systems. These geographic information 
systems (GIS) can of course be used for other purposes as well, such as for 
demonstrating how environmental hazards tend to be concentrated in areas 
 21 
 
inhabited by minority groups or differences in access to healthy foods. One of 
the key points Gandy (2009, p. 81) makes is that automated decisions often 
have a racial effect without necessarily having a racist intent. Even though 
automatic systems are said to eliminate human prejudice, the ways in which 
data are collected and interpreted may produce equally strong biases. While 
the provider of an advertising platform may not have a racist intent, 
advertisers can use these platforms for racist purposes, such as when Facebook 
allowed discriminatory housing ads (Facebook, 2018a, p. 3). Even though this 
discrimination was not made based on race but based on ‘multicultural affinity 
segments’, the result is the same. 
Popular writing on surveillance often presupposes that the information 
gathered is correct; in fact, it contains a significant amount of errors owing to 
the statistical error rates associated with making inferences. Although the 
collection of data is extensive, it does not always translate into accurate 
predictions (Pasquale 2015: 22). The statistical origins of how profiles are 
constructed mean that the accuracy of a profile is subject to a margin of error. 
Probabilities are never 1, and with datasets with millions of entries, even minor 
erroneous predictions may have devastating effects. For Haggerty and Ericson 
(2000: 632), profiles “transcend a purely representational idiom”, and as such 
the accuracy of the profiles is secondary to their pragmatic value of “allowing 
institutions to make discriminations among populations.” In other words, the 
profiles do not need to be a mirror of reality to serve their purpose as long as 
the error rate is within a tolerable range. In some cases, however, wrong 
predictions have devastating effects. Risks for false positives are also higher in 
some sectors than others. For example, finding evidence of money laundering 
and terrorism financing by looking at transactions is difficult because they 
differ little from legitimate transactions (Canhoto 2013: 98). 
Although the data collection is extensive, it does not always translate into 
accurate predictions (Pasquale, 2015, p. 22). The statistical origins of how 
profiles are constructed mean that the accuracy of a profile is subject to a 
margin of error. Probabilities are never 1, and with datasets having millions of 
entries, even minor erroneous predictions may have devastating effects. For 
Haggerty and Ericson (2000, p. 632), profiles ‘transcend a purely 
representational idiom’ and as such, the accuracy of the profiles is secondary 
to their pragmatic value of ‘allowing institutions to make discriminations 
among populations’. In other words, the profiles do not need to be a mirror of 
reality to serve their purpose as long as the error rate is within a tolerable 
range. In some cases, however, wrong predictions have devastating effects. 
Risks for false positives are also higher in some sectors than others. For 
example, finding evidence of money laundering and terrorism financing by 
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looking at transactions is difficult because they differ little from legitimate 
transactions (Canhoto, 2013, p. 98). 
It is important to address one important conceptual distinction between 
the (post)panoptic diagram and the big data paradigm. They overlap to a high 
degree and it is often neither feasible nor necessary to distinguish between the 
two when the data concerned is personal information. However, there is one 
difference that I would like to underline at this point. While the origins of 
surveillance are also rooted in the regimes of disciplinary, bureaucratic 
control, the big data paradigm is less concerned with the psychological effects 
of being monitored. It is epistemically closer to the natural sciences than social 
psychology. Surveillance is naturally an important element of this type of 
societal optimisation, but the big data paradigm moves beyond managing 
populations and focuses on managing resources, human or otherwise. 
Therefore, it is important to also address how personal information may be 
regarded as a resource and, by extension, a commodity. 
2.3 THE MARKET FOR PERSONAL INFORMATION 
To understand why data protection policy cuts across sectors and societal 
actors, it is necessary to look at the structures that enable the transmission of 
personal data. Most major companies accumulate data on their users and 
customers to create consumer profiles and have been doing so for decades 
(Hildebrandt & Gutwirth, 2008; Christl, 2017, p. 13). While state surveillance 
has received most of the media attention, most surveillance is in fact corporate 
(Schneier, 2015, p. 47; Zuboff, 2018). As already touched upon in the previous 
section, data change hands at an accelerating pace. Retailers and creditors sell 
their customer records to data brokers. Data brokers sell personal data to 
customers who wish to verify credit history, target potential customers or even 
security agencies that want to identify security threats. Social networking sites 
use these profiles to match advertisers’ content to potential customers, 
whereas online retailers use them to suggest new products to their customers. 
Banks and credit card companies track transactions to offer new services, 
detect fraud, and sell aggregated data to data brokers. Insurers gather data to 
make personalised risk assessments. Owing to the globalised nature of today’s 
multinational corporations, data flows are increasingly international.  
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that different countries offer different 
levels of protection of healthcare, financial, and credit data. In the EU, credit 
bureaus are usually subject to quite strict regulations and may in most 
countries not provide their services to others than creditors and for other 
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purposes than credit assessment, but there are a few exceptions (Ferretti, 
2015, p. 16). In Sweden, Finland, the United Kingdom (UK), and Germany, 
credit bureaus may provide their services for other purposes and to others 
than creditors. But those sharing restrictions do not apply to customer lists 
that are shared within the same corporation. Gandy (1989, p. 73) proposes that 
this is the reason behind conglomerates seeking to provide banking and 
financial services, credit cards, travel, insurance, and consumer retail service 
records at the same time. This is already happening in some sectors, with 
especially airlines and retailers providing their own credit cards that are 
directly connected to their loyalty programmes.  
The use of analytics systems has become especially ubiquitous in 
marketing. Automated, personalised behavioural marketing requires vast 
amounts of data that are fed into analytics systems that can sometimes provide 
counter-intuitive suggestions on how to proceed in a specific market. Central 
to the success of these systems is the collection of data from all possible 
sources. Thus, it is no coincidence that Facebook and Google together 
dominate the online advertising market and are increasing their share of 
worldwide advertising revenue year by year (Reuters, 2017). The two 
behemoths are sitting on the most advanced databases of human behaviour in 
the history of marketing – Facebook’s data on social relationships and 
networks of two billion accounts and Google’s near-monopoly search engine 
provide the two with extensive capabilities to infer people’s interests.  
A significant contribution of the critical political economy studies of 
communication is the so-called audience commodity thesis, famously 
introduced by Dallas Smythe (1977). The central contribution of Smythe’s 
landmark paper was to focus on how audiences were being bought and sold, 
which had previously been a blind spot for political economists who tended to 
focus more on the production of media content. Smythe’s subject of study was 
the television industry in the U.S. and the use of audience segments to sell 
advertising spots, but the underlying logic that Smythe identified applies to 
not only the media industry but the wider sale of personal data. The audience 
commodity thesis has subsequently been developed by scholars such as Fuchs 
(2012, 2013), Mosco (2009), Andrejevic (2002), Napoli (2010, 2016), 
Hesmondhalgh (2012), Jin and Feenberg (2015), Bolin (2012), Bermejo 
(2007), and Meehan (2002, 2005), to name a few. Common to most accounts 
would be a close connection to Marx’s (1867/1984) commodity thesis as 
presented in Capital. 
Some problems with applying the Marxist approach to personal 
information need to be addressed. First, as Gandy (2011, p. 442) notes, 
information does not require labour to be reproduced. By definition, data is 
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both non-rivalrous and virtually costless to reproduce, which means that its 
value is largely determined by the extent to which the proprietors of data can 
control (and monetise) access to the database. Thus, it is inherently related to 
how privacy rights are conceptualised, as we will see in the following chapter. 
Second, the value of personal information does not reside in each variable 
but in adjunct with other information in the aggregate (Gandy, 2011, p. 444). 
This also explains why it would be difficult to create a system where people 
would sell access to their own personal data to the highest bidder. Third, the 
value of raw data is trivial compared with the value of that which is inferred 
from the data (cf. Athique, 2018, p. 64). These inferences are not the product 
of human labour but that of algorithms. While the initial setup requires labour 
and the systems might be tweaked over time, the inferences themselves are 
made by machines. As soon as the systems are in place, the cost of each 
acquired data point and each inference is miniscule (Gandy, 1989, p. 66), 
allowing established data brokers and online advertising giants to reap the 
benefits. Thus, the database is greater than the sum of its parts, and its 
creation is not the result of processes that can clearly be associated with some 
sort of labour. 
Whether one sees audiences as the product of labour, product of 
consumption or dispossession is a broad theoretical discussion that is not the 
primary purpose of this study; the focus here lies in explaining how the big 
data paradigm relates to policy change. Regardless of how one conceptualises 
the audience, it is clear that personal information can be regarded as a 
commodity at least in aggregate form. Different industries tend to value 
different data points, as shown by Turow’s (2006, p. 98) presentation of data 
broker Acxiom: the auto insurance package is sold with 33 elements, health 
care with 40, travel and entertainment with 36, and financial services 
industries with 12, to name a few. For the biggest U.S.-based data brokers, the 
three biggest sources of revenue are marketing, risk mitigation, and people 
search, corresponding to US$196 million, US$178 million, and US$53 million, 
respectively, in 2012 (Federal Trade Commission, 2014, p. 23). Facebook has 
partnered with several data brokers in the U.S., such as Epsilon, DLX, 
Experian, and Acxiom (Andreou et al., 2018, p. 5); however, owing to the 
massive critique surrounding the Cambridge Analytica scandal, it limited its 
partners’ access to data. This, of course, does not stop Facebook from buying 
data sets to develop the company’s own targeting portfolio. Google and 
Facebook have previously sought to incorporate all of their data within the 
same corporate structure, although Facebook wowed not to do so when it 
acquired WhatsApp. Now both Google and Facebook are trying to launch their 
payment services on a wider scale to further cement their targeting power. It 
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is not too unlikely that Google and Facebook will start providing credit ratings 
of their own. 
For present purposes, it is not necessary to provide a detailed description 
of how audiences have been sold over time, but it is important to provide a 
brief overview of how the evolution of distribution technologies has changed 
the fundamental dynamics of the marketing industry (see Table 2.1). From a 
process-tracing perspective, the critical event that needs to be pinpointed is 
the moment where the commodification of audiences evolved into the 
commodification of individual audience profiles, thus triggering questions of 
data protection. 
The history of audience commodities can be divided into three distinct eras 
that have each been decisively connected to how media products are 
distributed.10 For newspapers, the product that was sold to advertisers was 
reach – the ability to reach certain groups of people, either the subscribers or 
the people who bought single copies (Turow, 1997, p. 22). The readership of 
the newspaper would be sold partly as an entity in terms of total reach (total 
circulation) and partly, as the advertisement industry evolved, as a way to 
reach certain demographics. With broadcasting, the dynamics changed. The 
key metric under broadcast television is exposure to content and thus 
advertising. The potential audiences were largely unknown until the rating 
industries evolved in the 1930s and started to keep track of audiences and the 
content they consumed (Napoli, 2010, p. 37). The first audience researchers 
largely distributed paper diaries to keep track of what people were consuming. 
While the use of targeted marketing goes back to before the 1950s, it was not 
until the late 1970s that targeted marketing was deployed on a wider scale 
(Turow, 1997, p. 19). In the 1970s, ratings companies handed out set-top 
meters to keep track of what audiences were watching (Napoli, 2010, p. 40). 
At this time, the focus shifted from households to individuals. The audiences 
for different television shows could then be packaged and sold as segments.  
The first Internet ads in the mid-90s were so-called banner ads on 
websites, closely emulating newspaper ads in both their presentation and how 
they were sold. It is worth noting that Internet cookies were not addressed in 
the Data Protection Directive – when the Directive was drafted, cookies were 
not used for online advertising purposes.  
                                                  
10 While it is worth noting that the evolution of audiences traces slightly different curves in Europe and 
the U.S., I will focus only on the starting points for paradigmatic shifts in marketing rather than detail 
their actual implementation worldwide. Many of the developments outlined below thus describe the U.S. 
context. 
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Table 2.1 A brief history of Internet ads. 
1994: The first banner ads see the light of day 
1995: Internet explorer accepts cookies by default 
1996: DoubleClick is founded. Ad networks emerge 
2000: Google starts selling keyword ads (Auletta, 2009, pp. 61-63) 
2007: The rise of ad exchanges; DoubleClick is acquired by Google for $3.1 billion  
2008: Facebook introduces ‘Facebook Ads’ analytics for advertisers 
2009: Real-time bidding (RTB) is invented 
2011: RTB becomes commonplace along with demand-side platforms 
 
Napoli (2010, p. 88) stresses that new sources of data on media audiences 
challenge the traditional exposure metric. With the introduction of browser 
cookies, it was possible for ad-serving companies to start tracking users over 
time. This allowed for a new metric to materialise – that of engagement. 
Napoli (2010, p. 96) underlines that while the concept of engagement has 
become the ‘dominant buzzword of the measurement industry’, the actual 
definition of engagement is elusive and varies across contexts. Whereas some 
choose to define engagement according to a combination of exposure metrics, 
others tend to value appreciation and emotional responses, recall of brands 
and attitudes, or behavioural responses (Napoli, 2010, pp. 100-13).11  
Nevertheless, central to the definition of engagement is that the behaviour 
of the target audience is recorded and analysed. Therefore, the promise of 
online advertising is not only that it offers detailed data on the interests of 
audiences but also that it is possible to track their actual behaviour post 
advertisement exposure. Thus, it is possible to disregard demographic data as 
proxies for possible future behaviour and look directly at purchases. This is 
also what drives the data broker industry – data on purchases are combined 
with records of advertisement exposure to ‘onboard’ offline behaviour to 
online marketing platforms (Napoli, 2010, p. 110, Christl, 2017).  
Marketers gather a variety of demographic data, location data, activities, 
social networks, online behaviour, and offline purchases to target individuals 
(Turow, 2011, p. 89). Nevertheless, connecting advertising exposure or 
engagement to purchases is only part of the equation. It is equally important 
to use this data to create predictive models of user behaviour that can then be 
used to personalise both content and ads (see Pridmore & Zwick, 2011). Online 
behavioural advertising can be defined as ‘the practice of monitoring people’s 
                                                  
11 While many of these definitions of engagement are used in market research, audiences are sold relative 
to exposure and behavioural metrics by referring to either impressions (CPM) or clicks (CTR). 
 27 
 
online behaviour and using the collected information to show people 
individually targeted advertisements; (Boerman, Kruikemeier, & Borgesius, 
2017). Access to profiles is sold programmatically in milliseconds without 
human involvement using real-time bidding. Personal data are sent with each 
programmatic bid, which occurs several hundred billion times per day (Ryan, 
2019).  
Because advertisers frequently employ several different databases and it is 
often difficult to know whether an advertiser uses exclusively online data, I 
choose to use the broader term behavioural targeting. Behavioural targeting 
entails three stages: the collection of data (tracking), the search for and 
inference of patterns (mining), and the association of the patterns with an 
individual (profiling) (Castelluccia, 2012). While the collection of data, data 
mergers, and inferences made are the foundational building blocks on which 
targeting relies, an important aspect of behavioural targeting is the ability to 
reach individuals. Drawing on the work of Turow (1997), Hildebrandt (2006), 
and Pasquale (2015), I define behavioural targeting as the dissemination of 
content to select recipients based on the contextual information and inferred 
attributes and interests of those recipients and their proxies. 
To further elucidate this dynamic, I denominate access to audiences and 
control over behavioural databases targeting power. An important aspect that 
I have ignored until now is the centralisation of targeting power. In the early 
days of media advertising, targeting power was mainly divided between 
audience research companies, data brokers, and media outlets, with the two 
former providing data on the audience and the latter a way to reach those 
audiences. This division of power lied in the interest of media buyers who 
could rely on third party data which made it possible to compare the 
performance of the media outlets (Bermejo, 2009, p. 139). As pointed out 
elsewhere in this chapter, especially Google and Facebook have acquired 
dominant positions in the realm of online marketing. Their dominance lies in 
their unparalleled targeting power – the combination of access to audiences 
and control over behavioural data. The company that provides both access and 
behavioural analysis is one and the same. Media companies that provide the 
context for the ads are increasingly becoming replaceable middlemen – as long 
as it is possible to reach the same demographic, what difference does the 
publication make?  
An important development that helps explain Google’s current position 
was the rise of ad networks in the early 2000s to mid-2000s. Instead of media 
sites offering banner ads for sale directly to advertisers, the ad networks sell 
access to profiles and serve ads across different sites (Bermejo, 2007, p. 136; 
Webster, 2014, p. 71). DoubleClick, one of the largest ad networks at the time, 
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was acquired by Google for US$3.1 billion in 2007 despite the antitrust claims 
made by the online advertising industry and most notably by Microsoft 
(Teinowitz, 2007). Both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
European Commission agreed to the acquisition. With DoubleClick, Google 
could move from selling keyword ads to using the detailed profiles that 
DoubleClick had crafted (Turow, 2011, p. 81). DoubleClick’s profiles were 
based on tracking cookies placed on the sites that adhered to the ad network. 
Previously, the company had combined this data with a database on purchases 
that the company had obtained through its acquisition of the data firm Abacus 
but backed away from this practice after widespread critique (Turow, 2006, p. 
82). Although DoubleClick eventually gave up onboarding, the practice is still 
commonplace and used by many marketers and data brokers. 
The EU updated the ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC) in 2009 to reflect 
the changes in the online advertising economy. The updated ePrivacy Directive 
(2009/136/EC) entered into force in May 2011 and included a new rule 
requiring that online advertising should be based on consent. In practice, the 
consequence of this provision was that many websites added a pop-up 
claiming that by using this site you agree to our deployment of tracking 
cookies. The provision did little to stop online tracking and has largely been 
regarded as a dead letter owing to how the ePrivacy Directive was practically 
implemented.  
The online advertising ecosystem has become increasingly complex since 
2009.12 Whereas early day tracking was based strictly on cookies and Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses, single-sign on, device IDs and various device 
fingerprinting techniques are currently used to tie people to online behaviour 
across different devices (Narayanan & Reisman, 2017; Englehardt, Han, & 
Narayanan, 2018). Escaping surveillance is virtually impossible because even 
opting out from most tracking and refraining from using the services of Google 
and Facebook will not erase the tracks that emanate from other users and data 
                                                  
12 Ad exchanges have also become increasingly sophisticated. Their predecessors, ad networks, lacked 
coordination and media buyers had to bid on many different networks at the same time. Ad exchanges 
were developed to gather the sale of access to publishers in one place. Websites (publishers) provide 
their advertisement slots via supply-side platforms to ad exchanges (such as DoubleClick, Microsoft Ad 
Exchange, or AppNexus), while advertisers can bid on access to profiles using demand-side platforms 
(such as the DoubleClick Bid Manager, Adobe Media Optimizer, or AppNexus). Advertisers (or more 
frequently, media agencies) define their target group, budget and track the performance of bought ads 
via the demand-side platform. Although there are a few different supply-side platforms, ad exchanges, 
and demand-side platforms, the biggest companies tend to offer both the marketplace for ads and the 
platforms for buying ads and keeping track of ad performance. Google has thus steadily been acquiring 
companies to be able to control the entire online advertising supply chain.  
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controllers. Facebook, for example, actively encourages advertisers to upload 
their own consumer databases to be able to target look-a-like audiences and 
previously bought databases on purchasing behaviour to hone their own 
database.  
 Whether the ineffectiveness of the ePrivacy Directive is attributable to the 
lack of meaningful sanctions or unclear definitions of what consent entails is 
a matter of debate. The shortcomings of the ePrivacy Directive and the Data 
Protection Directive would have a clear impact on the policy applications put 
forth by the Commission’s draft General Data Protection Regulation. The need 
to update the laws demonstrates that the old principles in a pre-online 
surveillance era had not aged well. While the ePrivacy Directive managed to 
introduce compulsory cookie notices, it is doubtful whether these notices were 
effective in influencing corporate practice.  
2.4 THE INFLUENCE OF PARADIGMS 
At the beginning of this chapter, I have highlighted how paradigms and ideas 
shape political decision-making. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to 
demonstrate how a big data paradigm has evolved, tracing its origins to three 
elements: that data on individuals and their performance generate greater 
efficiency and control, that social action can be accurately quantified and 
individual behaviour predicted, and that this enables a market for personal 
information. A significant part of this market is the online advertising 
ecosystem. This part of the market has come to be dominated by a few key 
players, most notably Google and Facebook.  
Paradigms structure and constrain institutional change (Campbell, 2004, 
p. 108). Therefore, the regulatory initiatives that aim to limit the uses of 
personal data face powerful and influential discourses of surveillance as 
security and data as an important driver of economic progress and innovation. 
Moreover, strong economic forces resist and lobby against regulation on data 
use. However, this does not mean that the big data paradigm is completely 
uncontained because many of the developments presented above have also 
been met with resistance from the fundamental rights discourse.  
As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the GDPR was partly a 
response to the evolution of online behavioural advertising, which the 
previous Data Protection Directive and the ePrivacy Directive had failed to 
curtail – mainly because of unclear definitions but also because they lacked 
meaningful sanctions. It is consequently time to take a closer look at how 
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privacy relates to data protection and how data protection regulation is used 
to not only contain but also enable the big data paradigm.
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3 THE PATH TO DATA PROTECTION 
The previous chapter outlined how the big data paradigm has evolved and the 
economic incentives crucial for understanding exactly why the vast collection 
of personal information has become so central in bureaucratic societies. The 
big data paradigm is highly connected to the innovation discourse, and 
proponents of the big data paradigm often state that the regulation that limits 
data collection and processing also ultimately hinders innovation (Cohen, 
2016). The relationship between the big data paradigm and regulation is 
complicated. On the one hand, regulation can be (and has been) used to 
intensify the surveillance capacity of states in particular. On the other hand, 
privacy regulation can and has limited commercial surveillant practices 
(Goldfarb & Tucker, 2010). All this indicates, quite naturally, that there are 
strong incentives for both public and private actors to influence legislators 
whenever data protection laws are being drafted. 
The data protection policy domain is somewhat abnormal in the EU policy 
context because it cannot be easily connected to the media policy paradigms, 
information society initiatives, or competition policy. While the origins of data 
protection policy cannot be readily attributed to these three policy domains, 
data protection issues are moving from the periphery to the centre of each of 
them. The evolution of data protection policy and regulation can be traced 
back to national rights-based activism that frequently involved the 
intervention of legal professionals. According to Venturelli (2002), the EU’s 
approach to privacy legislation is characterised both by the Member States’ 
focus on public service regulation that, to some extent, prioritises citizen rights 
over contractual freedoms yet maintains a wide margin of appreciation for the 
solutions that can be seen as privacy infringing but somehow advance 
collective interests within the domains of welfare, law enforcement, and 
national security. It may be noted that a significant part of this chapter is 
devoted to demonstrating the differences between the EU and U.S. approaches 
to information privacy. This comparative approach is motivated by the 
importance of showing how ideas motivate policies (Schmidt, 2008). U.S.-
based companies participated in the GDPR’s legislative process to a very high 
degree, as will be demonstrated in chapter six; therefore, it is important to be 
aware of the regulatory background that has, at least on some level, 
ideationally guided their submissions and lobbying activities in the policy 
process. Moreover, the originators of European data protection legislation 
were also inspired by U.S. scholarship on information privacy (Simitis 2010). 
The path to data protection 
 
32 
 
The GDPR is largely based on its predecessor, the Data Protection Directive 
(95/46/EC), which was in many respects a more radical regulatory 
intervention than its successor. According to Peters (2012, p. 76), one of the 
most decisive questions for historical institutionalist research is defining the 
moment of creation. In the case of the GDPR, does one start with the Data 
Protection Directive, the first regional data protection law in the state of Hesse 
in Germany, the UN Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, or even earlier? 
While it is possible to argue for each of these starting points, I will focus on the 
events leading up to the Data Protection Directive but also provide an overview 
of the history of privacy legislation. Drawing on new institutionalism and 
Mahoney’s definition of path dependence 13  (2000, p. 509), I consider the 
GDPR’s legislative process as a sequence that can be traced back to the events 
that unfolded in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Following Pierson (2000), 
the objects of study are the ‘critical junctures’ that set political institutions on 
a specific path. Crucially, early events are considered more important than 
later events, but this does not preclude that different mechanisms of change 
can provide a deviation from the path (Mahoney, 2000, p. 517; Pierson, 2000, 
p. 263). These mechanisms of change can be associated with changing political 
or economic realities, the introduction of new technology, or the Importantly, 
the mechanisms of change can constitute the policy windows that open for the 
possibility of enacting new policies (Kingdon, 2013, p. 166; Zahariadis, 2008). 
In Kingdon’s multiple streams approach, political issues are significantly more 
likely to draw the attention of decision-makers if three streams are coupled: 
problems, policies, and politics. At any given time, there are a number of 
solutions and ideas available: in Kingdon’s terminology, a ‘primeval soup’ of 
ideas. However, their realisation is dependent on not only whether the policies 
may be seen as acceptable or feasible in the policy community but also if the 
time is right. Policy windows open because of changes in the political stream 
(such as a change of administration or shift in national mood) or because a 
new problem captures the attention of decision-makers (Kingdon, 2013, p. 
168). According to Kingdon, policy windows ‘present themselves and stay open 
for only short periods’. When the window is open, policy entrepreneurs can 
push for and introduce specific policies. Kingdon’s model is based on the 
political process in the U.S., and it excludes actual decision-making and 
focuses on the agenda-setting stage (Zahariadis, 1995, p. 33).  
However, in Zahariadis view (1995, p. 34), it can be revised to also include 
the decision-making stage to explain why certain policies are not only set on 
                                                  
13 For more comprehensive lists of the studies that have used path dependence as an analytical approach, 
see Greener (2005) and Bennett and Elman (2006). 
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the agenda but also ultimately chosen. Furthermore, Zahariadis is critical of 
the notion of ‘public mood’ because it is difficult to pinpoint and instead 
chooses to interpret the political stream as ‘the ideology and strategy of 
governing parties’. In the EU context, Zahariadis (2008, p. 518) sees the 
politics stream as ‘the balance of Council member national and partisan 
affiliation, the ideological balance of parties in Parliament, and the European 
mood’, seemingly forgetting his initial critique of the vagueness of a concept 
such as national mood. Noting the difficulties in defining a national mood, let 
alone a European mood, I choose to define the European mood not as an 
existing public discourse but rather as a discourse that is perceived as 
dominant among decision-makers.  
The policy windows approach explains why issues are reframed and why 
change happens. Nevertheless, there are other factors in place that also explain 
policy equilibrium and more incremental change. Drawing on the economic 
theory by Arthur (1994) and North (1990), Pierson (2000) proposes that 
policies are resistant to change owing to the increasing returns processes, 
where positive feedback loops lead to equilibrium. Therefore, changes to 
current policies may be resisted by the legislators, those subject to the new 
policies, and those enforcing them. While acknowledging that this may be the 
case in the early stages of path-dependent systems, Greener (2005, p. 69) 
nevertheless argues that Pierson’s static approach to change simply does not 
hold owing to the pressure applied from both endogenous and exogenous 
forces for change. Thelen (2009, p. 475) points out that sometimes significant 
change can take place not only by an abrupt exogenous shock but also ‘through 
a cumulation of seemingly small adjustments’. Peters, Pierre, and King (2005) 
also highlight that historical institutionalism approaches are ill-adapted to 
handling the political conflict which occurs not only in the formative moments 
of a policy but also at later, path-dependent stages.  
In the case of information privacy, notable events include the 
computerisation of databases in the 1950s, industry sharing of personal data 
in Europe in the 1970s, subsequent regulatory initiatives in Europe, evolution 
of ad-tracking technology from the early 2000s onwards, proliferation of 
social networking sites from 2006 onwards, NSA leaks of 2013, and 
Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal of 2018. Few of these events would 
constitute policy windows in a strict sense owing to their prolonged nature but 
were in many cases strategically used by policy entrepreneurs to put forth 
information privacy regulation in the EU. The Data Protection Directive was, 
for example, not a result of a window of opportunity occurring, but it was a 
product of national authorities forcibly prying a window open. There are 
similar examples of policy entrepreneurs creating windows of opportunity in 
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education (Corbett, 2005) and telecommunications (Cram, 1997), although 
the extortive nature of the data protection authorities’ (DPAs’) actions was 
quite extraordinary.14 Before turning to the evolution of data protection policy, 
I will present an overview of the history of the right to privacy. 
3.1 THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND ITS ORIGINS 
The history of privacy legislation is concomitant with the development of 
media and communication technologies. Newspapers, pocket cameras, covert 
listening devices, video cameras, and social networking sites have changed 
how people relate to the private sphere, blurred the distinction between what 
is private and what is public, and at times, created an urgent need for more 
legislation (Tene & Polonetsky, 2013).  
While the criminalisation of libel and slander can be traced back to the code 
of Hammurabi, it can be argued that the foundations of privacy as a 
fundamental right originate from the U.S. Bill of Rights from 1791 and the 
French Constitution of the same year, both heavily influenced by the 
Enlightenment philosophy. 
Although the ten Amendments to the U.S. Constitution do not explicitly 
mention privacy, the Fourth Amendment expresses the following: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Reflective of the U.S. Constitution, the Fourth Amendment provides 
protection of the individual from the interference of the state – it is, in other 
words, a negative right.  
                                                  
14  DPAs are independent regulatory bodies focused on enforcing data protection 
regulation. Their powers are mainly investigatory, but the GDPR has granted 
supervisory authorities the power to issue sanctions, which was previously possible 
on a national level but not explicitly recognised in the Data Protection Directive. 
Sometimes the DPAs are called Information Commissioners, and sometimes they are 
part of other regulators. For reasons of clarity, the term ‘data protection authority’ 
will be used consistently in this study. 
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The French Constitution established protections for freedom of the press, 
but those freedoms were also restricted in Article 17, which extends 
protections against insults relative to the ‘vie privée’ (cf. Whitman, 2004, p. 
1172).15 In Europe, the development of the right to privacy through later court 
practice and statutory law was mostly related to dignity (Whitman, 2004, p. 
1174).  According to Simitis (2010: 1993), this is a rather blunt assessment, and 
in his view, privacy was grounded in both dignity and liberty in Europe. While 
accounts may differ on this particular aspect of the origins of privacy 
legislation, present day privacy regulation in Europe can at least be traced to 
both notions.  
The rise of new technology as well as journalistic institutions has had a 
profound impact on privacy legislation. The press’ use of photographs 
extended the honour of private life to a right to one’s image in France in the 
mid- to late 19th century (Whitman, 2004, p. 1176). Similarly, in the U.S., the 
early privacy laws were torts that permitted individuals to seek compensation 
if the media had violated their privacy (Ohm, 2010, p. 1733). 
Inspired by continental legal developments, Warren and Brandeis (1890, 
p. 206) defined privacy as a right which ‘protect[s] the privacy of the individual 
from invasion either by the too enterprising press, the photographer, or the 
possessor of any other modern device for rewording or reproducing scenes or 
sounds’. Thus, this definition of privacy was closely related to capturing a 
moment and making that moment available in the public sphere. Warren and 
Brandeis’ significant contribution was that they suggested that the right to 
privacy must be separated from libel and slander and be construed as the 
broader right to be let alone. While clearly inspired by the European notion of 
reputation, the right to be let alone was slightly broader. Reputation protects 
individuals from false and hurtful information, while the broader right to 
privacy contains also factually correct information that is not harmful 
(Neuvonen, 2014, p. 13). Warren and Brandeis’ suggestion did not result in 
new privacy laws as such, but their article influenced practice in the U.S., 
effectually carving out a new right to privacy.  
It was not until after the Second World War that the right to privacy evolved 
to its present form. Most constitutions base their wording of the right to 
privacy on Article 12 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights from 1948, which 
was inspired by the French and U.S. approaches to privacy. The article 
combines both elements of privacy: the integrity of a person and their 
communications as well as dignity.  
                                                  
15 Chapter V, Article 17, third paragraph: ‘Les calomnies et injures contre quelques personnes que ce soit 
relatives aux actions de leur vie privée, seront punies sur leur poursuite’. 
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No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and 
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks. 
While the Declaration is an important landmark for the evolution of human 
rights, it does not bind nations other than morally. It has, nonetheless, been 
the inspiration to both international treaties and national laws on privacy. 
These laws often provide a more extensive list of exceptions than the original 
declaration. While privacy rights are recognised in national law, there are 
clearly many other issues of public interest that mandate exceptions to those 
very rights. Fundamentally, the human rights law rests on the idea of 
‘contextual balancing’, where it is possible to invoke a counter-right for every 
right, and each right is accompanied by exceptions (Koskenniemi, 2004, p. 
208). For privacy, the counter-rights most frequently invoked are either 
security or freedom of expression. Moreover, civic freedoms and rights have 
always been partially relinquished in exchange for security and access to 
valuable infrastructure in the modern bureaucratic state (Giddens, 1985).  
Privacy laws as such do not make room for business interests as a 
permissible exception, as Article 4(1) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights clearly states that derogations are necessary only ‘[i]n time 
of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of 
which is officially proclaimed’. However, the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR), ratified by all EU member states, does contain a reference to 
the macroeconomics of a state in Article 8(2): 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
The exceptions in the ECHR outline some of the collective interests that can 
be invoked to limit the right to privacy. This is usually the case when law 
enforcement is involved, for example, when police are granted permission to 
use wiretaps to prevent crime. In these cases, there can be a direct, foreseeable 
outcome – the surveillance activity is directly connected to the crime being 
committed. In other areas, the outcome may be less predictable, such as in the 
area of mass surveillance. Similar uses of mass processing of personal data 
could be applied to infer public health risks. This requires that highly sensitive 
medical records are shared between as many research institutions as possible, 
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but the collective gains from sharing medical information might surpass 
individuals’ privacy claims.  
Whether one accepts these measures is usually dependent on whether the 
end goal is regarded as achievable and proportional in relation to the limits it 
imposes on the right to privacy. The characteristics of the EU’s information 
society policy include the ‘persistence of the European social model and 
political tradition of public service regulation as reflected in higher levels of 
protection for individual citizens in cyberspace’ and a legal tradition that 
privileges public interest over proprietary rights and contractual freedoms 
(Venturelli, 2002, p. 80). However, this public interest may also correspond 
with significant exceptions to privacy rights in matters of national security and 
law enforcement. This is a significant difference vis-à-vis the U.S., where 
privacy rights have been used to limit the powers of the federal government 
rather than private actors, whereas the EU has favoured the opposite 
approach. 
It important to stress that the derogations to the right to privacy are 
connected to the interest of the nation, which is usually equated with public 
interest. Industry requests to limit the right to privacy that fail to become 
universally regarded as the public interest are not compatible with the right to 
privacy. However, if a corporation’s wish to limit the right to privacy can be 
argued to serve the public interest, derogations could be justifiable. Therefore, 
corporations choose to participate in policy processes. Corporations wish to 
define their activities as within the public interest rather than as a single 
business’ private interest. It is no coincidence that many position papers start 
by expressing the size of the industry in which they operate. 
As its history demonstrates, the right to privacy has not remained static 
over time. The different aspects of privacy can be defined as conceptual 
subdomains of the right to privacy. These include the physical integrity of a 
person, the integrity of personal communications, the integrity of one’s home, 
information privacy, and the right to one’s reputation. Therefore, each 
subdomain will be subjected to a different set of exceptions that are legitimised 
in different ways. As the focus here is on information privacy, I will not address 
the other subdomains – importantly, I will not address the question of 
reputation because data protection policy does not directly discuss the 
reputational damage information disclosures cause – although it is implied. 
Conceptually, I consider data protection a policy instrument used to enable 
information privacy. In this dissertation, data protection is defined as the 
operationalisation of information privacy which is itself a subdomain of the 
right to privacy. The two are not to be seen as synonymous, and especially in 
the European context, data protection is considered separate from privacy. 
The path to data protection 
 
38 
 
Instead, I argue that data protection operates on a lower, operational level 
than privacy and information privacy, which are more conceptual in nature. 
The boundaries of information privacy have always been difficult to 
pinpoint owing to technological change and people’s different perceptions of 
what privacy entails (see Nissenbaum, 2011; Cohen, 2012; Papacharissi, 2010, 
p. 46). For example, citizens from the different EU member states value 
different information quite contrarily; whereas most EU citizens regard 
financial information as personal data, most Polish and Romanian citizens 
disagree (European Commission, 2011b, p. 13). Earlier research has also 
shown that German citizens are concerned with surveillance and 
telecommunications data retention (Bug, 2013). These changes in attitudes 
make EU regulation especially difficult because normative ideas of privacy 
differ quite substantially. 
In the EU, the particular challenge of what people regard as private has 
been circumvented by abstaining from limiting the definition of personal data 
to certain categories of data, but whether data can be reasonably linked to an 
individual. Therefore, the question of whether something is regarded as 
personal is irrelevant.  However, as techniques of re-identification are refined, 
this may lead to a situation where all data becomes personal, ‘like an ideal gas 
to fit the shape of its container’ (Ohm, 2010, p. 1741). Nevertheless, in the EU, 
it is believed that refraining from limiting the scope of the law awards the 
greatest protection of information privacy. This solution has been called the 
‘omnibus’ or ‘principle-based’ approach to personal data. In the U.S., both 
academics and policy-makers argue that an all-encompassing definition is too 
vague to be efficiently enforced. They favour the ‘sectoral approach’, where 
different standards of protection are granted to different types of data (see 
Nissenbaum, 2010; Ohm, 2010; Schwartz, 2013). The separation between the 
two approaches is less clear-cut in practice, because European lawmakers use 
the omnibus approach for defining general principles, but specific legislation 
to regulate uses of data in different domains (Simitis 2010). The European 
approach has nevertheless been more influential globally, as many other 
countries have opted for the omnibus approach to data protection (Bennett & 
Raab, 1997, p. 244; Schwartz, 2013; Newman, 2008a, p. 104; Bradford, 2012; 
Fischer‐Hübner, 1998). 
The costs and benefits of the collection, processing, and trade of personal 
information come at potential benefits for businesses and costs to individuals, 
which would argue for an interpretation of privacy law that prioritises the 
individual (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 111). In information privacy law, this balance 
is no longer as clearly tilted in favour of citizens. Information privacy is 
fundamentally different from the negative right to privacy that requires the 
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state to refrain from being intrusive. Data protection is a positive right, which 
happens to recognise practices that both protect the rights of individuals and 
limit those same rights at the same time. As noted at the beginning of this 
chapter, human rights law is fundamentally based on conflicts of rights 
(Koskenniemi, 2004), such as whether one should give precedence to the 
freedom of expression or the right to privacy. The abnormal trait of data 
protection is that it seeks to advance two opposing goals at the same time: to 
secure the free movement of data and protect the privacy of individuals. 
Schwartz (2013, p. 1971) argues that the international debate on information 
privacy has always been about both human rights and data trade. However, 
data trade does not advance the right to privacy, which generates an inherent 
tension in information privacy law.  
To understand the origins of this purpose paradox, it is worth revisiting the 
origins of data protection regulation. When national legislators set to create 
the first data protection rules in Europe in the 1970s, public authorities were 
already processing personal data and analysing it with the help of computers. 
When databases were digitised, they also became easier to transfer, which 
shifted the focus of privacy law from control over publication to control over 
data flows. Activists and legal professionals were concerned that state-run 
computerised databases on citizens could be abused and required that 
safeguards be instated. The first countries to introduce data protection 
legislation in the 1970s were Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, Austria, 
France, and the UK (Schwartz, 2013; Newman, 2008b). In other words, data 
protection regulation was, as with previous privacy laws, a reaction to 
technological change. Furthermore, owing to the perceived benefits of 
computerising the databases of personal information, it would be unrealistic 
to outlaw the practice simply because of the privacy risks their use might 
entail. 
The first global document on data protection was the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1980) guidelines on the 
protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data, which can be 
regarded as the common baseline for all data protection regulation. . The first 
legally binding international instrument on data protection, Convention 108, 
opened for signature a few months later in 1981. Five states had ratified the 
Convention by 1985, and 51 states have currently acceded (Council of Europe, 
2018). Whereas the OECD principles were more focused on establishing a 
common, general framework for what could be described as decent data 
processing, the Convention introduced some more detailed provisions. 
However, because the Convention is an international treaty, it produces no 
direct effects for citizens – a breach under the Convention is therefore 
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meaningless if national law does not recognise it. Under the Convention, it is 
also possible to come up with a wide range of exceptions as long as those are 
explicitly stated in the law.  
The global data flows raised significant concerns among privacy advocates. 
DPAs in European countries with stringent data protection laws were 
concerned that multinational corporations were relocating their data 
processing activities to Belgium and Spain, which lacked data protection laws 
altogether – although both were signatories of Convention 108. The concern 
of these DPAs would ultimately trigger data protection reform at the 
community level. 
3.2 THE PURPOSE PARADOX 
Research on the politics surrounding the inception of the Data Protection 
Directive conducted by Simitis 16  (1995), Bennett and Raab (1997), and 
Newman (2008a, 2008b) has revealed three important features of the 
Directive’s legislative process. First, it was initially the Parliament that from 
1979 onwards was concerned with questions of data protection, while the 
Commission was reluctant to initiate legislation for a decade (Simitis, 1995, p. 
446). Second, lobbyists from data-intensive industries, such as the European 
Banking Federation (EBF) and the European Direct Marketing Association, 
were significantly involved in lobbying the first 1990 draft and were eventually 
successful in introducing the reference to the ‘free movement of such data’ in 
the title of the second draft in 1992 (Bennett & Raab, 1997, p. 248). These 
lobbying groups were also financially supported by American business groups. 
Third, the newly instated national data privacy authorities acted as 
transgovernmental policy entrepreneurs and pressured their governments for 
supranational regulatory intervention (Newman, 2008b, p. 76). 
The third feature of the legislative process is worth dwelling on. Newman 
(2008b, p. 77) highlights that national interests were decidedly against 
introducing supranational legislation. Both business elites and the 
governments of the biggest economies in Europe did not promote the 
harmonisation of data protection legislation. The Commission was equally 
uninterested in advancing this agenda and supported national regulation. The 
Commission’s switch from resistance to promotion was not marked by 
changes in national attitudes but by the increased lobbying and even threats 
by the national DPAs. In the 1980s, the national DPAs were concerned with 
                                                  
16 Simitis authored the world’s first data protection regulation in the German state of Hesse in 1970. He 
served as the state’s data protection commissioner from 1975 to 1991. 
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the lack of regulatory oversight in Belgium, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. 
If no common rules on data protection were introduced, the DPAs would block 
data flows to countries lacking legislation (Newman, 2008b, p. 89). In 1989, 
the French DPA Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés 
(CNIL) blocked the transfer of personal information on French citizens 
between Fiat’s French and Italian corporate offices, forcing Fiat to sign a 
contract stating that Fiat Italy would handle French personal data under the 
French data protection regulation rules. The contract can be seen as a 
precursor of the current regime of binding corporate rules (BCRs). The French 
and German DPAs also managed to stall the Schengen agreement until 
Belgium had pledged to introduce appropriate legislation.  
Owing to these developments, the Commission finally changed its position 
on harmonising data protection regulation, and the Directorate-General17 for 
the Information Society and Media (DG INFSO) drafted a proposal that was 
presented in 1990. The wording of the first draft was heavily influenced by the 
national DPAs. The Commission’s drafting committee comprised Commission 
officials and national DPA representatives (Newman, 2008b, p. 92). The 
private sector was largely left out of the drafting procedure but engaged in 
heavy lobbying after the draft was published. European business groups also 
lobbied strongly for subsidiarity and the preference of national legislation, 
supported by the governments of Denmark, Ireland, the UK, and the 
Netherlands. The national DPAs countered these initiatives by proposing that 
the Directive should require member states to set up supervisory authorities 
and that their transborder network would be formally recognised in the 
Directive as the Article 29 Working Party,18 thus guaranteeing subsidiarity. 
The Article 29 Working Party (WP29) was advisory, but its interpretation of 
data protection legislation has been and is still highly influential within the 
field. Its papers have been frequently cited by European courts, and its 
interpretations of data protection law are quite authoritative. Nevertheless, 
the WP29 was strictly speaking an information network with no enforcement 
powers. Following Slaughter (2005, p. 169), the WP29 can be seen as a 
combination of hard and soft power: while the Working Party itself had no 
enforcement power, its members do in their national contexts. Furthermore, 
the representatives of the DPAs used their formal expertise in the negotiations, 
often sitting alongside their national governments while amendments to the 
                                                  
17 The Commission is divided into specialised DGs that employ administrators with 
expertise in different sectors. 
18 The Article 29 Working Party was made up of national DPA representatives, a representative of the 
EU Commission and the EDPS. 
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Directive were being proposed. The German federal data privacy 
commissioner even represented the German presidency during the 
negotiations (Newman, 2008b, p. 93).  
A common position was eventually agreed upon in 1995, although the UK 
abstained. Simitis (1995, pp. 450-451) notes that the Data Protection Directive 
is in many respects a combination of different legal traditions, with some 
principles corresponding to German data protection laws (purpose 
limitation), others British and Dutch (codes of conduct), and others French, 
Belgian, Spanish, and Portuguese law (prohibition against processing 
sensitive data). According to Simitis (1995, p. 449), the will to introduce parts 
of national legislation into the harmonised Directive was not a valuable aid but 
‘a serious handicap’. The primary aim of the Council appears to have been to 
introduce familiar rules instead of establishing a high level of protection. 
Simitis rightly predicted that the member states’ initiative to transpose the 
Directive to national legislation would be more dependent on to what extent 
the rules in the Directive corresponded to national legislation.  
Simitis (1995) is also more critical of the end-result than Newman (2008b) 
– possibly because Simitis, a former data protection commissioner, saw how 
the member states introduced exceptions to the Commission’s draft that had 
been largely co-authored by the DPAs. Simitis (1995, p. 457) was especially 
concerned with the expanded research exception to the so-called finality 
principle, according to which data should not be further processed for other 
purposes, which in the Directive’s wording would allow anyone to bypass the 
finality principle as long as they had a research department. Simitis (1995, p. 
461) also demonstrates how the representatives of national governments acted 
in their own interest when they pushed for the right for political parties to 
collect data for acquiring new members or for fund-raising purposes without 
obtaining consent and without specifying any specific safeguards.  
The legislative process of the Data Protection Directive corresponds to 
Slaughter’s (2005) depiction of how national regulators have become the new 
diplomats, engaging in transnational networks. These networks have also 
become more prominent over time, extending beyond the EU (Raab, 2010). 
Slaughter (2005, p. 159), drawing on Dehousse’s (1997) work on European 
information agencies, argues that the EU’s approach has ‘given rise to the need 
for a central node’ in transgovernmental networks. In the case of data 
protection policy, the WP29 became that node. The review by Simitis (1995) 
shows how while the national DPAs managed to set the agenda and influence 
the initial draft, the Council introduced a range of exceptions deemed 
unsatisfactory by the network of regulators. Newman’s (2008b) description of 
the legislative process also demonstrates that the private sector was largely 
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excluded from the negotiations and had to focus its lobbying activities 
especially on the national governments. These peculiarities of the data 
protection policy domain need to be taken into account when addressing the 
GDPR’s legislative process.  
In the years after the inception of the Data Protection Directive, data 
protection has even evolved into a right of its own in Europe, separate from 
the right to privacy. Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, which was ratified in 2000, states the following:  
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning 
him or her 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the 
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate 
basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which 
has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it 
rectified. 
Data protection was also explicitly mentioned in the Treaty of Lisbon which 
was signed in 2007 and entered into force in 2009. Article 16 states that 
‘everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them’.  
Laurer and Seidl (forthcoming) attribute both of these developments to the 
WP29’s efforts. In 1999, the WP29 chairman at the time, Stefano Rodotà, was 
appointed member of the drafting convention of the Charter. In an annual 
report cited by Laurer and Seidl, the WP29 ‘explicitly prides itself on having 
made a “major contribution” to anchor data protection in the charter’. The 
Charter would later influence the ultimately rejected Constitution for Europe 
which included a general article on the protection of personal data. That same 
article would later surface in slightly redacted form as Article 16 Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in the Lisbon Treaty.19 
When the Data Protection Directive was being drafted, the primary concern 
was the transfers that took place in the EU. However, it would not take long 
until the Internet would lead to large quantities of personal data being 
transferred to the U.S. and other so-called third countries. The problem with 
these transfers was that the EU did not formally regard U.S. data protection 
regulation as ‘adequate’, which was a prerequisite for transferring personal 
data to a third country unhindered (Schwartz, 2013, p. 1980). The EU’s focus 
                                                  
19 The introduction of this new right (or even rights) has caused some confusion as to the status of data 
protection (González Fuster & Gutwith 2013). Kokott and Sobotta (2013) have concluded that in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
there are some differences regarding the scope of the rights and their limitation.  
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on process and subject rights was not formally compatible with how 
information privacy was operationalised in the U.S. Stopping data transfers 
completely would still not be an alternative. Because U.S. privacy law would 
never be adequate by European standards owing to lack of political initiative 
within the privacy domain, a political solution was needed (cf. Farrell & 
Newman, 2019). Companies with EU subsidiaries could rely on a contractual 
solution for intra-group transfers, so-called BCRs20, which extend data rights 
to processing taking place in a foreign jurisdiction. However, this alternative 
would not be available for external transfers. 
To avoid disturbing trade relations, a special agreement between the EU 
and the U.S. was negotiated. The so-called Safe Harbor agreement comprised 
seven principles that U.S. corporations could adhere to in order to show that 
they respected the EU’s data protection legislation (European Commission, 
2000). The principles corresponded to the rules outlined in the Data 
Protection Directive but with a lot less detail and a lower level of protection 
more in line with the U.S. approach to information privacy. Significantly, the 
Safe Harbor agreement added procedural safeguards that did not exist in the 
U.S. The FTC was partly responsible for overseeing that the principles were 
followed. The enforcement of these principles was highly criticised in several 
reviews of the agreement, and reports highlighted both lack of compliance as 
well as a disappointingly low number of adherents to the agreement as key 
issues (Connolly & Van Dijk, 2016).  
The Safe Harbor regime was demonstrably not very successful, and the 
personal data transferred to the U.S. were clearly not adequately protected. 
The ineffective agreement partly encouraged the Directorate-General for 
Justice (DG Justice) to draft the GDPR in the first place. The question had 
become more pertinent as non-EU actors were able to offer services to 
European citizens without any physical presence in the Union. Evidently, U.S. 
dominance in the ICT sector was a contributing factor: Google dominates the 
search market; Cisco has the largest market share of all switch vendors; 
Google, Amazon, IBM, Microsoft, EMC, and Dropbox provide the majority of 
                                                  
20 BCRs can be employed by businesses that make intra-group transfers of data to countries outside of 
the European Economic Area (Article 29 Working Party, 2008; European Commission, 2012a, Article 
43). Once a data protection authority approves the BCR, the company no longer needs to sign a new 
contract every time a transfer is made within the group. The validity of BCRs is dependent on formal 
approval by the national data protection authorities. The rules are used to make sure that the EU data 
protection legislation is respected regardless of where the company processes data. The Article 29 
Working Party (2003) recognised BCRs in a Working Document from 2003, but they had previously 
been applied in national contexts. The BCRs are formally recognised in the new GDPR. 
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all cloud storage services for both consumers and enterprises; Amazon 
provides the infrastructure for a large part of the Internet; Facebook and 
Google dominate the online advertising market; and nearly all phones run 
either Apple’s IOS or Google’s Android. The duopoly of smartphone operating 
systems provided both Apple and Google detailed access to people’s data and 
enabled this information to be transmitted to the developers of third-party 
apps. 21  Therefore, data on European citizens were constantly being 
transferred to the U.S., and any new laws that would either increase the 
liability of American companies or extend the reach of EU law were going to 
be prone to lobbying.  
3.3 INFORMATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION OR 
BUREAUCRATIC PROCEDURALISM 
To assess the extent to which the GDPR is path-dependent of previous data 
protection policy, it is worth mulling over how data protection should be 
operationalised. In the EU’s data protection policy, two of the most defining 
operational principles relate to whether information privacy should be 
achieved through bureaucratic procedures or by informational self-
determination. The purpose here is not to provide a detailed evaluation of 
applications associated with these two operational principles but to provide a 
broader framework for understanding data protection legislation and the 
rationale behind including provisions that either serve informational self-
determination or are more procedural in nature. These two operational 
principles can be connected to the French and German approaches to 
information privacy (cf. Whitman, 2004; Simitis, 1995).  
Conceptually, many theoretical accounts are focused on the managerial 
aspects of privacy. A common characteristic found in surveys on people’s 
attitudes to privacy is that they tend to circulate around questions of control 
and access. This is usually how information privacy is conceptualised in legal 
theory and policy research (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 70). Some legal scholars, 
such as Westin (1967, p. 158), prefer to see privacy as the control one has of 
information about oneself. The data subject presides over their personal 
information and submits pieces of it to the public domain, organisations, or 
other people. Access, on the other hand, can be defined as ‘the condition under 
which other people are deprived of access to either some information about 
you or some experience of you’ (Reiman, 1976, p. 30). Access is partly decided 
by the data subject themself and partly by the rest of the society. In other 
                                                  
21 Apple’s App Store and Google’s Android Market both opened in 2008. 
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words, information privacy is construed negatively as the possibility to 
withhold some information about oneself despite not being in full control. 
Thus, part of the body of personal information may be obscured by the subject, 
while some access to personal information is restrained by societal norms.  
The managerial approach to data protection has been highly influential in 
Europe (Koops, 2014), resulting in a range of rights pertaining to how data is 
processed. Privacy activists frequently elevate the autonomy and self-
determination of individuals when they advocate for stronger privacy rules – 
consent is often seen as the highest possible standard. Especially in the U.S., 
where the liberal market position has been dominant, consent has been seen 
as the best way to preserve privacy rights despite obvious shortcomings and 
power imbalances (Hoofnagle, 2018, p. 162). In the U.S. tradition, the freedom 
to agree to terms and conditions is unrestricted, regardless of how detrimental 
they might be to the privacy rights of the user himself/herself. Thus, consent 
has been an effective tool for U.S. companies to continue with their wide-
reaching data processing activities. Companies employ highly complex end-
user license agreements (EULAs) that outline all the possible ways companies 
may use data that have to be accepted prior to using software of one kind or 
the other. Europeans have to some extent adapted to the U.S. consent regime 
because most popular IT services are of North American origin. However, in 
Europe, consent alone has not sufficed. One of the key differences between the 
EU and the U.S. is that European data protection law has put greater emphasis 
on user rights as expressed by notice, access and correction rights (Schwartz, 
2013, p. 1976). The U.S. model is frequently referred to as ‘notice and consent’, 
whereas European informational self-determination requires an additional set 
of rights that grant additional control to citizens. 
In Europe, the managerial approach has resulted in a number of data 
rights, such as the need to consent to personal data processing (unless it falls 
under one of the exceptions), the right to be forgotten (or erasure), the right 
to rectification, and the right to object to processing. Common to these 
applications of informational self-determination is the idea that the individual 
should possess some degree of autonomy regarding information that concerns 
them. They are more closely connected to the notion of control, but the scope 
of this autonomy is heavily restricted by a number of exceptions. Sometimes 
the control is limited to being aware of how data is being processing – 
transparency – which can be either construed as a data subject right or as a 
data processor obligation. Transparency sets out principles for how the data 
should be processed and how this should be communicated. Data subjects 
should be aware of how and for what purposes their data is used. A recent 
study demonstrated that ad transparency undermines the effectiveness of ads 
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when marketing practices violate people’s beliefs of what the information 
flows look like (Kim, Barasz, & John, 2019). Some level of transparency may 
thus trigger people’s awareness of their privacy rights. However, the 
transparency of ad practices might not be all that forthcoming. A study of 
Facebook’s ad transparency tools showed that the information Facebook 
provides on why people are targeted is often incomplete and sometimes 
misleading, while data explanations are often incomplete and vague (Andreou 
et al., 2018).22  
Despite the operational approach being dominant in the U.S. and an 
important aspect of the data protection regime in Europe, many academics are 
critical of its presumed efficiency. Obar (2015, p. 5) calls it the ‘fallacy of data 
privacy self-management’. Koops (2014, p. 252) argues that informational 
self-determination is deeply flawed and that consent is ‘not a suitable 
approach to legitimate data processing’. Furthermore, he highlights that data 
subject rights remain theoretical because it is nigh impossible for a layman to 
use them efficiently. This can be connected to Gandy’s (1993, p. 9, 43) view 
that individuals are generally ‘contract term takers’ in transactions that 
require personal information. The problem is that there is scant evidence of 
people seizing control over their data. Numerous studies in both Europe and 
the U.S. show that people are increasingly worried about their online privacy, 
yet they refrain from taking action that would secure their privacy in practice 
(Pew Research Center, 2015a, 2015b, 2016; European Commission, 2015a; 
Turow, 2003; Debatin, Lovejoy, Horn, & Hughes, 2009; Halbert & Larsson, 
2015; Kennedy, Elgesem, & Miguel, 2015). This has been termed the privacy 
paradox (Utz & Krämer, 2009).  
The privacy paradox is reinforced by another paradox, the transparency 
paradox, according to which detailed privacy policies are less likely to be 
understood if they state all the possible conditions for the use of personal data 
(Nissenbaum, 2011, p. 36). It is becoming increasingly difficult for regular 
users to understand how companies (and to some extent public authorities) 
process data. This challenge is likely to intensify during the coming decades, 
                                                  
22 The problem is that Facebook’s explanations show the attributes that match the most users, which is 
usually reduced to demographic data, even though the targeting is clearly based on behavioural data. In 
fact, when different types of targeting are employed, Facebook uses the following order to provide an 
explanation for the targeting: demographic > inferred interests > advertiser-provided database > 
behaviour on and off Facebook (Andreou et al., 2018, p. 10). The attributes that Facebook has acquired 
from its data broker partners Acxiom, DLX, Experian and Epsilon are, however, deliberatively never 
disclosed to users (Andreou et al., 2018, p. 13). 
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when an increasing amount of home appliances and devices are connected to 
the cloud.  
Legislators have not been oblivious to this aspect of privacy, and a 
significant aspect of EU data protection law is that data controllers 23  are 
subject to data processing obligations (Koops, 2014, p. 253). These obligations 
apply irrespective of what individuals have consented to. I call it bureaucratic 
proceduralism owing to its focus on logging events, providing documentation, 
and following specific regulatory guidelines. For data controllers, the 
procedural approach is in many respects more cumbersome than respecting 
informational self-determination. Informational self-determination needs to 
be triggered by the data subjects themselves, whereas bureaucratic 
proceduralism requires controllers to take necessary steps to comply with the 
law. Whereas the former constitutes an ex post regime, the latter is an ex ante 
regime. The two approaches are concerned with transparency, although 
transparency serves different purposes under informational self-
determination and bureaucratic proceduralism. In the former regime, 
transparency is used to provide necessary background information so that 
data subjects can make an informed choice. In the latter regime, transparency 
is more oriented towards documentation so that public authorities can review 
how data is being processed. Therefore, transparency can be regarded as an 
element of both informational self-determination and bureaucratic 
proceduralism. However, I would argue that transparency requirements are 
more consistent with bureaucratic proceduralism in the EU context because 
they oblige data controllers to document (and communicate) their procedures 
ex ante. Data protection focused on informational self-determination would 
also be more focused on the understandability of the privacy notices.  
To better understand the nature of bureaucratic proceduralism 
Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity framework can be of assistance. While it 
has not been used to inform information privacy legislation, it is helpful in 
explaining that information privacy legislation must be adaptive to context.  
According to Nissenbaum (2010, p. 186), people’s perception of 
information privacy depends on the time, setting, and actors involved in the 
disclosure of personal data. At the heart of the contextual integrity framework 
lies the examination of how information flows are governed by societal norms. 
The norms that govern the transmission, communication, transfer, 
                                                  
23  A data controller can be defined as the entity who determines the means and purposes of the 
processing. In practice, this might be very difficult to determine, and in many cases, the data processor 
which should rely on the instructions of the data controller has more actual power over how personal 
data are processed. 
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distribution, and dissemination of personal information are called 
informational norms in Nissenbaum’s (2010, p. 140) framework.  
Informational norms are based on four building blocks: contexts, actors, 
attributes, and transmission principles. First, informational norms are always 
part of a wider normative system that governs conduct in general and, as a 
consequence, privacy in particular. Second, informational norms provide 
different roles for different actors – it is imperative to know in which capacity 
a person presides over, disseminates or receives personal information. Is the 
actor the recipient of information, the sender of information, or the subject of 
information? Third, the type of information involved will impact how it is and 
should be handled; however, attributes are also very sensitive to context. 
Finally, transmission principles provide additional rules for information 
flows, such as whether the disclosed information is confidential, that the 
information must be provided consensually, that the provider of information 
expects to be paid, or that the information may be sold or otherwise distributed 
(Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 145). An example of such a principle would be the right 
to be anonymous when speaking to the press, a right that is also legally 
recognised in many countries. Many informational norms have, in fact, been 
formally codified (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 146). Therefore, the challenge with 
general, principle-based data protection legislation is to draft rules for a 
diverse set of contexts without making the law over- or under-inclusive.  
Informational norms are breached when personal information disclosed in 
one setting is inappropriately shared in another or ‘transgress context-relative 
norms’. If, for example, data is collected in conjunction with the use of a fitness 
app and used within this ecosystem, this is hardly regarded as invasive, but if 
this data is shared with insurers, people might experience that their privacy 
has been violated. Therefore, the challenge for legislators is to draft laws that 
permit uses of information in one sphere of activity but stops their 
transmission to another. This is why access to credit or health data has been 
more strictly regulated in the past. These types of personal information have 
been restricted to a specific set of actors that are, by way of their professional 
obligations, deemed worthy of having access to sensitive information. At the 
same time, they are also subjected to rules prescribing how the data should be 
handled. 
The obvious shortcoming of bureaucratic proceduralism is that it is 
resource intensive for both data controllers and enforcement agencies. The 
administrative burden is heavy for both public administration and private 
companies. It requires highly skilled personnel, detailed bureaucratic 
structures, and the real possibility of a regulator actually evaluating these 
practices. A recent freedom of information request in the UK revealed that the 
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Information Commissioner’s Office had spent nearly £1.3 million on the 
recent Cambridge Analytica scandal, of which Facebook was one of the 40 
companies under investigation (Baines, 2018). To put that into perspective, 
Facebook was issued the maximum fine available under the old sanctions, 
£500,000. In other words, compliance investigations are expensive and the 
sheer volume of actors involved in data processing means that regulators are 
heavily understaffed compared with the task. Notwithstanding the most 
gruesome abuses of data protection principles, it is highly unlikely that smaller 
companies would ever be subjected to routine evaluations by a DPA.  
Bureaucratic proceduralism has direct implications for how data 
protection law is enforced. The enforcement system in the EU is highly 
institutionalised as characterised by the requirement to set up independent 
‘supervisory authorities’ or DPAs when the Data Protection Directive 
(95/46/EC) was implemented. 24  However, even though each EU member 
state is required to have a DPA, this does not mean that they are given 
adequate resources (Wright, 2016). In some countries, several DPAs might 
exist on a subnational level, such as in Spain and Germany. In Germany, for 
example, the regional DPA in Hamburg cracked down on Google’s profiling 
activities (Essers, 2014). The DPAs and local courts might make quite different 
choices in their interpretation of rules, which challenges the harmonisation of 
data protection rules in the EU (Charlesworth, 2012, p. 90).  
In addition to the national institutions, the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS) was instated by the Data Protection Directive. The role of 
the EDPS is mostly advisory, except in cases that concern the EU 
administration’s processing of personal data. Conversely, in the U.S., privacy 
enforcement has been limited to self-regulatory instruments and oversight by 
the FTC, which can be denominated bureaucratic liberalism. Although the 
FTC’s enforcement powers and resources are in many cases superior to that of 
the European DPAs, the lack of regulatory backing cripples the enforcement 
initiatives especially in relation to data brokerage and online marketing, as 
touched upon in the previous chapter. 
 In terms of policy applications, one initiative that can be considered 
bureaucratic liberalism is ‘privacy by design’, a conceptual framework 
                                                  
24  DPAs are independent regulatory bodies focused on enforcing data protection regulation. Their 
powers are mainly investigatory, but the GDPR has granted supervisory authorities the power to issue 
sanctions, which was previously possible on a national level but not explicitly recognised in the Data 
Protection Directive. Sometimes the DPAs are called Information Commissioners, and sometimes they 
are part of other regulators. For reasons of clarity, the term ‘data protection authority’ will be used 
consistently in this study. 
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promoting that privacy aspects should be taken into account in all stages of 
planning and implementation of a software product (Cavoukian, 2009). 
Privacy by design was initially invented by the Information and Privacy 
Commissioner for the Canadian province of Ontario, Ann Cavoukian. It shuns 
procedural prescriptions, stressing instead the need for embedding privacy 
into the design of new products, the role of security, and the importance of 
default settings. Privacy by design has been adopted as a resolution by the 
International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners and 
has been quite influential in policy circles (Levin, 2018). 
While there is no conflict between the procedural approach and 
informational self-determination as such, relying too strongly on one might 
produce an adverse outcome for the right to privacy. Relying on informational 
self-determination to a very high degree might prove detrimental to the actual 
realisation of privacy rights because people are unaware of what they are 
agreeing to. Informational self-determination is further undermined by 
research that shows that even when people are presented with a choice, the 
default settings guide user behaviour to a large extent and should be seen as 
‘de facto regulation’ (Shah & Sandvig, 2008; see also Lessig, 2006). Moreover, 
online service providers tend to design privacy choices in a way which favours 
data collection (Hartzog, 2018). On the contrary, cumbersome procedural 
obligations might result in non-compliance, require a lot of public resources 
for regulatory oversight, and burden smaller businesses.  
3.4 THE INTERNAL CONFLICT IN DATA PROTECTION 
POLICY 
This chapter has so far explained how data protection is conceptually linked to 
the right to privacy and the operational principles that guide data protection 
law in the EU. I have demonstrated how data protection policy can be traced 
back to 19th century jurisprudence and how especially technological 
innovation and the subsequent changing behaviour have resulted in new 
privacy laws.  
I have demonstrated that the EU’s data protection regulation is motivated 
both by ideas of informational self-determination and bureaucratic 
proceduralism, each contributing to concrete applications in data protection 
instruments. These two operational principles are not in conflict as such and 
might sometimes be mutually reinforcing, but advancing both at the same 
time adds complexity to the law. While increased complexity is somewhat 
problematic from a fundamental rights perspective, the more critical 
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operational conflict relates to the twin goal of data protection. One of the main 
arguments of this chapter is that there is a purpose paradox in the EU’s data 
protection law. At the same time, as data protection law is to protect the 
fundamental right to privacy, it is also to advance the free movement of 
personal data. 
The purpose paradox can be partly attributed to a logical fallacy. In theory, 
the EU’s data protection law rests on the assumption that the same level of 
privacy protection will be awarded to whoever processes the data, as long as 
the EU’s data protection rules apply. This conceptual ambiguity is connected 
to the EU’s principle of mutual recognition, recognised in the landmark case 
Cassis de Dijon (C-120/78), which fortified the principle of the free movement 
of goods within the Union. The principle of mutual recognition stipulates that 
a product that is lawful in one member state should also be regarded as lawful 
in another, unless there are ‘overriding reasons of public interest’ (see TFEU, 
article 36). EU legislation cannot (and will not) support an interpretation of 
the law that would promote protectionist measures to realise privacy rights. 
The fundamental idea behind harmonisation is that EU law should provide a 
common baseline in the member state jurisdictions, although the protections 
awarded need not be identical. Similarly, although not explicitly stated as one 
of the aims within the actual Regulation, international transfers of data are to 
be facilitated as well.  
Therefore, it is possible to extend data protection rights and obligations to 
other jurisdictions via contracts or other regulatory tools, such as the 
Commission recognising other jurisdictions as demonstrating an ‘adequate’ 
level of protection. However, privacy scholars argue that it is precisely the free 
movement of data that erodes the right to privacy (Ohm, 2010). Therefore, the 
purpose paradox does not exist in abstraction but in practice, where each 
transfer of data potentially constitutes a risk to the right to privacy. Data 
protection regulation, with a focus on bureaucratic proceduralism, does very 
little to address this problem, and it cannot do so because the other goal is to 
advance the free movement of data.  
Policy goals with paradoxical measures can be attributed to the ambiguities 
surrounding how conceptual notions should be operationalised and applied in 
practice (Napoli, 2001, pp. 69-70). In the case of data protection legislation, I 
would still argue that the ambiguities are more connected to the competing 
interests than the difficulties in applying concepts of privacy in practice. The 
strong push to enable wide-scale personal data collection, processing, and 
sharing in combination with unease regarding the consequences of such 
actions enables this tension. The policy entrepreneurship of DPAs was highly 
decisive in getting data protection on the EU’s regulatory agenda, but their 
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influence could only reach so far. Strong governmental interests as well as 
successful business lobbying managed to shape the Data Protection Directive 
in a direction which did not overtly challenge data accumulation and 
exploitation. The years that followed its inception would demonstrate that the 
Data Protection Directive was not sufficient to restrain datafication.  
The twin goal of data protection has provided interest groups a broader 
framework for suggesting policy applications to legislators. Whereas an 
instrument focused solely on the aspects of privacy would not provide room 
for regulatory amendments that seek to improve and ease the transfer of 
personal data, data protection law seeks to advance datafication at the same 
time because its purpose is to contain it. The consequences of these 
possibilities should not be examined in abstraction but be connected to the 
legislative processes that shape future legislation. For this reason, it is 
necessary to look at how interest representatives participate in the EU’s 
legislative process. This will provide a useful backdrop for understanding how 
lobbyists can capitalise on the twin goal of data protection to advance their 
agenda and how the nature of the legislative process shapes the EU’s 
regulatory output. The next chapter will provide a theoretical overview of 
including third parties in the legislative process, how they operate, and what 
effect they might have on the EU’s regulatory output.
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4 PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND 
LEGITIMACY 
The previous chapters have outlined the current media and communication 
landscape and the development of data collection practices within all aspects 
of public and private life. I have demonstrated how epistemological shifts have 
contributed to the development of a big data paradigm. Although big data is 
not as frequently mentioned in innovation policy discourse as it used to be, its 
paradigmatic repercussions have not waned. The datafication of social 
relations is ongoing, and although challenged by notions such as fairness, 
accountability, and privacy, its hegemonic status as a key producer of social 
knowledge remains firm but contested. One such area of contestation is the 
evolution of information privacy legislation. Chapter three outlined the origins 
of the right to privacy and how data protection law evolved in Europe. In 
particular, drawing on the research by Newman (2008a, 2008b), the empirical 
account of Simitis (1995), and the later research by Farrell and Newman 
(2019), I have demonstrated how the contents of data protection policy 
instruments have been heavily influenced by not only national DPAs but also 
industry lobbyists.  
Many of the key principles in European data protection legislation have 
been and are still contested. Exactly why the GDPR looks the way it does is 
partly explainable by looking at these underlying conflicts of interests. 
However, such an assessment would be incomplete without first exploring the 
legislative system in which actors with opposing interests operate. In 
particular, it is worth departing from historical institutionalism to look at how 
and to what effect interest groups manage to influence the development of 
policy.  
The current chapter seeks to explain the theoretical underpinnings of 
including third parties in the legislative process as well as explore the possible 
effects such strategies have previously had on the policy output of the EU. The 
GDPR’s legislative process is, in many ways, similar to the policy processes of 
a range of other issues, although some features of the process make it unique. 
What sets the GDPR off from many other EU regulations is its extra-territorial 
application. Therefore, it is important to have a critical look at the EU’s 
legislative process before addressing the consequences of lobbying.  
As noted in the introduction, during the past twenty years, the EU has 
sought to improve the legitimacy of its policies partly by introducing third 
parties to the legislative process. One concrete measure has been the 
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institutionalisation of public consultations with stakeholders. In 2001, the 
Commission published a White Paper on European Governance which 
highlighted the need for ‘wide participation throughout the policy chain – 
from conception to implementation’, emphasising the role of including third 
parties in both legislative form and subsequent enforcement (European 
Commission, 2001, p. 10). Between 2013 and 2018, the Commission has 
launched approximately 500 public consultations (European Commission, 
2018). The strategy is part of the Commission’s (2015b) ‘better regulation 
agenda’ that seeks to involve citizens and stakeholders to a higher degree to 
increase the quality of its policy output.  
The inclusion of third parties is conspicuously vague as to which actors it 
might include. Beyers, Eising, and Maloney (2008, p. 1106) also recognise that 
this is an issue that ‘plagues the field of interest group studies’, citing a broad 
variety of terms used to describe what these third parties are: ‘interest groups, 
political interest groups, interest associations, interest organisations, 
organised interests, pressure groups, specific interests, special interest groups, 
citizen groups, public interest groups, non-governmental organisations, social 
movement organisations, and civil society organisations’.  
To provide some clarity, they propose that three factors define an actor as 
an interest group: organisation, political interests, and informality. To put it 
differently, an interest group must be at least loosely organised, advocate for 
certain political solutions, and not seek political office or government status 
(Klüver, 2013, p. 6). Klüver (2013, p. 7) highlights that many types of interest 
groups exist, such as trade unions, employers’ associations, companies, and 
professional associations, and distinguishes between two major types of 
interest groups: associations and companies. Importantly, the interest group 
definition excludes political parties, government agencies, and broad social 
movements. While this taxonomy of interest groups provides much needed 
clarity to the definition, I believe it is too limiting in scope. Particularly, it is 
problematic that political parties and public authorities are excluded from the 
definition. 
In contrast, the Transparency Register (2019) categorises interest 
representatives in the following subsections: ‘I - Professional 
consultancies/law firms/self-employed consultants, II - In-house lobbyists 
and trade/business/professional associations, III - Non-governmental 
organisations, Think tanks, research and academic institutions, V - 
Organisations representing churches and religious communities, and VI - 
Organisations representing local, regional and municipal authorities, other 
public or mixed entities, etc.’ These categorisations matter. One of the 
organisations involved in lobbying decision-makers during the GDPR’s 
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legislative process, the European Privacy Association, initially classified itself 
as a think tank. The Corporate European Observatory made a complaint 
stating that it was, in fact, an industry lobbyist, funded by Google, Facebook, 
Microsoft, and Yahoo, to name a few. As a result, the organisation had to 
change its status in the Register (Fontanella-Khan, 2013). 
Table 4.1 A taxonomy of stakeholder terminology 
Lobbyist Interest 
group 
Interest 
representative 
Stakeholder 
Professional 
consultancies and 
in-house lobbyists 
Trade unions 
and 
professional 
associations 
Professional 
consultancies and 
in-house lobbyists 
Professional 
consultancies and 
in-house lobbyists 
Trade unions and 
professional 
associations 
Trade and 
business 
networks and 
associations 
Business networks 
and associations 
In-house lobbyists 
and business 
networks and 
associations 
Trade and business 
networks and 
associations 
Non-
governmental 
organisations 
Non-governmental 
organisations 
Non-governmental 
organisations 
Non-governmental 
organisations 
Think tanks, 
research and 
academic 
institutions 
Think tanks, 
research and 
academic 
institutions 
Think tanks, 
research and 
academic 
institutions 
  Public authorities Public authorities 
   Political parties 
   Citizens 
 
As was already clear in the examination of how the Data Protection Directive 
came to be, excluding public authorities from this study would not be feasible. 
Moreover, it is sometimes necessary to highlight the role of political parties 
outside their regular structures. However, I recognise the need to maintain 
conceptual clarity, and to avoid muddying the definitional waters further, I 
have decided to use the term stakeholder to cover all of these groups. The 
benefit of the term stakeholder is that it covers individuals, political parties, 
companies, associations, and governmental agencies. In contrast, I choose to 
define an interest group slightly more strictly than Klüver by excluding 
individual companies from the definition. While corporations may of course 
be seen as an entity composed of individual shareholders and therefore a 
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‘group’, I believe that it is lexically sounder to consider companies as unitary 
actors. I also choose to exclude professional consultancies from the interest 
group definition, although they might of course represent multiple clients. In 
contrast, I choose to exclude political parties, research institutions, and public 
authorities from the term ‘lobbyist’; the first would only be seen as a 
stakeholder while the two latter categories qualify as ‘interest representatives’. 
Table 4.1 outlines the taxonomy employed here. 
Lobbying has been defined as ‘the activity of interest groups trying to 
influence the government and to affect public decisions’ (Bitonti, 2017, pp. 19-
20). The definition is obviously very constrained by what one defines as an 
interest group. However, I argue that in the EU context, political parties and 
politicians may also engage in lobbying when they aim to influence actors 
outside their formal spheres of power. A national minister can, in my view, try 
to lobby a Commission official, as can a public authority official. 
There are, of course, national precedents to the Commission’s increased 
focus on stakeholder involvement. However, the EU is an unusual case in that 
its democratic legitimacy rests on weak foundations. The first part of this 
chapter will outline the origins of the EU’s democratic deficit as well as the 
strategies employed to reduce it. In particular, I will address how the question 
of legitimacy is paramount to understanding the EU’s focus on stakeholder 
involvement. Second, I will address what this means in practice in terms of 
how interest representatives are received in the EU, what tactics they employ, 
and what purpose they serve from an institutional perspective. Finally, I will 
address what this means for data protection policy.  
4.1 LEGITIMACY ARGUMENTS FOR INCLUDING 
INTEREST REPRESENTATIVES  
It is a matter of fact rather than a matter of debate that the EU suffers from a 
democratic deficit (see e.g. Majone, 2005; Michalis, 2007; Harlow, 2006, p. 
204; Follesdal & Hix, 2006; Weiler, Haltern, & Mayer, 1995; Dunin-Wasowicz, 
2009). The deficit can be traced back to the EU’s Realpolitik origins, where the 
efficiency of policies was often regarded as more important than the 
transparency of procedure. The primary vessel of European integration, the 
so-called community method, relied on the transfer of sovereign power to a 
supranational organ, the Commission. The EU’s expansion into further areas 
of policy has led to the increased erosion of national powers which challenges 
the old policy-making process (Dehousse, 2003). In a review of his earlier 
work, Majone (2014a) emphasises that where he thought indirect legitimacy 
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could legitimate limited competences on the supranational level before, the 
gradual expansion of supranational competences from the Maastricht Treaty 
onwards has made the legitimacy problem far more pronounced. 
The problem with legitimacy in the EU, as Scharpf (1999, p. 187) argues, is 
the triple deficit of ‘the lack of a pre-existing sense of collective identity, the 
lack of Europe-wide policy discourses, and the lack of a Europe-wide 
institutional infrastructure that could assure the political accountability of 
office holders to a European constituency’. Because the primary mode of input 
legitimacy is provided by elections and local demonstrations, the EU’s input 
legitimacy is systemically questioned by the fact that its executive arm, the 
Commission, is not elected (Schmidt, 2013, p. 9). Furthermore, although the 
European Parliament became directly elected in 1979 and its powers have 
gradually increased, the EU election is treated as a secondary election with 
very low average voter turnout, thus failing to reduce the democratic deficit 
(Majone, 2014b). Moreover, the elections rarely raise questions that are 
relevant in the EU but are seen as an additional platform for addressing 
national policy issues. 
Moravcsik (2002, p. 619) argues against this critique and stresses that 
because the EU-related issues are not likely to be salient in national public 
discourses, it is impossible to judge the EU’s legitimacy based on public 
participation and that the EU’s legitimacy rests primarily on the democratic 
accountability of national governments. Nicolaïdis (2013, p. 352), supportive 
of Moravcsik, argues that the EU should not be judged as a democracy but as 
a demoicracy, ‘a Union of peoples who govern together, but not as one’, which 
puts less stress on the need to have a European public sphere and more focus 
on the institutional and regulatory frameworks that constitute the EU (for a 
similar argument, see also Cheneval, Lavenex, & Schimmelfennig 2015). 
According to Nicolaïdis (2013, p. 258), the core norms behind the European 
project are transnational non-domination and mutual recognition, which 
require that power asymmetries in the EU are mitigated by a strong 
Commission and the European Court of Justice. The Commission’s legislative 
powers are also usually justified by reference to the quality of policy output 
and the efficiency of supranational decision-making (Moravcsik, 2002; see 
also Coen, 2007, p. 335 for an overview). This is what, according to Scharpf 
(1999), constitutes ‘output legitimacy’. Nevertheless, as Bellamy (2010) points 
out, legitimacy refers to the agency of the constituency and not whether a 
decision is perceived as the best possible, which in any case is hardly clear cut, 
a question of normative choices, and a matter of political debate. In a response 
to Moravcsik and Majone, Follesdal, and Hix (2006, p. 546) also maintain that 
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because positions are rarely articulated in EU policy, no debates exist that 
could increase the salience of the EU-related issues.  
Regardless of how one chooses to evaluate the EU’s democratic qualities 
(or lack thereof), the solutions that aim to alleviate the democratic deficit and 
existing power asymmetries are usually focused on improving the formal 
structures of participation and increasing transparency in the EU (Smismans, 
2014). For example, access to Commission and Council documents was first 
implemented by way of Council and Commission decisions (Diamandouros, 
2008), and in 1999, the right to access documents was formally incorporated 
in the Treaty of Amsterdam. In 2001, the Transparency Regulation 
(1049/2001/EC) that provided public access to documents held by European 
institutions was adopted. Inspired by the Nordic countries’ access to 
information laws, the EU decided to make the legislative process more 
transparent: drafts were to be published online and third parties could 
participate in the legislative process in a more open manner (European 
Commission, 2000, p. 70). The Lisbon Treaty of 2007 introduced additional 
insight into and access to the legislative process. Although better transparency 
does not serve as a full proxy to legitimacy (Dunin-Wasowicz, 2009, p. 495), it 
at least provides an information supply on which to base legitimacy 
assessments. 
Initiatives that relate to the representativeness of interest group 
participation have focused on mainly the Commission’s consultations with 
stakeholders. A notable example is the introduction of public consultations in 
2001. The public consultations can be traced back to ideals of participatory or 
deliberative democracy, where the legitimacy of policy is connected to the 
institutions and procedures that provide venues of deliberation (Greenwood, 
2011a; Kohler-Koch, 2010; see also Habermas, 1999). Although online 
consultations do not really provide a setting for political discourse, it can be 
argued that they have a deliberative character owing to the diversity and 
rationality of arguments. The inclusion of interest groups can contribute to the 
legitimacy of a policy process not only by representing the larger constituency 
but also by enhancing the deliberative quality of legislative processes through 
increasing the diversity of arguments presented (Kochler-Koch, 2010; 
Quittkat & Kohler-Koch, 2013, p. 181).  
While deliberative democracy may serve as an underlying ideological 
framework, the EU’s version of participatory democracy is closer to the 
pragmatist approach of input–output legitimacy (Cengiz, 2018). The input–
output legitimacy model sees the involvement of citizens in the policy-making 
process (input) and the presumed positive effects of those policies (output) as 
separate contributing factors to the legitimacy of the political system (Scharpf, 
Participatory democracy and legitimacy 
 
60 
 
1999, pp. 7-12). The input level of participation can be characterised as 
‘government by the people’, whereas the policy effects are associated with the 
principle of ‘government for the people’. Whereas input legitimacy relies on 
public deliberation, output legitimacy relies on the presumed positive effects 
of enacted policies (Schmidt, 2013, p. 5). Quittkat and Kohler-Koch (2013, p. 
48) argue that while including citizens in decision-making is a publicly stated 
goal, ‘it is hard to avoid the impression that efficient governance is given more 
and more priority’. In a way, public consultations can be seen as a middle 
ground between Bellamy’s (2010) idealism and Moravcsik’s (2002) cynicism: 
they generally lack input from citizens and are used instrumentally by the 
Commission to inform policy, but they constitute an attempt to ground 
policies in viewpoints from outside the corridors of Brussels. Nevertheless, 
Bellamy (2010, p. 11) is also worried about regulatory capture owing to the 
closeness of the EU legislators to businesses and unions, highlighting that 
‘selective consultation with “stakeholders” creates a parallel dilemma, with the 
agenda potentially being set by the very groups whose interests’ regulation 
should be seeking to harmonize with the public interest’.  
The main difference, then, between deliberative democracy and the EU’s 
input–output model of legitimacy is that the former presupposes that the 
purpose of deliberation is to reach consensus (see e.g. Cohen, 2011), whereas 
the latter is more focused on representation. The EU’s input–model of 
legitimacy encourages participation; however, the goal is not consensus but to 
amass a wide variety of ideas that can be used to formulate policy. As such, the 
deliberative function of public consultations is only secondary because no 
consensus between the participating parties must be reached to draft rules and 
regulation. Policy input usually requires a national level of political activism 
which, in turn, is difficult to conjure on the EU level. Because the input of 
public consultations cannot readily be equated with ‘government by the 
people’, Schmidt (2013) proposes instead that the inclusion of citizens and 
interest groups in policy-making on the EU level should be categorised as 
‘interest-based throughput’, where interest articulation is formally introduced 
to the policy-making process. This type of ‘governance with the people’ is 
thought to counterbalance the lack of input by the people (Schmidt, 2013, p. 
15, emphasis in original). The way interest group participation is 
institutionalised in the EU’s policy processes is radically different from input 
as a result of public campaigning or aggressive lobbying, which is why it is 
fruitful to evaluate this aspect of EU policy-making with reference to 
throughput legitimacy (Schmidt, 2013, p. 7).  
The EU’s throughput legitimacy has been called into question as well. The 
Commission has often been accused of drafting laws behind closed doors and 
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meeting with industry representatives without public insight (Schmidt, 2013, 
p. 15). It is in light of this critique that transparency requirements have been 
instated. One consequence is that public consultations are included in the 
legislative process when a policy area is regarded as having a major impact on 
society (European Commission, 2002). Another consequence is that the 
Commission has suggested that the EU Transparency Register (2019) should 
be mandatory, requiring interest representatives to register in order to gain 
access to EU institutions and officials (European Commission, 2016a). 
However, it must be stressed that the Transparency Register was voluntary 
and not as well maintained during the GDPR’s legislative process and that 
many of the participants to the public consultation were not registered at the 
time.  
During the public consultations, private and public stakeholders are 
invited or encouraged to participate by submitting documents which either 
outline what legislation should be implemented or suggest how the current 
legislation and its enforcement could be improved. As Coen (2007, p. 336) 
proposes, lobbying is a two-way street because the EU institutions also seek 
out and, in some cases, even fund private and public interests. Grossman 
(2004, pp. 648-649) sees the Commission’s approach to invite stakeholders to 
participate in the policy process as opportunistic as it will not ‘hesitate to 
“betray” … contacts and “partners” in order to further its own competencies 
and European integration in general’. Extending invitations to participate is, 
of course, about legitimating policy and finding different rationales for going 
ahead with a preferred policy position. Choosing to frame this type of 
behaviour as betrayal is rather surprising but underlines that the inclusion of 
interest groups is also self-serving.  
The incorporation of public consultations in the legislative process is an 
example of institutional change that also shapes policy actors’ behaviour. 
However, while some institutions change, others remain. Here I draw on 
Armstrong and Bulmer’s (1998, p. 52) definition of institutions as ‘formal 
institutions; informal institutions and conventions; the norms and symbols 
embedded in them; and policy instruments and procedures’.25 Although the 
policy procedures undoubtedly have changed as the EU has instated more 
transparency requirements in the Maastricht and Lisbon Agreements, 
informal institutions and conventions are likely to remain. According to 
Armstrong and Bulmer (ibid.), ‘institutions structure the access of political 
forces to the political process, creating a kind of bias’. In other words, even as 
                                                  
25 This definition is quite close to Scott’s (2014, p. 56) conception of institutions, according to which 
‘institutions comprise regulative, normative, and cultural cognitive elements’.  
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public consultations are included in the policy process, this does not 
necessarily mean that a wider range of stakeholders are consulted or, more 
importantly, listened to. Therefore, it is important to look at the ‘institutional 
logic of interest intermediation’ in the legislative processes (Woll, 2006, p. 
460).  
Coen’s (1997) conceptualisation of the EU institutions as an elite pluralist 
environment is a fruitful starting point for exploring the EU’s legislative 
process. According to Coen (2007, p. 335), EU policy-making has produced an 
‘élite trust-based relationship between insider interest groups and EU 
officials’. The EU’s interest intermediation is heavily biased in favour of large 
European firms and Eurogroups with significant economic power and the 
ability to represent Europe-wide interests, respectively (Eising, 2007, p. 399). 
In some cases, however, public interest groups or organisations may also be 
insiders if the directors of Directorate-Generals (DGs) are sympathetic to their 
cause (Richardson, 2000). For example, the European Commission has often 
been criticised for advancing the interests of large European corporations and 
favouring an economic approach instead of focusing on the rights and 
freedoms of citizens when drafting media policy (Harcourt, 2005, p. 199; 
Hirsch & Petersen, 2007, p. 31). The Commission is also known for actively 
seeking out and involving ICT industries (Michalowitz, 2007, p. 139). 
However, it is quite difficult to make definite, generalisable statements on the 
actual influence of different societal actors on the EU’s policy processes, and 
the only certain conclusion which can be drawn is that the ‘level of access 
expected and provided can vary markedly for private and public interests 
across sectors, directorates, and policy areas’ (Coen, 2007, p. 339). 
Some of the problems associated with the EU’s governance processes are 
unequal access to the legislative processes, the lack of meaningful 
transparency in a policy environment that is notoriously information-heavy, 
and the accountability of the Commission and Council, which are not directly 
elected but rather an extension of political power relations on the national 
level (Schmidt, 2013, p. 16). For Schmidt (2013, p. 18), one solution to improve 
throughput legitimacy is to find more ways to include citizens, for example, by 
having national governments introduce civil society into national formulation 
processes. However, she also notes that ‘stakeholder democracy, even if 
improved, is not necessarily public interest-oriented democracy’ and cannot 
substitute the lack of input entirely. Kohler-Koch (2010) highlights that while 
the participation of civil society organisations has been lauded as a political 
goal in the EU, it is questionable whether these organisations can contribute 
to better representation. To what extent, then, the views of interest groups 
should be taken into account remains an open question because the ideals of 
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deliberation are clearly not met. Nevertheless, the increased importance of 
including interest groups in the legislative process means that analysing who 
takes part in public consultation is potentially indicative of the output of the 
EU institutions as well. Therefore, it is imperative to examine the throughput 
and output of policy processes together.  
4.2 LOBBYING IN THE EU: WHO, HOW, AND TO WHAT 
EFFECT?  
While the above discussion demonstrates the rationale behind introducing 
public consultations and formally including interest groups in the legislative 
process, it is worth examining the dynamics of interest group participation 
more closely. Peters (1994, p. 11) claimed that agenda-setting was already 
easier during the European Community than in national contexts because 
there are more points of access, many influential policy advocates, and a wide 
range of policy options that have already been legitimated in the member 
states. While most studies on agenda-setting have focused on the role of EU 
institutions and particularly the Commission’s actions (Alexandrova & 
Carammia, 2018), the theoretical contribution of Peters did not preclude 
policy entrepreneurship to the EU institutions nor did that of Kingdon (2013, 
p. 122): ‘These entrepreneurs are not necessarily found in or out of 
government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or research 
organizations … their defining characteristic, much as in the case of a business 
entrepreneur, is their willingness to invest their resources – time, energy, 
reputation, and sometimes money – in the hope of future return’. While the 
role of the formal institutions needs to be recognised, the role of external 
policy entrepreneurs that attempt to shape the agenda need to be considered 
as well.  
During the drafting of the EU legislation, interest groups aim to influence 
all the three institutions involved: the Commission, the Parliament, and the 
Council. They all play significant roles in the process, and as such, they are 
suitable targets for lobbying. Consequently, the ‘three EU institutions need to 
be investigated simultaneously to understand the logic of interest politics at 
the European level’ (Bouwen, 2002, pp. 366-367). According to previous 
studies, interest groups tend to be more active during the design stages rather 
than when policies are being implemented (Eising, 2007, p. 397). A logical 
conclusion is that the most efforts to influence policies are made in the very 
first stages of policy formulation, that is, when the Commission is drafting its 
first policy documents on a specific topic (Eising, 2007, p. 398).  
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In particular, getting the right DG to advance a policy is of importance. 
However, the DGs can sometimes have highly overlapping tasks, and policy 
issues can sometimes fall between them (Peters, 1994, p. 14). This provides 
policy entrepreneurs with more options to set the agenda because getting a 
particular DG to advance a policy issue will be instrumental in developing 
favourable policy applications (Peters, 1994, p. 14).  
When it comes to specific policy proposals, the Commission is considered 
the most important target for lobbying (Eising, 2007, p. 387). Policy 
entrepreneurs who wish to advance a specific policy are best positioned to do 
so before the Commission has put forth a formal position. Although the 
Council and the Parliament can make amendments to the Commission’s 
proposals, the Commission sets the agenda and the changes made at a later 
stage will not be major (Boräng & Naurin, 2015, p. 501). Interest groups also 
recognise that it is difficult to obtain significant changes to a Commission 
proposal after it has been submitted to the Council and the Parliament (Eising, 
2007, p. 387).  
However, the Parliament’s regulatory influence has increased in recent 
years (Rittberger, 2007), which means that it has also become a suitable target 
for lobbying (Lehmann, 2009). While Eising (2007, p. 398) found that many 
associations regarded the Parliament as less important than the other EU 
institutions, large firms still chose to lobby MEPs to the same extent as the 
Commission. Whether this is a conscious strategic choice or lack of insight in 
the policy formulation process and/or connections to the institutions is 
difficult to assess.  
Although interest group participation in the legislative process is used 
partly to increase the EU’s throughput legitimacy, the Commission is heavily 
reliant on good relations with the industry when it drafts new policies and 
legislation (Coen, 2007, p. 335). According to Bouwen (2002), whether an 
interest group or firm will be heard depends on the ‘access goods’ it can 
provide. These access goods are not synonymous with economic power, but 
financial and technical means are of great importance. Bouwen (2002, p. 369) 
has identified expert knowledge, information about the European 
encompassing interest, and information about the domestic encompassing 
interest as the three main types of access goods. Expert knowledge refers to 
the expertise of the industry within specific policy areas. Without proper 
understanding of the workings of a policy domain, it is difficult to draft 
efficient legislation. Dominant industry actors will therefore be able to access 
the legislative process by their knowledge of the market mechanisms involved.  
European encompassing interest refers to an association’s or firm’s access 
to the interests and needs of a sector affected by EU policy. This particular 
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access good is naturally provided by Eurogroups such as the EBF or the 
European Association of European Internet Services Providers Associations 
(EuroISPA). Domestic encompassing interest refers to an association’s or 
firm’s access to the needs and interests of how a sector is affected by EU policy 
on the national level, typically represented by national associations or 
business networks. Because the EU regulation needs to be adhered to by a 
large variety of industry actors, it is of course desirable that as many 
corporations as possible are not hostile to the Commission’s new policies. In 
some cases, as in the ICT sector, the Commission is directly dependent on 
telecommunications companies to succeed in realising its digital strategies. It 
follows that any new legislation that affects the telecommunications industry 
would also have to contain some concessions to the most powerful 
telecommunications companies. In media policy, the European Commission 
has often been criticised for advancing the interests of large European 
corporations and favouring an economic approach instead of focusing on the 
rights and freedoms of citizens (Coen, 2007, p. 335; Hirsch & Petersen, 2007, 
p. 31; Harcourt, 2005, p. 199). 
Not surprisingly, Bouwen’s (2002, p. 383) research confirmed that large 
individual firms have the best access to the European Commission out of the 
three organisational forms, which supports the elite pluralism hypothesis 
provided by Coen (1997). However, the level of access is not always determined 
by some sort of transaction. Sometimes cause groups have prioritised access 
to Commission fora because of sympathetic political leanings of DG directors 
(Coen, 2007, p. 339). Nevertheless, in an analysis of 100 policy decisions in 
the EU, Bernhagen, Dür, and Marshall (2015) concluded that the 
informational resources lobbyists provide were important when facing a 
friendly DG, but that friendliness alone did not move the Commission’s policy 
position closer to the lobbyists’ positions.  
The access goods outlined above partly ignore the potential benefits of 
listening to public interest cause groups. Other scholars highlight the 
importance of citizen support, which can contribute to a higher degree of the 
output legitimacy of enacted policies. Drawing upon the rational choice theory 
(Downs, 1957; Coleman, 1990), Klüver (2013) departs from deliberative 
democracy and argues that lobbying can be seen as an exchange between 
interest groups and decision-makers, and the relevance of the exchange is 
determined by mutual benefit. Decision-makers expect that interest groups 
should have wide citizen support, economic power, and expertise in the policy 
issue (Klüver, 2013, p. 41, 48, 53). Interest groups, on the contrary, demand 
influence (Klüver, 2013, p. 24). A cause group with significant citizen support 
but limited financial resources may still be highly influential because it will be 
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able to sway potential voters’ opinions, which would matter especially in the 
European Parliament. Therefore, it is fair to assume that the same interest 
groups can be very differently received depending on the EU institution or 
individual politician they choose to interact with.  
However, the rational choice theory tends to ignore ideological factors. 
Supporting the mechanisms which uphold the big data paradigm cannot be 
reduced to a survivalist approach arguing that the primary purpose of 
politicians is to secure their seats in future elections. However, for 
corporations, this approach might hold true: if a business’ primary business 
model is to process, analyse, and sell databases of personal data, any 
legislation which might encumber this capacity will be seen as a threat. 
Similarly, cause groups with a communication rights approach would 
naturally engage in a discursive struggle to strengthen data protection 
legislation by lobbying decision-makers and raising public awareness through 
various publicity stunts and website launches.  
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of listening to cause groups, it is 
worth noting that business associations and firms are usually better staffed 
and funded, which facilitate their ability to influence policy outcomes at all 
levels of governance. Other resources include legitimacy and 
representativeness, knowledge, expertise, and information (Dür & Mateo, 
2012, pp. 971-972). This is exemplified by public consultations, which, aside 
from the occasional engaged citizen, mostly attract participation from the 
industry (Quittkat, 2011). The industry responses are also the most carefully 
drafted because they would possess the resources necessary to submit well-
written reports. Nevertheless, Bunea (2017) found that the stakeholders 
themselves did not perceive that the public consultations contributed to 
reinforcing an elite bias.  
However, the public consultations cannot be viewed in isolation of other 
lobbying activity. Dür and Mateo (2012, p. 978) found that business 
associations have ‘noticeably better access to executive institutions’ and also 
slightly better access to ‘both members of the European Parliament and … 
national parliaments than other associations’. Furthermore, they found that 
business associations have a clear advantage with respect to the number of 
direct contacts with officials, access to meetings, and ability to prepare 
position papers (Dür & Mateo, 2012, p. 979). Thus, the paradox of EU politics 
is that as transparency increases and participation in the legislative process is 
encouraged, business interests tend to dominate and eschew the balance 
further, thus maintaining the democratic deficit of the Union. This is the main 
challenge for achieving throughput legitimacy in the EU (Schmidt, 2013).  
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Coalitions and large associations are successful in lobbying because they 
can offer citizen support, economic power or information in greater numbers 
(Klüver, 2013, p. 45). If the issue at hand is highly complex and the 
institutional actor has limited knowledge of the policy domain, the 
‘information supply’ by lobbying coalitions has an especially positive effect on 
their influence (Klüver, 2013, p. 58). Interest groups have usually been well 
received by especially MEPs for this reason (Kohler‐Koch, 1997, p. 6). Where 
Klüver calls the exchange of information between interest groups and EU 
officials a ‘mutual benefit’, Coen (2007, p. 334) is more critical and calls it a 
‘significant resource dependency’. The two approaches differ in their 
fundamental approach to democratic theory: while Klüver clearly favours a 
more utilitarian, transactional, and output-oriented view on legislative 
processes, Coen is more concerned with (input) legitimacy. Greenwood (2017, 
p. 226), who has studied interest representation extensively, seems to land 
somewhere in the middle: while acknowledging that the EU relies on an 
informational exchange with elite tendencies, he argues that the plurality of 
interest groups and the fragmentation of their positions together with the 
design of procedural regimes ‘ensures sufficient checks and balances’.  
Because the data protection policy domain is inherently transnational, it 
follows that many U.S.-based companies aim to influence EU policy. This 
could mean that lobbying methods such as ad hoc issue coalitions are 
employed more frequently within this particular policy domain. 26  Many 
companies operate on the same premises regardless of the state of origin, and 
a video streaming service such as Dailymotion is likely to meet the same 
regulatory challenges as YouTube, despite the former being French and the 
                                                  
26 Although the primary focus of this study is not lobbying coalitions, the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF) serves as a basis for understanding lobbying activity (Sabatier, 1998). ACF conceptualises policy 
subsystems as groups of people and/or organisations that interact regularly over a longer period of time 
to influence policy within specific policy areas or domains (Sabatier, 1998, p. 113). The subsystems are 
further divided into advocacy coalitions, which are composed of actors from both public and private 
organisations who share normative beliefs and engage in a ‘non-trivial degree of co-ordinated activity 
over time’ (Sabatier, 1998, p. 103). The division of interest groups and firms into policy subsystems and 
coalitions is a way of understanding how public and private interests converge. Whether a co-ordinated 
coalition factually exists is, in this particular case, secondary because the primary focus lies in identifying 
the stakeholders that shape data protection policy rather than examining exactly how the interest groups 
are organised. As earlier research has shown, a large part of the EU interest groups is already formally 
organised as advocacy coalitions in European or national umbrella associations that represent various 
trade groups; as such, the need to form less-formalised ad hoc issue coalitions is less acute than that in 
the U.S. (Mahoney, 2007, p. 377). Interestingly, it is the wealthier organisations that choose to pool their 
resources rather than poorer ones (Mahoney, 2007, p. 378).  
Participatory democracy and legitimacy 
 
68 
 
latter a Google company. Thus, lobbying efforts might be coordinated among 
ICT companies to reach the same goals. There is empirical evidence of 
companies forming coalitions on specific issues, despite a lack of formal 
partnerships (Klüver, 2013, p. 54). Klüver (2013, p. 53) argues that the 
collective resources of lobbying coalitions need to be taken into account when 
measuring influence. 
Political scientists are often eager to point out that access does not 
necessarily equal influence (see e.g. Beyers, 2002; Dür, 2009; Eising, 2007). 
While better access to the EU institutions should not be seen as synonymous 
with influence, the ability to set the agenda on a policy issue is determined by 
access. Having privileged access to the EU institutions might not equate 
significant influence, but not participating in the policy process at all 
guarantees a complete absence of influence. For the above-mentioned reasons, 
it is important to look at which actors are represented in the public 
consultations on data protection policy. Several studies have confirmed that 
business networks and associations represent the majority of all EU interest 
groups (Greenwood, 2011b), and it would be highly surprising if this were not 
the case in the data protection policy domain.  
However, there are other ways to study the influence of interest groups. 
Apart from subjective studies where policy-makers and interest groups 
themselves estimate their success (cf. Whiteley & Wingard 1987; Heinz et al., 
1993; Egdell & Thomson, 1999; Pappi & Henning, 1999), a few studies have 
been conducted where objectively observed policy outcomes are compared 
with the positions of lobbyists (McKay, 2012; Bernhagen, 2012; Klüver, 2013; 
Dür, Marshall, & Bernhagen, 2019). Klüver’s (2013) and Dür, Marshall, and 
Bernhagen’s (2019) studies on the influence of interest groups in the EU have 
come up with the results that challenge the notion that the EU is generally 
supportive of corporate interests.  
Klüver (2013) has studied influence through quantitative text analysis 
based on the prevalence of certain keywords and phrases that are associated 
with different policy positions and their occurrence in subsequent legislative 
drafts by the European Commission. Klüver (2013, p. 207) found that citizen 
support and economic power are equally important factors to consider when 
measuring the influence of lobbyists. Corporations were certainly better 
represented than citizens and consumers, but this did not translate into 
influence (Klüver, 2013, p. 214).  
Dür, Marshall, and Bernhagen (2019) come to a slightly different 
conclusion using a spatial approach to measuring interest group success. In 
their approach, actors’ policy positions are assigned on a scale of 0–100, where 
success is determined by the distance between an actor’s ideal policy point and 
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the final outcome (Dür, Marshall, & Bernhagen, 2019, p. 48). Low values on 
the scale represent less regulation and high values represent more regulation. 
The policy positions were quantified by EU officials (Dür, Marshall, & 
Bernhagen, 2019, p. 26). In their analysis of 70 regulatory proposals, 
containing the policy positions of 853 interest groups, the authors concluded 
that citizen groups were more successful than business groups (Dür, Marshall, 
& Bernhagen, 2019, p. 77). They explain this by pointing out that businesses 
tend to be supportive of the status quo, whereas citizen groups are more 
inclined to push for more regulation. Nevertheless, Dür, Marshall, and 
Bernhagen (2019, p. 77) acknowledge that businesses tend to be successful 
when the policy issue is less conflictual, and they are met with limited 
opposition from other interest groups. This can be connected to the research 
on lobbying success that suggests that businesses are more successful in 
periods of ‘quiet politics’ when political salience is low (Culpepper, 2010; 
Rasmussen, 2015). Furthermore, they point out that industry lobbyists tend to 
be accomplished at loophole lobbying, succeeding to add important exceptions 
to otherwise disadvantageous rules (Dür, Marshall, & Bernhagen, 2019, pp. 
84-85, 90, 95, 104). This is also consistent with studies suggesting that 
lobbyists are more successful when issues are complex (Rasmussen, 2015), 
and Boräng and Naurin’s (2015) study of frame congruence that concluded 
that civil society frames were more often similar to the frames employed by 
EU officials. 
A more detailed review of estimating influence is provided in chapter 5, but 
it is interesting to note at this stage that different methodological approaches 
have resulted in quite varying results. The dominant idea that business groups 
are more influential is convincingly challenged by the two quantitative 
approaches presented here. It is true that when the EU is intending to 
introduce new legislation in a policy domain, many businesses stand to lose. 
As such, the balance is already tilted in favour of more regulation. However, 
many policy proposals contain both favourable and detrimental regulatory 
obligations and rights for many different actors. Therefore, qualitatively 
assessing which actors promote what policy applications is instrumental in 
examining relative influence within a policy domain, regardless of whether the 
introduction of a new regulation may be considered a policy failure for an 
interest group. 
In the introduction to this chapter, I have highlighted that policy 
entrepreneurs would be inclined to attempt to frame policy issues in a certain 
way to set the agenda early on. While one aspect of this is getting a policy in 
front of the right DG, another is establishing the appropriate frame for a policy 
issue. Therefore, it is important to note that interest groups use different 
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arguments in different venues, so-called policy frames (Rein & Schön, 1994; 
Harcourt, 1998; Baumgartner & Mahoney, 2008; Klüver, Mahoney, & Opper, 
2015, p. 483; Boräng & Naurin, 2015; Eising, Rasch, & Rozbicka, 2015; De 
Bruycker, 2017; Voltolini & Eising, 2017). In the EU, political scientists have 
tried to empirically analyse to what extent the frames employed by interest 
groups have had an influence on the Commission’s position by comparing 
framing congruence over time (Boräng & Naurin, 2015; Klüver & Mahoney, 
2015), framing strategies by interest groups (Klüver, Mahoney, & Opper, 2015, 
p. 483), and the Commission’s use of different frames (Harcourt, 1998; Morth, 
2000; Thomas & Turnbull, 2017).  
While many policy studies use the definitions of framing employed in social 
movement studies (cf. Benford & Snow, 2000) and communication studies 
(Entman, 1993), van Hulst and Yanow (2016) convincingly argue that Rein 
and Schön’s conceptual framework is best adapted to policy processes. As 
such, the idea of framing is closely related to that of agenda-setting and policy 
entrepreneurs. Rein and Schön (1994, p. 32) differentiate between rhetoric 
frames and action frames, where the former are used to influence policy debate 
and the latter shape actual policy practice. Therefore, position papers and 
lobbyists’ proposals are usually focused on shaping action frames. One of Rein 
and Schön’s (1994) arguments is that policy issues are more easily defined 
early on in the policy process and more difficult to reframe later on. van Hulst 
and Yanow (2016) develop Rein and Schön’s original processes of framing, 
naming, selecting, and storytelling and add two additional processes, sense-
making and categorising. According to van Hulst and Yanow (2016, pp. 97-
99), actors first try to make sense of the issue at hand, after which they will 
proceed to select which aspects of the issue to focus on and then name and 
categorise it. Last, framers attempt to establish a narrative around the issue: 
‘[i]n telling about policy action and its human and non-human actors, policy 
framing stories implicitly or explicitly attribute blame or praise and suggest 
causes of harm or success’ (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, p. 101). While the 
present study is more focused on influence as demonstrated by concrete policy 
applications and not a detailed depiction of framing strategies, action frame 
congruence between lobby proposals and the EU policy output is also 
indicative of influence. 
Using different frames in different settings makes sense as the composition 
and roles of the three EU institutions are radically different. Within the 
institutions, there are also significant differences that need to be taken into 
account. Strategies that refer to the public interest may be less effective on the 
Commission officials than the ones that focus on technical and economic 
arguments for the simple reason that they are not democratically elected (see 
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Coen, 2007, p. 340). Nevertheless, interest groups are much more likely to use 
public interest frames when a proposal is drafted by the DG Environment, DG 
Justice, or DG Health and Consumer Protection (Klüver, Mahoney, & Opper, 
2015, p. 491). However, it may be noted that Klüver, Mahoney, and Opper 
(2015) had labelled 40% of all studied policy frames as either technical or legal. 
An alternative interpretation of the results could instead highlight that 
ideological choices are often enshrouded in technical or legal jargon, which 
quantitative text analysis tools have difficulties identifying.  
In the data protection policy domain, three DGs have at different times 
spearheaded the development of new policy: DG INFSO (now DG 
Communications Networks, Content, and Technology) drafted the first Data 
Protection Directive, the Directorate-General for Internal Market (now DG 
Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship, and SMEs) provided the review 
of the Directive, and DG Justice and Consumers drafted the GDPR. The 
different foci of the DGs imply that interest group framing strategies of data 
protection policy have probably differed depending on which DG was in 
charge. 
The Parliament, on the contrary, is quite fragmented, with 751 MEPs in 
eight political groups that are sometimes unsuccessful in negotiating common 
strategies. Although the MEPs have assistants, the Parliament possesses less 
technical expertise than the Commission. Because all the proposed EU 
legislation cannot possibly be the responsibility of all MEPs, the Parliament is 
divided into 20 parliamentary committees with different foci. In the case of 
the GDPR, the Parliament’s amendments were prepared by the Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE), while the Committee on 
Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), the Committee on Industry, Research 
and Energy (ITRE), the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection (IMCO), and the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) provided 
opinions (European Parliament, 2013).  
Therefore, interest representatives would likely focus on using 
employment, consumer protection, industry, as well as civil liberties frames 
while addressing MEPs in the corresponding committees. Earlier research has 
shown that the chairs of the committees have been frequent targets of interest 
groups (Klüver, Braun, & Beyers, 2015, p. 454). Drawing on Bouwen’s (2002) 
model of access goods, Eising (2007, p. 392) concluded that the Parliament 
demanded information on both the European and national encompassing 
interests yet were less interested in market knowledge provided by large firms. 
In the particular case of data protection, the exception to this rule might be the 
ITRE committee, whose purpose is to some extent oversee the industry’s 
interests, which are likely to differ in the EU member states. Although MEPs 
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are accountable to their electorate, many also depend on the support of trade 
unions and business organisations.  
From an EU lobbying perspective, the Council is a sub-optimal target: the 
ministers seldom convene in Brussels, which means it is more effective to 
lobby local governments via national routes (Eising, 2007, p. 388; Coen, 2007, 
p. 341). As a result, Council lobbying is not as well-researched as lobbying in 
the Commission and the Parliament (Hayes-Renshaw, 2009). Furthermore, 
the Council is mostly concerned with the domestic consequences of policies to 
begin with (Bouwen, 2004), which would require lobbyists to employ national 
frames when addressing the ministers in the Council. Because the Council is 
especially susceptible to lobbying from corporations with a strong presence in 
the member states (Klüver, 2013, p. 39), one would assume that American 
corporations are at a disadvantage. However, owing to favourable taxation 
policy, many ICT companies have decided to base themselves in Ireland. 
Therefore, it is possible that American companies can influence the Irish 
government and Irish MEPs.  
4.3 DATA PROTECTION: WITH THE ELITES, FOR THE 
PEOPLE? 
The above discussion has outlined three important trends in EU policy-
making. First, the EU institutions are becoming more accessible and 
transparent, but the so-called elites still have privileged access to the EU 
institutions. Second, this elite pluralism can largely be attributed to the EU 
institutions’ origins and their close relationships with the industry. After all, a 
functioning single market is only partly dependent on harmonised legislation, 
and the cooperation of dominant market actors is equally important. Third, 
EU legislators navigate an intrinsically complex regulatory environment with 
countless actors and interests, and listening to stakeholders is a prerequisite 
for being able to draft efficient policies and legislation. When legislators lack 
expert knowledge in policy areas, this relationship might evolve into one of 
dependency instead of mutual benefit. These trends contribute to creating an 
understanding of why lobbying is such an integral part of the EU. However, 
such a determinist approach overemphasises structure over ideology and 
disregards the ideological choices of political actors, windows of opportunity, 
and path dependencies of policy domains.  
Data protection regulation in Europe has activist origins, and the Data 
Protection Directive was initiated in a manner which is slightly alien to the 
EU’s decision-making process. The role of DPAs cannot be understated, and 
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their participation in the GDPR’s legislative process is unquestionable. 
However, owing to their special relationship to the national ministries of 
justice as well as their institutionalised role in EU data protection governance, 
their input cannot be compared with that of individual lobbyists. It is, 
nevertheless, precisely this institutional advantage and prioritised access to 
law-makers that encouraged the Commission to be more inclusive in the 
GDPR’s legislative process. After all, the private sector hardly participated in 
the early drafting of the Data Protection Directive. While that may to some 
commentators seem as an inherently positive feature of the legislative process, 
it is unquestionable that the companies that were directly affected by a new 
law had very little to say about its contents. In that respect, the Data Protection 
Directive’s legislative process was very far from the ideals of deliberative 
democracy – closer, in fact, to enlightened absolutism: ‘everything for the 
people, nothing by the people’. 27  The heart of the legitimacy problem is 
perhaps not solved by including interest groups, but excluding the private 
sector from the legislative process is equally problematic.  
The legitimacy dilemma can be summarised as follows: because there is no 
hope of creating a truly European public sphere, we are left with the solution 
to institutionalise the involvement of interest groups, but as policy elites 
dominate these processes, they cannot serve as a proxy for deliberated societal 
consensus. Within the data protection policy domain, there is an added level 
of complexity. Data transfers are not limited by geographical borders, and 
information society services can be efficiently provided from one jurisdiction 
and consumed in another. If one chooses to ignore this aspect of the economies 
of personal data, the rights of EU citizens are heavily weakened. On the 
contrary, if one engages in extra-territorial law-making, 28  one creates 
responsibilities for actors that never had a say in the legislative process by way 
of political representation. To what extent is the legislature obliged to include 
non-nationals of member states in the legislative process? Furthermore, many 
of the world’s largest IT companies are based in the U.S. but have European 
subsidiaries. What level of influence can be considered appropriate in those 
particular cases, knowing that these companies will mainly seek to transfer 
data outside of the EU’s jurisdiction?  
A legitimate policy process would have to take all of the following factors 
into account: the global nature of data protection, the unequal division of 
power, the EU law-makers’ lack of policy expertise, the growing importance of 
                                                  
27 Allegedly, this was the motto of Austrian emperor Joseph II who lived in the 18th century. 
28 Legal scholar Anu Bradford (2012) has coined this type of unilateral regulatory globalisation as the 
‘Brussels Effect’.  
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national DPAs, the ever-increasing lobbying activity in Brussels, and peoples’ 
expectations of privacy. Owing to the data protection domain’s cross-sectoral 
nature, even identifying all relevant sectors and interests is a challenge, much 
less including them in the decision-making process. The Data Protection 
Directive’s legislative process revealed that at least the advertising industries, 
credit and financial actors, DPAs, and arms of the national governments are 
worth examining more closely. While the private sector might argue that they 
are fighting an uphill battle owing to the path dependence of data protection 
regulation in Europe and the undeniable influence of national regulators, the 
amount of resources spent on lobbying tells a different tale. If lobbying was a 
complete waste of time and money, specialised data protection lobbyists would 
not exist. Given the multitude of factors to consider when analysing the 
GDPR’s legislative process, correctly identifying influence is of principal 
importance. The approach taken in this study is presented in the following 
chapter.
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5 EVALUATING LEGITIMACY AND 
INFLUENCE  
The previous chapters have outlined some paradigmatic shifts connected to 
the evolution of the surveillance society, the right to privacy, and, finally, the 
EU’s legislative process. The challenge at hand is to make sense of these 
ideological, economic, political, technical, and legal developments without 
ascribing too much importance to one or the other. Policy processes are 
complex, and data protection policy is no exception. This chapter will outline 
the methodological approach taken to assess the degree of influence that 
certain positions have had on the GDPR’s legislative process. The focus is on 
concrete policy applications and frames rather than individual actors. This is 
because the primary sources are documents and the paper trail leading up to 
the finalised regulation. Thus, it is impossible to say with absolute certainty 
which individual actors were influential, but it is possible to connect certain 
successful policy positions to a group of actors.  
To reiterate, the following are overarching research questions of this study:  
1. What policy alternatives were put forth by the EU institutions in the 
course of the GDPR’s legislative process, and how did they correspond 
to the ideas, issues, and frames promoted by interest representatives?  
2. What does the influence of organised interests and stakeholders in 
GDPR decision-making reveal about the democratic legitimacy of the 
process? 
The following operational research questions are a way to trace the steps that 
transformed the GDPR into what it is today:  
 Whose views have been heard during the legislative process? 
 Which actors supported the creation of a new GDPR? Why did these 
actors support this mode of regulatory intervention? 
 What are the main dividing lines between the suggestions made by 
different interest representatives in the two Commission consultations 
(2009 and 2011)? 
 How are the interests of stakeholders reflected in the following: (1) the 
European Commission’s Communication on data protection (2010); 
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(2) the Commission’s Proposal for a General Data Protection 
Regulation (2012); (3) the European Parliament’s amendments to the 
Proposal (2014); (4) the EU Council’s adopted version (2015); and (5) 
the finalised Regulation (2016)? 
To answer these questions, a variety of sources and tools are used. I will begin 
by outlining the sources consulted in the course of my research. The nature of 
the sources has significantly guided the research process, and the 
methodological choices made are reflective of an iterative process. The tools 
employed are primarily adapted for this particular study, which is why I 
choose to describe my sources prior to diving into the methodology (see Table 
5.1). The methods used to explore influence are inspired by some of the EU 
policy studies that were presented in the previous chapter, but as I will 
demonstrate below, there are some key differences to the approach taken here. 
5.1 SOURCES: POSITION PAPERS, SECONDARY 
TESTIMONIES AND POLICY OUTPUT 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Commission launched three public 
consultations with the aim of mapping industry and civil society interests 
pertaining to data protection issues. In total, 523 position papers and 
comments have been submitted to the Commission and at least 73 have been 
distributed among MEPs (this number is likely to be higher). The three rounds 
of consultations served slightly different aims. The first consultation was a 
review of the initial Data Protection Directive that entered into force in 1998, 
although some of the provisions were transposed into national legislation 
much later. The review gathered interests mostly from business associations 
and law firms, but many of the position papers were extensive and quite 
detailed. While these position papers are indicative of the dedication of certain 
lobbyists and persistency of some grievances, a more detailed analysis of their 
contents has not been included in this study. The review clearly flagged the 
Data Protection Directive for an update, but as no steps were taken to revise 
the Directive, the impact of these replies on the GDPR’s legislative process is 
negligible, at least compared with the two subsequent consultations.  
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Table 5.1 Primary and secondary sources used in the study 
Primary sources Secondary sources 
2002 Consultation of EU countries (N = 14) and 
DPAs (N = 14) on the implementing measures  
 
2002 Summary of DPA and member state 
questionnaire answers  
 
2002 Position papers on implementation by 
stakeholders (N = 68) 
 
2002 Summary of online consultations with 
citizens and controllers 
 
2009 Consultation replies (N = 167)  
2010 Commission summary of replies to 
consultation 
 
2010 Communication  
2011 Consultation replies (N = 288) 2011 Eurobarometer on data 
protection  
2012 Commission proposal including market 
impact assessment and summary of consultations 
(European Commission 2012a; 2012b; 2012c) 
2013 Fontanella-Khan’s 
(2013) article in the Financial 
Times 
2014 Position papers submitted to MEPs (N = 73)  
2014 Parliament 1st reading of the GDPR 2014 Lobbyplag.eu influence 
analysis 
2015 Council proposal 2015 Eurobarometer on data 
protection II 
2015 EDPS commentary 2015 Lobbyplag.eu Council 
analysis 
2016 Final GDPR 2016 Albrecht’s (2016) 
account of the process 
 2018–2019 Research by Rossi 
(2018), Laurer and Seidl 
(forthcoming), Kalyanpur 
and Newman (2019) 
 
The two more decisive consultations were launched by DG Justice, which had 
been designated the lead on the data protection reform. The Consultation on 
the legal framework for the fundamental right to protection of personal data, 
as it was called, was launched in 2009 to determine whether the legislative 
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framework provided by the Directive was sufficient, and if not, what 
amendments citizens, NGOs, governments, and corporations requested. Some 
of the respondents replied to the consultation on request of the Commission, 
whereas others submitted papers on their own initiative. 
The Commission asked the respondents to address the following questions: 
 Please give us your views on the new challenges for personal 
data protection, in particular in the light of new technologies 
and globalisation. 
 In your views, does the current legal framework meet these 
challenges? 
 What future action would be needed to address the identified 
challenges? 
The questions reveal that the Commission was aware of the need to update the 
EU’s data protection framework and that it wished to receive general opinions 
on the subject which could legitimate a revision of the Directive from 1995. 
Although the public consultation was only a first step towards the GDPR, it 
laid the legitimate foundation on which the Commission would continue to 
draft both its 2010 Communication on a comprehensive approach on 
personal data protection in the European Union (European Commission, 
2010a) and the proposal for a new General Data Protection Regulation 
(European Commission, 2012a). The Commission provided a 14-page 
summary of the replies on November 4, 2010, nearly a year after the 
consultation had ended (European Commission, 2010b). The summary does 
not provide a detailed account of who expressed what views; it merely lists the 
issues addressed. The summary will be used to support the results of this 
study.  
The second public consultation, the Consultation on the Commission’s 
comprehensive approach to personal data protection in the European Union, 
was launched alongside the publication of the 2010 Communication. As the 
Communication was partly inspired by the previous consultation, DG Justice 
wanted to obtain views on the Commission’s ideas … on how to address the 
new challenges for personal data protection’ (European Commission, 2011a). 
Whereas the first public consultation had been an open call asking for general 
feedback and comments, the Commission expected comments on its concrete 
suggestions in the second consultation. Many of these suggestions would 
eventually end up in the Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation 
(European Commission, 2012a). The public consultation was open between 4 
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November, 2010 and 15 January, 2011, and during this time, the Commission 
received 288 position papers. The position papers vary in length and 
complexity, some simply expressing a few main points in one to two pages and 
others providing a comprehensive overview of the issues at hand spanning 
over fifty pages. 
The purpose of the second consultation was to strengthen the 
Commission’s proposal and preferably gain the affected industries’ and civil 
society’s support for the Regulation – in other words, the Commission aimed 
for increased throughput legitimacy by including the interested parties in this 
step of the process. Concurrently, the Commission commissioned an EU-wide 
survey on citizen’s views on privacy and personal data (European Commission, 
2011b). Thus, the consultation and the survey would serve as the key initiatives 
that would aim to legitimise the regulatory output of the Commission. 
DG Justice finally drafted its proposals for a GDPR and a Directive on the 
processing of data related to law enforcement on January 25, 2012. In the 
previous rounds, it was not entirely clear that there would be a separate 
regulatory instrument for law enforcement. However, owing to the EU’s 
limited competences in this regard, it is not entirely surprising that law 
enforcement was ultimately excluded from the GDPR. The two proposals were 
accompanied with a comprehensive market impact assessment report.  
The Commission’s proposal served as the starting point for the Parliament 
and the Council such that both based their revised proposals on this text. 
However, it would take up to three years until actual negotiations between the 
EU institutions took place. In the European Parliament, the proposal fell 
under the responsibility of the committee of Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs (LIBE), with Jan-Philipp Albrecht (Greens/EFA) as lead rapporteur 
and Axel Voss (EPP), Marju Lauristin (S&D), Sophie in't Veld (ALDE), 
Timothy Kirkhope (ECR), Cornelia Ernst (GUE/NGL), Kristina Winberg 
(EFDD), Marine Le Pen (ENF) as shadow rapporteurs. Four additional 
committees, Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), Legal Affairs (JURI), 
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPLO) and Internal Market 
and Consumer Protection (IMCO), submitted their own opinions suggesting 
amendments, which were taken into account in the final proposal.  
The European Parliament adopted its opinion on the first reading in March 
2014. During this process, over 5,300 amendments were suggested (Parltrack, 
2016). Many of these amendments were, in one way or another, provided by 
lobbyists. Lobbyplag (2013), a project launched by the NGO OpenDataCity and 
Max Schrems, drew attention for revealing that certain MEPs had been copy-
pasting amendments from position papers. They exposed that the position 
papers by interest groups influenced amendments to the GDPR heavily – for 
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better and for worse. The project website provides visitors with access to 
position papers and compares them with the amendments to the GDPR made 
by the MEPs. These position papers are used to a lesser extent in this study 
because they provide a less complete picture of interests than the consultation 
position papers. Nevertheless, Lobbyplag’s analysis will be conjoined with the 
qualitative document analysis.  
The Council worked on the Commission’s proposal for over three years and 
significantly amended the Commission’s proposed legislation. The final draft, 
signed at Brussels on 15 June, 2015 contained amendments to nearly every 
article in the Regulation. It is very clear that the EU’s legislative process is not 
equally transparent during the different stages. Whereas notes from meetings 
that have addressed the development of the Council’s version are available, 
apart from a few exceptions, position papers that were directed at the 
ministers have not been leaked to the public. However, Lobbyplag (2016) did 
manage to obtain documents that contained the individual positions of the 
different member states, spanning a total of 11,800 pages. While these 
documents are of interest, the primary focus of this study is the influence of 
interest representatives on the policy output of the EU institutions. As such, a 
more granular analysis of both individual MEPs’ contributions and the 
different member states falls outside the scope of this study. Thus, the analysis 
is limited (although not strictly) to the version the Council agreed upon in June 
2015 and how it compares to the earlier position papers. 
5.2 ASSESSING INFLUENCE 
One of the most difficult questions in policy research is ascribing influence 
with certainty (Dür, 2008). As noted in the previous chapter, access has often 
been used as a short-hand for influence – not in the sense that the relationship 
would be perfectly correlated but as a prerequisite for and an indicator of 
influence.  
At this point, it is worth underlining that this study does not go into the 
details of the sources of power touched upon in the previous chapter – I will 
not provide a detailed analysis of the ‘access goods’ (Bouwen, 2002) interest 
representatives offer but look for evidence of influence in the policy output. 
Therefore, it is important to define what counts as influence. In this study, 
influence is defined as the ability to shift policy positions towards the goals 
that are aligned with one’s own policy objectives. This might entail softening 
or strengthening a provision in a legislative draft, introducing new 
terminology or even convincing a political actor to shift frames entirely.  
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In formalised policy processes, such as the EU’s legislative process, the 
effects of influence are, at least in theory, easily available. The result is a 
formalised policy, a law with discernible consequences. Moreover, owing to 
increased demands of transparency and critique of the EU’s democratic 
deficit, the EU has provided improved insight into policy processes and the 
participation of stakeholders. It is possible to draw a parallel with the practice 
of studying algorithms. By analysing the input and output of an algorithm, it 
is possible to make some assumptions of the black box’s contents (Bucher, 
2016). Similarly, whereas a combination of personal factors, power 
relationships, path dependencies, and happenstance contributes to the final 
policy, I argue that it is possible to infer influence based on how the input – 
policy positions – and output – the different legislative proposals – 
communicate.  
Within policy studies, this is often termed process tracing, where detailed 
knowledge of the process is used to find out the causes behind specific 
outcomes (Collier, 2011; Deters, 2013). In particular, process tracing is well 
equipped for studying complex phenomena such as path dependence (Bennett 
& Elmer, 2006). Therefore, process tracing can be used to determine the level 
of influence different interest groups have had on policy outcome or help 
explain how framing processes work (Voltolini & Eising, 2017). Bennett and 
Checkel (2014, 7) define process tracing as ‘the analysis of evidence on 
processes, sequences and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes 
of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that 
might causally explain the case’. In essence, process tracing is not limited to 
specific sources or even methodological tools, but it is generally ‘backward-
looking’ (Scharpf, 1997). However, most research that uses process tracing 
tends to rely on interviews (Dür 2008, p. 563). 
Dür (2009, pp. 1223-1224) notes that one problem with these studies is 
that assessing the degree of influence is difficult. Analysing evidence from a 
broad range of background documents and interviews can lead to difficulties 
in determining the weight of equivalent empirical sources. Nonetheless, 
although it would be valuable to determine influence more exactly, influence 
is hardly a matter which is entirely quantifiable in a reliable way. Another 
problem that might arise is that interest representatives might over-estimate 
their influence, while EU officials might also wish to portray legislative 
processes in a particular way (Dür 2008, p. 564). 
Another way of determining influence is by assessing the distance between 
the preferences of actors and comparing it to the policy outcome (Mahoney, 
2007), sometimes termed the preference attainment model. By determining 
the preferred policy position by different actors and comparing that position 
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to the enacted policy, it should be possible to discern whether an actor tends 
to be influential in policy processes. Dür (2009, p. 1224) rightly acknowledges 
that this approach also has its drawbacks because ‘different causal effects may 
explain closeness’. Proximity is not always the same thing as causality. 
In an effort to reap the benefits from both approaches, Klüver (2013) draws 
on the preference attainment model but uses computerised quantitative 
document analysis to gain insights into the process. Klüver (2013, p. 63) claims 
that ‘comparing the policy preferences of interest groups with the 
Commission’s preliminary draft proposal, the Commission’s final proposal, 
and the final legislative act adopted by the Council and the European 
Parliament allows one to objectively assess who was successful in shifting the 
policy output over the course of the legislative process towards their ideal 
points’. With these types of computerised analysis, it is also possible to 
calculate the degree of proximity by comparing the distribution of word 
frequencies. 
Klüver’s methodological approach is more reliant on formal policy input 
than process tracing; nevertheless, compared with the preference attainment 
model, she pays further attention to what preceded the outcome. While the 
computerised quantitative content analysis is an efficient way of figuring out 
whether policy positions have shifted over time, the method’s main drawback 
is that it must rely on word occurrences and policy documents that are 
comparable. For example, reliably comparing position papers with the articles 
of final directives and regulations is not possible, but the analysis must be 
limited to documents of the same kind. Moreover, as with the preference 
attainment model, analysis does not discriminate between causation and 
correlation.  
The present study is inspired by these three approaches but relies mostly 
on qualitative document analysis. The critique towards process tracing is not 
devastating in this instance because no attempt is made to generalise the 
findings to all the policy process in the EU. Nonetheless, it will be important 
to be able to generalise the findings in the selected documents to achieve 
internal validity. Noting that it would not be feasible to qualitatively analyse 
all 596 position papers, I have chosen to analyse 20 position papers from the 
2009 public consultation and 44 position papers from the 2011 public 
consultation. Although it would be possible to quantitatively assess all 
submitted position papers to draw some general insights from the legislative 
process, I have instead decided to limit my analysis to specific actors from a 
wide range of sectors to gain deeper knowledge of the actual issues at hand.  
My reasons are the following: first, the participation of stakeholders in 
public consultations is strongly indicative of other lobbying activities, but it is 
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(probably) not a conclusive list of the actors who have contacted the EU 
institutions to influence the outcome of the Regulation. Thus, a quantitative 
analysis of all the position papers would not be any more valid. Second, the 
mere presence of an opinion in several position papers does not guarantee an 
equivalent amount of influence. As earlier studies have shown, other factors 
have to be considered, such as the possession of expert knowledge or 
connections to political constituencies (Klüver, 2013; Bouwen, 2002; Kohler-
Koch, 1997; Dür & Mateo, 2012). The most important question is whether a 
particular stakeholder’s views can be seen as representative of the goals of a 
sector. Thus, the selection of position papers from the pool of replies to the 
consultations is largely based on how reasonable it is to generalise the views 
in a position papers and attribute them to a sector as a whole. The 
Commission provides a crude categorisation of the stakeholders who 
submitted papers to the consultation, dividing the position papers into 
individuals, organisations, non-listed organisations, and public authorities. 
However, whether an organisation is listed bears little relevance to the 
purpose of this study, and to select a representative sample from the submitted 
replies to the consultation, it is thus necessary to re-categorise the 
respondents.  
The method applied here can be summarised as follows. The first step of 
the analysis includes a categorisation of all the position papers to the 2009 and 
2011 consultations to find appropriate position papers for the qualitative 
analysis. I will categorise the position papers according to (1) type of actor,29 
(2) country of origin,30 and (3) sector.31 In addition to these categories, I will 
collect data on the size of the organisation as well as annual budget or revenue. 
Because the actors differ in organisational structure, it is not feasible to 
compare them according to size or revenue, the exception being publicly listed 
companies which are required to disclose information on their operations. 
However, the figures do shed light on the economic powers involved, which 
according to Klüver’s (2013) study was a factor which affected the policy 
                                                  
29 1 = Citizen, 2 = NGO and other non-profits, 3 = corporation, 4 = public authority, 5 = regional or 
national business network, 6 = international business network, 7 = research institution or association, 8 
= political party, 9 = trade union, and 10 = professional association. 
30 This includes the categories ‘global’ and ‘Europe’ for associations that are not based in one nation 
state. Multinational corporations have been coded according to their headquarters and not the local 
subsidiary, regardless of what part of the company participated in the consultation. However, stock 
ownership has not been regarded. 
31 Twenty different sectors, of which some are more generally defined as some business associations and 
corporations span several industries. Sectors with fewer than two representatives in either consultation 
were added to the ‘other’ category.  
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output of the EU institutions. The most important factors taken into 
consideration while choosing the qualitative sample, in addition to the three 
categories provided above, were the primary business model, size, level of 
multinationality, and international recognition. Bouwen’s (2002) 
categorisation of access goods helped inform the choices. For example, quite 
often it is more useful to analyse a position paper submitted by an umbrella 
association instead of a single company. However, an approach solely focused 
on size and scope would ignore smaller actors with considerable clout. The full 
list of analysed position papers can be found in Appendix 1.  
The second step of the research comprises the qualitative assessment of the 
position papers in the 2009 consultation. To complement the qualitative 
analysis, I use Boolean search strings to comb through the entire material for 
keywords that appeared extensively in the papers chosen for the qualitative 
analysis. This analysis is secondary and not as advanced as the approach taken 
by Klüver, but it allows me to find whether specific terminology has been 
employed by certain interest representatives in the early stages of the lobbying 
process and whether the same terminology has surfaced in the EU institutions’ 
output. The second step concludes with a comparison between the lobbyists’ 
positions and the Commission’s 2010 Communication. 
The third step of the research focuses on the qualitative assessment of the 
position papers in the 2011 consultation. These papers are more extensive, and 
their contents are analysed with more detail than the first round of position 
papers. In addition to the qualitative analysis, the positions are formally coded 
to more precisely map the positions and ensure consistency over time (see 
section 5.3). These positions are used as a baseline for comparing the formal 
output of the different institutions: the Commission’s draft proposal (2012), 
the Parliament’s first reading (2014), and the Council’s general approach 
(2015). The Parliament’s first reading is viewed in light of the findings 
presented by Lobbyplag (2013) and therefore includes references to some of 
the leaked position papers that were directed towards MEPs. The Council’s 
position is similarly analysed with the help of Lobbyplag’s (2016) analysis of 
the leaked documents from the Council’s proceedings. The Parliament’s and 
Council’s draft versions are also contrasted with the EDPS’s commentary 
(2015).  
The fourth step focuses on the analysis of the final Regulation, as agreed 
upon as a result of the trilogue negotiations. This analysis will be more cursory 
than the previous overview and focus on some of the key questions that were 
subject to the most extensive amendments. The final Regulation is obviously 
a compromise between the EU institutions’ versions, but to reiterate, the 
purpose of this study is to find out whether certain positions presented by 
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lobbyists have been more willingly received by one EU institution or the other. 
Thus, I will look for key differences in the draft regulations and compare my 
findings to the positions advanced by interest representatives. In particular, it 
will be important to examine how the stakeholders relate to the elements of 
the big data paradigm: are they in favour of monitoring practices and extensive 
databases at the expense of privacy, or does the protection of personal data 
take the central stage? Rather than treating interest representatives as an 
unspecified, undemocratic mass aiming to influence decision-makers, I will 
try to discern what the representatives of diverse sectors advocate. Although 
interest representatives from different sectors might agree on some issues, I 
also suspect that there are diverging opinions on others. To make any 
meaningful and valid inferences, it is of utmost importance that stakeholder 
positions regarding information privacy are determined in a nuanced way. To 
do so, I have developed a taxonomy of information privacy principles that 
correspond to the privacy framework developed in chapter three. 
5.3 DETERMINING STAKEHOLDER POSITIONS 
Owing to the complexity of data protection legislation, it is quite difficult to 
create a workable taxonomy of different stakeholders’ attitudes to information 
privacy. There are very few instances where an entity would be unequivocally 
for or against the regulation of information privacy. Rather, there is significant 
overlap between sectors on some issues and highly divergent opinions on 
others. 
In chapter three, I presented how the right to data protection and its 
provisions could be deconstructed with reference to the two operational goals 
of data protection: the free movement of data and the protection of 
individuals. Whereas some articles in data protection legislation might 
advance the free movement of data, others protect the privacy of individuals. 
This inherent normative conflict is often ignored when focus is given to 
individual clauses or paragraphs in legal documents. 
Nevertheless, individual position papers more often than not argue more 
forcibly for one of the twin goals of data protection, even though individual 
applicational propositions might be more closely associated with the other 
goal. Therefore, the question is whether the sum total of the concrete 
provisions presented by an actor primarily advances the free movement of 
data or the protection of individuals. To create a workable analytic tool for 
making this assessment, I have created a list of variables connected to the 
fundamental applicational domains associated with European data protection 
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law, which are assigned to either of the two operational goals (see table 5.2). 
Enforcement can be based on both approaches, as sanctions can be based on 
failure to provide user rights or failure to follow procedure regarding 
processing activities.  
The process has been iterative, meaning that some of the variables have 
been added during the course of the analysis. The applicational domains 
associated with the free movement of data are co-regulation, self-regulation, 
law enforcement derogations, EU Commission powers, exceptions to data 
transfer legislation, and increased DPA cooperation. The applicational 
domains associated with the protection of privacy are binding regulation in 
lieu of other solutions, user empowerment, transparency, data minimisation, 
security, privacy by design, and sanctions. To clarify the role of different 
institutions, I have also identified whether each principle is connected to 
informational self-determination or bureaucratic proceduralism. This is not 
an exclusive list of the issues raised by interest groups or the Commission but 
includes some of the most salient issues that have been discovered in the 
course of the analysis. Most sectors have some special issues that are of utmost 
importance for their respective industries which might not be relevant for 
other sectors. One example is the case of derogations for research purposes or 
journalistic work – these are usually key issues in the position papers of 
research institutions and media outlets but are generally ignored by others. 
This division is not entirely flawless, as some of these applicational 
domains can also be associated with the other goal, such as the role of 
increasing cooperation between regulators. While the goal with increasing 
cooperation is to facilitate global data flows, DPAs also enforce data protection 
legislation which means that they could obstruct data transfers more 
efficiently if the cooperation between authorities was more seamless. These 
applicational concepts and principles are further concretised into tangible 
propositions that are marked as observed variables, such as seals and marks 
in the case of self-regulation, contracts that are used to facilitate data transfers 
outside the EU, encryption and anonymisation technologies in the case of 
security, and so on (see table 5.2). Note that this is not a comprehensive list of 
all the concepts featured in the position papers or the proposed GDPR.  
The papers from the first consultation are analysed with a focus on the core 
messages that the interest representative wishes to convey summarised in a 
few paragraphs. The goal is twofold – to determine the most salient issues of 
stakeholders and to identify keywords that are circulated in several of the 
position papers. After the qualitative analysis, a quantitative search for 
keywords will be conducted using Boolean search strings. Therefore, the 
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taxonomy in table 5.2 is of lesser importance in the first three steps of the 
analysis.  
 
 
Table 5.2 Classification of observed variables. 
Observed variables Applicational 
domain 
Operational 
principle 
Operational 
goal 
DPOs, data protection 
impact assessments 
(DPIAs), self-regulation 
with DPA oversight 
Co-regulation Bureaucratic 
proceduralism 
Free movement 
of data 
Certification, seals and 
marks, best practices 
Self-regulation Bureaucratic 
liberalism 
Free movement 
of data 
Data retention, law 
enforcement exceptions 
Law 
enforcement 
Bureaucratic 
proceduralism 
Free movement 
of data 
Commission adequacy 
decisions, delegated acts 
and implementing 
powers 
Commission 
powers 
Bureaucratic 
proceduralism 
Free movement 
of data 
BCRs, standard contract 
clauses, accountability 
principle, no to 
adequacy decisions 
Data transfers Bureaucratic 
proceduralism 
Free movement 
of data 
Lead authority, data 
supervisor board 
DPA 
coordination 
Bureaucratic 
proceduralism 
Free movement 
of data 
Consent, data 
portability, right to be 
forgotten, joint judicial 
remedy, access & 
rectification, right to 
object 
User 
empowerment 
Informational 
self-
determination 
Protection of 
privacy 
Mandatory data breach 
report, 
understandability, 
obligatory privacy 
notices, accessibility, 
user communication 
Transparency Informational 
self-
determination 
and bureaucratic 
proceduralism 
Protection of 
privacy 
Evaluating legitimacy and influence 
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Retention time limits, 
original purpose 
requirement, necessity 
requirement 
Data 
minimisation 
Bureaucratic 
proceduralism 
Protection of 
privacy 
Data protection risk 
assessment, privacy-
enhancing technologies  
Security Bureaucratic 
proceduralism 
Protection of 
privacy 
Formal recognition of 
Privacy by design 
principles 
Privacy by 
design and/or 
default 
Bureaucratic 
proceduralism 
Protection of 
privacy 
Fines, 
controller/processor 
liability, compensation 
Sanctions Bureaucratic 
proceduralism 
Protection of 
privacy 
 
The position papers from the second consultation are more closely 
analysed according to the taxonomy presented in table 5.2. The stakeholder’s 
policy position regarding each applicational principle is determined by 
examining the position paper and scored on a scale of 1–5, where 1 equals 
highly opposed, 2 equals opposed, 3 equals neutral or no opinion, 4 equals in 
favour, and 5 equals highly in favourIf an interest representative has not 
provided commentary on an issue, it will be coded as neutral. I will divide the 
stakeholders from the second consultation into three groups based on the 
coded position papers: 1) free data lobbyists, 2) privacy advocates, and 3) 
mixed approach proponents. In the second consultation, stakeholders were 
asked to comment on the Commission’s outlined approach, which structures 
the position papers. Thus, it is easier to discern the interest representatives’ 
policy position in the second consultation.  
To underline the differences between the models, I provide radar charts of 
how a typical candidate would approach data protection legislation. This of 
course does not mean that there would not be significant variation within the 
three groups. To display the differences within the groups, I can compare 
tables and radar charts over how different actors approach specific concepts. 
The radar charts based on the position papers can then be compared with the 
model chart for each of the three models to exhibit key common characteristics 
as well as key differences. 
5.3.1 FREE DATA LOBBYISTS 
The free data lobbyists are united by their wish to ease the flow of personal 
information within the EU and beyond. However, the group is highly 
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heterogeneous because it contains every sector imaginable from advertisers to 
aviation, research institutions, and the telecommunications industry (see table 
5.2). The typical free data lobbyist is a multinational corporation of either 
European or American origin, with significant activities in several EU member 
states. While the name implies professional interest representation, by way of 
their expressed interests, public authorities or even government ministries can 
be included in this category. 
Figure 5.1 Free data lobbyist model type 
 
The crucial questions for free data lobbyists revolve around the ability of users 
to take control over their personal information and the data controllers’ ability 
to transfer personal data from one country to another. Their attitudes towards 
different applicational domains (see figure 5.1) mirror this purpose. The free 
movement of data is often interpreted as minimising the amount of 
interference by public authorities. 
5.3.2 PRIVACY ADVOCATES 
Whereas the free data lobbyists generally support the second goal of data 
protection, the privacy advocates support the first goal, the protection of 
information privacy of citizens. On a general note, data privacy advocates are 
supportive of all measures that empower citizens, such as rights that enable 
the right to object, access, rectification, or be forgotten. 
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Figure 5.2 Data privacy advocate model type 
 
Unsurprisingly, the ideal data privacy advocate model (figure 5.2) is almost 
the mirror image of the free data lobbyist model (figure 5.1).  
5.3.3 MIXED APPROACH ADVOCATES 
The mixed approach advocates are the interest representatives that cannot be 
easily placed in either group. It might be that they support user rights but 
simultaneously focus on self-regulation and data transfers to such a degree 
that placing the advocate in either category would not be justifiable. This group 
will also likely contain a very diverse set of actors.  
The results from the second consultation and the three advocacy models 
are then used to evaluate the positions of the different EU institutions. The 
qualitative analysis along with the policy position coding are compared to the 
approach advanced by the Commission, the Parliament and the Council. These 
positions are then finally compared to the finalized GDPR.  
The results from the second consultation and the three advocacy models 
are then used to evaluate the positions of the different EU institutions. The 
qualitative analysis along with the policy position coding is compared with the 
approach advanced by the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council. 
These positions are then finally compared with the final GDPR.  
The reliability and validity of the analysis are further tested by asking for 
commentary by people who have been involved in the GPDR’s legislative 
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process in one capacity or another. This commentary is informal in nature and 
mainly used to guide the analysis. Therefore, the comments are not included 
as source material but rather as a way to assure that the analysis is sound. 
Bearing in mind the drawbacks associated with process tracing and the 
preference attainment model (Dür, 2009), it is worth noting that this model 
of inquiry partly suffers from the same weaknesses as the three methods 
presented above. First, it is assumed that proximity equals influence. 
However, this inference is based on not only proximity but also novelty, which 
is easier to distinguish via qualitative analysis. 
Second, owing to the qualitative nature of the study, some position papers 
have been left out and therefore the influence of some interest representatives 
might not be known. Nevertheless, as I have argued above, this would be the 
case even if all position papers were included in the sample because 
participation in formal public consultations is not the only lobbying strategy 
employed – some interest representatives might choose to leave no paper trail 
behind. Third, the evaluation of stakeholder interests and the choice of 
applicational principles to code are undoubtedly subjective. However, the 
position papers are publicly available (although no longer directly 
downloadable) and it is possible to test their validity should a classification 
raise doubts.  
The results of this study will be presented in the following chapter. The 
chapter will begin with a brief overview of the stakeholders’ characteristics as 
determined by the first step of the analysis, after which I will continue to 
present my study on influence according to the procedure outlined above. 
These results are then used to assess the legitimacy of the process.
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6 LOBBYING IN THE EARLY STAGES OF 
POLICY FORMULATION 
Chapter four elaborated on the question of the EU’s democratic deficit and 
how the inclusion of interest groups impacts various aspects of the EU’s 
legitimacy. To address the main research questions of this study that relate to 
the influence of organised interests and the legitimacy of the process, it is first 
necessary to provide an overview of the public consultations that preceded the 
draft of GDPR and the positions that were expressed by various interest 
groups. 
It is important to first identify who participated and second, determine 
what opinions were expressed in the position papers: 
1. Whose views have been heard during the legislative process? 
2. What are the main dividing lines between the suggestions made by 
different interest representatives in the two Commission consultations 
(2009 and 2011)? 
3. Which actors supported the creation of a new GDPR? Why did these 
actors support this mode of regulatory intervention? 
The structure of this chapter follows the chronological order of the legislative 
process. First, I will present a brief overview of the legislative process 
beginning with the first reviews of the GDPR’s predecessor, the Data 
Protection Directive, in 2002. Second, I will address who participated in the 
later public consultations organised by DG Justice and present a 
categorisation of the type of actors involved (1). This will allow me to evaluate 
to what extent the consultations contribute to the legitimacy of the legislative 
process such that the participating parties can be perceived as representative 
of different societal actors. Third, I will address the contents of the positions 
adopted by different interest representatives. This will be done in two steps. 
First, I present the concerns raised in the first consultation of 2009. In the 
next step, I will present both the Commission’s 2010 Communication and the 
positions raised in the 2011 consultations that sought concrete comments on 
the Commission’s proposal (2). The two are causally linked; therefore, I will 
touch upon the question of influence already at this stage. Crucially, I will look 
for the policy applications associated with different operational principles of 
information privacy. Third, drawing mainly on the position papers in the 
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second consultation, I will be able to demonstrate what type of actors favoured 
the drafting of a regulation instead of either amending the Directive or drafting 
a new one (3). After the characteristics of the interest groups and the 
applications they favour have been presented, I will present the congruence of 
these suggestions with the legislative drafts by the EU institutions in chapter 
seven.  
 
6.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE GDPR’S LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESS 
The first steps outlining a legislative update can be traced back to 2002 when 
the Commission reviewed the original Data Protection Directive. 32  DG 
Internal Market provided one questionnaire for the DPAs (European 
Commission, 2003a) and another for the member states (European 
Commission, 2003b), organised a public survey for citizens (European 
Commission, 2003c) and controllers (European Commission, 2003d), and 
invited stakeholders to submit position papers.33 The goal was threefold – to 
see whether the member states had implemented the Directive, to ask whether 
the national governments and DPAs had any suggestions on how to amend it 
and to see how controllers and data subjects viewed the regulatory framework. 
The results from the review detail highly divergent practices between 
member states, which can largely be traced back to the respective member 
states’ diverging policies on data protection. However, the most telling aspect 
of the review was the concluding remarks in which the member states were 
asked to address the difficulties in implementing the directive. Whereas some 
member states, such as Belgium, were happy with the status quo, others 
requested ‘simplified’ provisions focusing on misuse (Sweden). In what would 
be seen as a highly ironic statement considering Ireland’s lacklustre position 
on enforcing data protection rules vis-à-vis U.S.-based technology companies, 
Ireland stated that ‘The growth of the Internet, the rapid pace of technological 
change, and the globalisation of business, pose particular challenges for data 
protection rules’ (European Commission, 2003a, p. 79). Nevertheless, one of 
the most obvious conclusions was that the Data Protection Directive did not 
sufficiently consider data that is processed online and did not provide clear 
                                                  
32 The results from the review were previously available on the Commission’s website but have since 
been taken down. 
33 Sixty eight position papers were submitted to the Commission. Many of the lobbyists would also 
submit position papers to the other consultations and participated in lobbying MEPs and the Council. 
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answers to how the transfer of data that is required for the web to work should 
be regulated. It may be noted that this review took place before the ePrivacy 
Directive was updated. However, the ePrivacy Directive is directly dependent 
on many of the key provisions in the Data Protection Directive, and any update 
to the latter would influence the former. 
Regardless of the obvious shortcomings of the Data Protection Directive, 
the Commission would not proceed with a revision of the law until a few years 
later. It was not until social networking sites had become commonplace that 
the Commission decided to take the points raised by the member states, DPAs, 
and other interested parties into further consideration. The first concrete steps 
taken to update the European data protection legislation were in 2009 when 
the European Commission launched its first public consultation on the topic 
(see table 6.1). The initiative was taken by DG Justice and not DG INFSO, 
which had been the DG in charge of the previous Data Protection Directive, 
nor DG Internal Market, which had launched the review in 2002.  
Laurer and Seidl (forthcoming) argue that DG Justice took the lead 
because the Lisbon Treaty had established data protection as a rights-based 
issue and because DG Justice provided the secretariat of the WP29. Therefore, 
it was ‘an obvious choice’, as expressed by Alexander Dix, who was the 
commissioner for data protection and freedom of information for the Berlin 
State Parliament (Laurer & Seidl, forthcoming). 
Cloud computing was also becoming more prevalent at the time, and it was 
clear that any modifications to the data protection regime would have to take 
cloud-based services into account. The 2009 public consultation was the first 
of two public consultations in the Commission’s legislative process. The public 
consultation platform was open to the general public and anyone could submit 
a position paper online. The Consultation on the legal framework for the 
fundamental right to protection of personal data, as it was called, was 
launched to determine whether the current legislative framework was 
sufficient, and if not, what amendments citizens, NGOs, governments, and 
corporations required. Some of the respondents replied to the consultation on 
request of the Commission, whereas others submitted papers on their own 
initiative. 
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Table 6.1 The GDPR's timeline.34  
Year Event Primary actor(s) 
2009 Consultation on the legal 
framework for the fundamental 
right to protection of personal 
data (European Commission 
2009). 
European Commission, 
interest groups 
2010 Communication on a 
comprehensive approach on 
personal data protection in the 
European Union (European 
Commission 2010a). 
European Commission 
2011 Consultation on the Commission’s 
comprehensive approach on 
personal data protection in the 
European Union (European 
Commission 2011a). 
European Commission, 
interest groups 
2011 Special Eurobarometer 359: 
Attitudes on data protection and 
electronic identity in the European 
Union (European Commission 
2011b). 
European Commission, 
TNS Opinion & Social 
25 January 
2012 
Proposal for a new General Data 
Protection Regulation (European 
Commission 2012). 
European Commission 
12 March 
2014 
Proposal passes the European 
Parliament’s first reading 
European Parliament 
15 June 2015 Council’s position accepted by the 
EU Ministers’ of Justice (Austria 
and Slovakia voted against) 
European Council 
2015 Trilogue meetings: seven in total 
between 24 June and 15 December  
European Commission, 
the European Council 
and the European 
Parliament 
17 December 
2015 
LIBE Committee adopts the result 
of the negotiations35 
European Parliament 
                                                  
34 Mainly sourced from Eur-lex (2016). 
35 The negotiated text was backed by 48 votes to 4, with 4 abstentions (European Parliament 2015).  
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Year Event Primary actor(s) 
8 April 2016 Council’s position at first reading 
and statement of reasons 
European Council 
11 April 2016 Adoption by Commission of its 
communication on Council’s 
position at first reading.  
European Commission 
and the European 
Council 
14 April 2016 Parliament’s second reading, 
accepted without amendments 
European Parliament 
27 April 2016 Signature by the President of the 
European Parliament and by the 
President of the Council 
European Council and 
the European Parliament 
25 May 2018 Regulation in force All member states 
 
Although the public consultation was only a first step towards the GDPR, it 
laid the foundation on which the Commission could draft its 2010 
Communication on a comprehensive approach on personal data protection 
in the European Union (European Commission, 2010a) which would set out 
the path for enacting a new data protection law. The second consultative 
round, the Consultation on the Commission’s comprehensive approach to 
personal data protection in the European Union (European Commission, 
2011a) was initiated so that stakeholders could comment on the 
Communication. Concurrently, the Commission commissioned a report on the 
Attitudes on data protection and electronic identity in the European Union 
(European Commission, 2011b).36  
The report revealed that ‘[n]ine out of ten Europeans (92%) say they 
are concerned about mobile apps collecting their data without their consent’ 
and ‘[s]even Europeans out of ten are concerned about the potential use 
that companies may make of the information disclosed’ (European 
Commission, 2011b, pp. 1-3).  
                                                  
36 The survey was requested by DG INFSO, DG Justice and the Joint Research Centre, 
and co-ordinated by DG Communication. The survey was conducted by TNS Opinion 
and Social. 
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Table 6.2 Europeans’ concern about the undisclosed use of personal data per 
country (European Commission, 2011b). 
 
 
The stakeholder proposals and the results from the survey were taken into 
account in the Proposal for a new General Data Protection Regulation 
(European Commission, 2012a), which was presented to the European 
Parliament and the Council in 2012 under the ordinary legislative procedure. 
However, exactly what weight the different positions were given was not clear. 
It can be noted that the original proposal was quite ambitious and clearly 
disregarded many of the more self-regulatory solutions promoted by lobbyists. 
The public consultations did draw significant interest from different 
interest groups, yet the full force of lobbying would be revealed at a later stage 
when the European Parliament made amendments to the Commission’s 
proposal. The Parliamentary readings proved to be thorough: in total, over 
5,000 amendments were submitted in the committees involved in the 
Regulation (Parltrack, 2016). At the time, it was called one of the most lobbied 
legal documents in the history of the EU. Owing to leaks from MEPs, many of 
the lobby documents submitted to MEPs were made available to the public, 
sometimes revealing a high degree of both material and ideational overlap in 
the amendments provided by lobbyists and the amendments suggested by 
MEPs. The Parliament’s first reading of the GDPR eventually passed in March 
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2014 with 621 votes in favour, 10 against, and 22 abstentions (European 
Commission, 2014). The overwhelming support of the first reading has largely 
been attributed to the change in salience caused by the Snowden revelations 
(Kalyanpur & Newman, 2019; Rossi, 2018; Laurer & Seidl, forthcoming).  
The Council of the European Union adopted its position at a later stage in 
June, 2015. Whereas the different versions circulated within the Council are 
accessible to the general public, there are far fewer official and unofficial 
records of lobbying activity. After the Council had presented its version of the 
new Regulation, the trilogue negotiations between the Council, the 
Parliament, and the Commission were initiated. Although it had taken several 
years for the Council and the Parliament to reach their respective positions, 
the trilogue negotiations moved on comparatively swiftly and were formally 
concluded in December, 2015. The Council (2016) adopted its first reading on 
8 April, which was in line with the compromise text, and the Parliament 
adopted the text without amendments in its second reading on 14 April, 2016. 
Between 2014 and 2016, 22% of all co-decision legislation was agreed upon in 
an early second reading (European Parliament, 2019), indicating that while 
the GDPR was slightly more difficult than the majority of files (75% of the 
decisions are already reached in the first reading), it was by no means 
exceptional. The President of the European Parliament and the President of 
the Council signed the new GDPR on 27 April, 2016. 
The GDPR entered into force on May 25, 2018, slightly over two years after 
it was signed by the EU institutions. The compromise text was met with slight 
criticism from the digital rights groups that had attempted to influence the 
contents of the legislation, but it was mainly regarded as a satisfactory 
compromise (Järvinen, 2015). However, the new sanctions did cause quite a 
stir and many organisations struggled to interpret and implement the new 
provisions of the law during spring 2018, most notably causing a cascade of 
re-consent emails being sent to Internet users across Europe.  
The GDPR’s extra-territorial effects have also been covered in especially 
the U.S. press, often citing concerns about how U.S. companies will fare under 
the new regulations, and have sometimes been used as a critique against the 
U.S.’s own lacking privacy protections (Searls, 2018a, 2018b). The timing of 
the GDPR’s entry into force could not have been better. In March 2018, several 
of the U.S. and U.K.’s leading newspapers broke news about Cambridge 
Analytica’s questionable business practices and Facebook’s careless data 
sharing practices. In the wake of the scandal, the FTC (2018) opened an 
investigation into Facebook’s data sharing practices, Facebook CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg testified before the U.S. Congress (Wong, 2018) and the European 
Parliament, and the British Parliament issued an ultimatum to Zuckerberg to 
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either appear before the Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport Committee 
voluntarily or face a formal summons to appear when he is next in the UK. The 
apparent failures of the world’s largest social networking site and the world’s 
second largest online advertising platform underlined that data protection 
needs to be taken seriously and that even the most technologically advanced 
and financially strong actors are capable of making severe mistakes. The 
GDPR could not have received a better introduction. 
Nevertheless, there are several aspects of the legislative process that merit 
further study. First, owing to the intense lobbying that took place, the GDPR 
is an apt case study for examining the role of interest group influence in the 
EU and its consequences for the legitimacy of legislative processes. Second, it 
is necessary to look at not only who were ultimately successful in shaping the 
legislative agenda but also in what way. Following the arguments raised in 
chapter four, I will begin with an examination of the public consultations that 
preceded the Commission’s proposal. I will examine them from two 
perspectives – whether the inclusion of interest groups can be seen as a proxy 
for legitimacy owing to the representativeness of the interest groups and if the 
legitimacy stems from the diversity of viewpoints presented. 
6.2 REPRESENTATIVENESS AS A PROXY FOR 
LEGITIMACY 
As I have touched upon above, the Commission did not provide any details on 
the characteristics on the respondents to the two public consultations. If the 
consultations are to contribute to the throughput legitimacy of the legislative 
process, some degree of representativeness is required (Schmidt, 2013). 
Through categorising each respondent in the two consultations, I can 
demonstrate whether the representative function of the consultations was 
fulfilled in the GDPR’s legislative process.  
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Figure 6.1 Replies by type of stakeholder 
 
The categorisation of respondents reveals that the majority of all replies to the 
consultations represented private interests rather than public ones, which 
support Dür and Mateo’s (2012) claim that resource-rich organisations, such 
as business networks, are at an advantage vis-à-vis cause groups and other 
public interest associations. The results reaffirm Quittkat’s (2011, p. 677) study 
of online consultations across different policy domains, where she found that 
around half of the submissions to consumer policy consultations come from 
either business interest associations or corporations. 
In total, 455 position papers were sent to the two consultations. 37  The 
2009 consultation attracted 167 submissions and the 2011 consultation 288 
position papers, a 72% increase.38 The results demonstrate that the biggest 
group of respondents could be categorised as either trade associations or 
                                                  
37 The total number of participating organisations, public authorities, corporations, associations, and 
individuals was slightly higher, as six associations sent in joint replies. Therefore, I will refer to the 
submitters of these position papers as entities – a joint reply by two associations would therefore be 
registered as one entity and not two associations. 
38 One reply to the second consultation was clearly a joke and therefore removed from the results. 
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business networks in both consultations (62 in 2009 and 102 in 2011) (see 
figure 6.1). The trade associations were, to a high degree, regional, national, or 
international chambers of commerce or specialised business networks that 
represent the ICT sector, which is consistent with Coen’s (1997) elite pluralism 
thesis.  
Including the submissions by individual corporations, corporate interests 
where represented in 97 replies in 2009 and 152 replies in 2011. Compared 
with Quittkat’s (2011) sample, the number of individual corporate 
submissions is exceptionally high. Surprisingly, the number of NGOs or other 
cause groups increased only moderately between the two consultations 
compared with other types of actors. Nevertheless, the second consultation 
drew more replies from public authorities than the previous consultation. 
While research institutions were largely absent in the first consultation, 
several institutions participated in the second round. 
Of the 288 entities that participated in the second consultation, 90 entities had 
also participated in the first consultation in some capacity. The absolute 
number of corporations is probably higher owing to mergers, reorganised 
association structures or new network memberships, but the lack of 
consistency is still remarkable. Note that 47% (77) of the other entities that 
submitted to the first consultation refrained from submitting proposals to the 
second consultation. For example, there was a significant increase in citizen 
replies to the consultation (55%), but only two of the citizens had participated 
in the previous consultation. This lack of follow-up is perplexing, given 
previous research results that have stressed the importance of lobbying in the 
early stages of the decision-making process (e.g. Pierson, 2000; Eising, 2007).  
Turning to the question of geographical representation, which might be 
considered a key issue from a legitimacy perspective, it is easy to discern that 
the population size of different member states is poorly correlated with the 
participation in public consultations. The size of the economy is a slightly 
better predictor, although not entirely consistent with the results. The three 
countries from which most proposals were submitted were the UK, Germany, 
and the U.S. This is hardly surprising as the UK and Germany are the two 
biggest economies in Europe. Germany is also known for its strict data 
protection policies. Perhaps most strikingly, U.S.-based associations, 
corporations or networks submitted 20 positions papers to the first 
consultation and 30 to the second, where stakeholders in many EU member 
states failed to send even one.  
Most of the replies to the consultations came from organisations or 
associations with either European or global reach (see figure 6.2). On closer 
examination, the global trade associations also usually represent many 
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American corporations. Because the citizen respondents’ backgrounds were 
often not explicitly stated, they were not included in the tables on sectors and 
countries of residence. However, it may be noted that most of the citizens had 
a background in either law or academia and many of them were German 
residents, which is consistent with research showing that German citizens are 
concerned with data retention and surveillance issues (Bug, 2013).  
These results also confirm Quittkat’s (2011, p. 668) results, where 
participants from countries central to EU-decision-making (France, Germany, 
and the UK) are highly over-represented whereas newer member states hardly 
participate. Quittkat’s analysis did not include the participation of non-EU 
countries –because of either lack of data or differences in categorisation.39 It 
must be stressed that in this study, country of residence has been assigned 
according to the headquarters of the company and not the local subsidiary. 
Therefore, Facebook’s contribution is categorised as a U.S. submission and not 
an Irish one. However, this rule does not apply to the associations that span 
several countries or continents. It would be counterintuitive to categorise 
international business interest associations by their strategic location in 
Brussels. Therefore, they have been categorised as either ‘European’ or 
‘global’. This is not only an important methodological note in this study but 
also an issue which should be taken into account when the Commission 
reports on who participates in the consultations. Presently, the Commission 
reports that many replies come from Belgian associations. This is neither 
informative nor reflective of the actual interests represented. 
 
                                                  
39 If one categorises companies according to the location of the subsidiary rather than the headquarters, 
the number of U.S.-based companies would not stand out. 
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Figure 6.2 Replies by country based on the location of headquarters, 2009 
and 2011 consultations.40 
 
Because this study is focused on a single policy domain, it is worth looking at 
what different sectors are represented on a more granular level than the one 
provided by the Quittkat (2011). Although industry convergence and group 
mergers make a strict division of sectors difficult, it is possible to label the 
respondents to the consultations according to 21 broad categories (see figure 
6.3).41 The best-represented sectors were IT, healthcare, telecommunications, 
general business interest advocacy, data protection advocacy, credit and 
financial services, and marketing.42 
                                                  
40 Citizen replies not included due to lack of information on country of residence. 
41 These sectors could also be labelled as policy subsystems (Sabatier, 1998) because most of them 
comprise actors from both the public and private sector. 
42 Data broker services could in many instances be included in the marketing category, but because these 
services are not used exclusively for marketing, it is better to keep them separated.  
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Figure 6.3 Replies by sector, 2009 and 2011 consultations.43  
 
General business interests were represented by a large variety of national and 
international chambers of commerce, whereas consumer organisations, data 
protection officials, and NGOs represented citizen interests.44 The findings 
further support Mahoney’s (2007) conclusion that European firms and 
associations prefer formal coalitions to ad hoc ones. Most of the position 
papers were submitted by formal umbrella associations and business 
networks. Nevertheless, there were some signs of especially firms engaging in 
more loosely arranged networks. Some companies and organisations united 
under networks that could also be categorised as ad hoc coalitions, such as the 
Data Industry Platform, which comprises national direct marketing 
associations and some news publishers, Axciom, and commercial 
broadcasters. The most striking result is the significant increase in replies by 
                                                  
43 The “Other” category contains replies by sole respondents of a single sector. The replies submitted by 
citizens are not included. 
44 The IT and data protection sector replies came from individual firms as well as business networks. 
Although quite a few law firms participated in the consultation, many of them did so on behalf of clients 
and it would therefore not be unfeasible to include them in the business advocacy category. However, 
because they did not always disclose who their clients were, I have decided to include them in the ‘law’ 
category. 
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specialised organisations or associations. Between 2009 and 2011, 
associations or firms which specialised in data protection increased by over 
200%. It is also notable that a wider array of sectors was represented in the 
second consultation.  
The data protection consultations are an example of how companies lobby 
EU institutions through several different associations and networks as well as 
in their own capacity. Microsoft, for example, participated through the 
European Privacy Association, Digital Europe, the Business Software Alliance, 
and AmCham, 45  to new a few, and in its own capacity. 46  Drawing final 
conclusions on these networks is difficult because not all associations or 
networks openly state their lists of members. A network analysis of the 
Transparency Register could shed some light on this question. 
The wide range of sectors represented in the consultations further 
exemplifies how the use of data and, in particular, personal data has come to 
permeate the entire society. It confirms the theoretical considerations 
presented in chapter two, according to which the weight attributed to data-
based decision-making in a range of different industries has become a 
fundamental part of modern bureaucracies, both private and public. The 
participation of different industries in the development of new regulatory 
instruments shows that the practices are often sought to be formally codified, 
and when such codification poses challenges or hurdles for increased 
datafication, such regulation will be resisted through lobbying decision-
makers.  
While industry domination was to be expected, the difference in the level 
of private interest participation compared with public interest replies was 
quite striking, which supports the elite pluralism paradigm. Although a wide 
range of sectors did participate, the position papers came, in most of the cases, 
from extremely resource-rich associations and firms and also from a limited 
number of countries, confirming Coen’s (2007) critique. What is perhaps most 
disquieting is that some of the member states were represented in no capacity 
in either of the two consultations while organisations from three countries, the 
U.S., the UK, and Germany, put forth over a third of all position papers. 
Because a key argument for including stakeholders in the legislative process is 
the ambition to increase the representativeness of different societal groups 
                                                  
45 According to Hayes-Renshaw (2009, p. 82), AmCham is regarded as the most successful interest group 
in Brussels. 
46 In 2014, Microsoft listed that it belonged to a total of 33 networks and associations in the Transparency 
Register.  
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and thus increase the legitimacy of EU policy (Schmidt, 2013), it can be argued 
that the public consultations on data protection were a failure in this regard.  
However, if one approaches the question of legitimacy from a more input-
oriented perspective, the goal is rather to make sure that a diversity of opinions 
is expressed according to the ideals of deliberative democracy (Kohler-Koch 
2010; Quittkat & Kohler-Koch 2013). In that case, the slanted participation 
need not be a problem as long as the ideas raised by marginal actors are also 
taken into account in the legislative process. As such, the legitimacy of the 
process cannot be properly reviewed without also addressing the policy output. 
This analysis is dependent on a prior assessment of the views that were 
presented in the consultations. I will now turn to the concerns raised by the 
different stakeholders.  
6.3 PARTICIPATION AS DIVERSITY 
6.3.1 THE 2009 CONSULTATION  
The mere categorisation of sectors or number of submissions to public 
consultations is a poor indicator of what issues are raised and to what extent 
these issues have been taken into account. Moreover, following Kohler-Koch’s 
(2010) Habermasian perspective on including stakeholders for their 
contributions to the policy discussions and not for their level of 
representation, the central question is connected to the concrete input of the 
interest representatives. However, it would be fair to state that an issue raised 
by a wide degree of stakeholders has a better chance of making it into actual 
data protection legislation than concerns which are raised independently. 
After all, this is why strategic alliances are formed (cf. Sabatier, 1998). 
Twenty three position papers from the 2009 consultation were selected for 
more detailed qualitative analysis (see Appendix 1). 47  The responses were 
approximately 10 pages on average, the shortest paper being only two pages 
while it was not uncommon for papers to span more than 30 pages.48 Drawing 
on Bouwen (2002) and Klüver (2013), the papers were chosen after reviewing 
their relevance in terms of the access goods interest groups provide: policy 
expertise and sector-specific insights, size of enterprise or geographical reach, 
and citizen support. Following the results from the mapping of participants to 
the two consultations, it was clear that some stakeholders would be better 
                                                  
47 Although the consultation deadline was 31 December, 2009, some of the replies were submitted in 
January, 2010. 
48 One individual even submitted an entire book to the consultation process. 
 107 
 
represented than others and often lobbied through various business 
associations. Owing to these considerations, priority was given to so-called 
Eurogroups and umbrella associations representing a wide range of industries. 
The sample also included public authorities and civil society organisations.  
The position papers reveal that there is wide agreement on the lack of 
harmonisation and specificity of the definitions in the original Data Protection 
Directive. These concerns unite all types of stakeholders. For example, the core 
definitions are too vague, even to the extent that the terms ‘personal data’, 
‘data controller’, and ‘data processor’ are interpreted inconsistently across the 
member states.  
Figure 6.4 The prevalence of data protection keywords in the 2009/10 
position papers. 
 
A quantitative analysis of the prevalence of certain keywords in all the position 
papers reveals three common trends: the ambiguity of definitions, a request 
for more harmonisation, that international transfers should be facilitated, and 
that the current framework seems bureaucratic. 
However, the question of how they should be defined is tackled differently 
by free data lobbyists and privacy advocates. The definition of personal data 
takes two forms: for example, the broad and the relative approach. The former 
is supported by communication rights activists and data protection officials in 
Europe, whereas the latter is supported mainly by U.S. companies with 
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significant European presence. The broad approach to personal data was first 
presented in an advisory opinion by the Article 29 Working Party (2007). The 
advisory opinion provides an extensive analysis of how the Data Protection 
Directive’s definition of personal data should be interpreted; to summarise, 
one could state that the broad approach suggests that data is personal if it is 
about a person or if this person is either identified in the data or reasonably 
identifiable by looking at the different data categories. The theoretical 
possibility of identification is not sufficient but determined by the resources 
which could be used for identifying a person behind the data categories.49 
Because the national DPAs also have the possibility of denying transfers of 
data, it is fair to say that the Working Party’s opinions can be very influential 
within the EU data protection policy discourse. Several privacy advocates cited 
the advisory opinion in their submissions. 
However, according to the relative approach, ‘data is considered personal 
for someone who can link the data to identified individuals’ (Appendix 1: 
AmCham, 2010, p. 7). In other words, if a marketer has access to a database 
with different consumer profiles but these profiles lack names or other clear 
identifiers, the data should not be considered personal. The relative approach 
has not been successful in shaping European data protection policy, but its 
existence shows that the vague definition provided by the Data Protection 
Directive can result in highly varying interpretations of what data may be 
processed and how. The public consultations provided interest representatives 
with an opportunity to suggest their definition of personal data. I will now 
proceed with presenting how these two types of interest representatives 
argued for more substantial privacy applications.  
6.3.1.1 Free data lobbyists 
Companies and business interest associations request, as a rule, more 
harmonisation across member states, fewer regulations on international 
transfers, and self-regulation instead of binding legislation, largely 
corresponding to the ‘free data lobbyist’ model presented in the previous 
chapter. Most of the suggestions relate to the procedural approach to personal 
data, which is largely perceived as ‘bureaucratic’.  
On an operational level, the procedural approach to privacy was heavily 
contested by firms and business interest associations, who rather seek to 
regulate data protection through self-regulation with some transparency 
                                                  
49 For a more detailed description of the broad and relative approaches to personal data, see Hildén 
(2017). 
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requirements. While the underlying logic of the Data Protection Directive is 
largely challenged in the corporate position papers, the corporations rarely 
present a viable alternative to achieving a higher level of protection. The 
applications that these corporations favour are rarely connected to public 
interest goals. For example, a common position is the one presented by the 
Confederation of British Industry (Appendix 1: CBI, 2009, p. 3) that wants to 
limit access requests, claiming that they can place a ‘significant burden’ on 
businesses.  
Whenever questions of public interest are raised, they usually relate to 
criminal activity, and the frames used are most typically associated with 
surveillance for security purposes (cf. De Landa, 1991; Lyon, 1994). The audio-
visual industry representatives, including the Motion Picture Association and 
the International Video Federation, hold that privacy is necessary but that it 
‘should not be used to protect criminals or those who have been involved in 
illegal or harmful activities’ (Appendix 1: MPA et al., 2009, p. 3). They claim 
the following: 
At this stage there is a huge risk of forum shopping by rogue service 
providers and no enforcement of the rules against them. In other 
words, it seems easier for a rogue ISPs to hide behind/play with 
privacy rules rather than for legitimate users to protect their rights 
granted by existing laws. (Appendix 1: MPA et al., 2009, p. 7) 
What the audio-visual industry representatives are criticising in their reply to 
the consultation is, in fact, primarily the Directive on electronic commerce 
(2000/31/EC), which states that hosting service providers are neither 
responsible for the illegal content hosted on their servers nor are they required 
to monitor the content. However, because rights holders need to link IP 
addresses to illegal file-sharers to sue them for copyright infringement, data 
protection law becomes relevant as well. The approach taken by the copyright 
industries is rather belligerent and oppositional towards ISPs.  
While the telecommunications industry was generally supportive of the 
measures that limit the scope of obligations of data controllers, they were 
equally eager to point out that the same level of obligations that 
telecommunications companies are subjected to through specialised 
legislation should also apply to online companies. On the contrary, while 
arguing that consumers demand targeted advertising (Appendix 1: Telefonica, 
2009, p. 4), they simultaneously advocated for a ‘level playing field’ (Appendix 
1: ETNO, 2009). In other words, competition regulation frames were used in 
the context of privacy regulation. Therefore, it is to some extent possible to 
simultaneously advocate for data maximisation and promote that procedural 
Lobbying in the early stages of policy formulation 
 
110 
 
obligations should be extended to other industries. Moreover, EuroISPA 
(Appendix 1: 2010) simultaneously argued that data retention for anti-
terrorism purposes has ‘eroded’ the framework of data protection.50  
Notwithstanding the concerns raised by telecommunications companies, 
there is a wide degree of interest overlap between corporations and 
governments. The problem multinational corporations face is that all 
countries have slightly different notification requirements, meaning that 
several different notification procedures need to be managed at the same time. 
Therefore, many firms either wish to abolish the notification procedure 
altogether or, at the very least, apply a ‘home country rule’ so that it would only 
be necessary to notify one DPA.51  Regarding international transfers, many 
multinational corporations address the need to further develop ‘BCRs’, which 
are enforceable intra-group contracts stating that EU rules on data protection 
apply regardless of where the company’s subsidiaries are situated. In other 
words, the rules are extra-territorially applied by way of contracts. 
The Dutch government was very critical of the notification regime’s 
effectiveness and state that the Netherlands will aim for compliance through 
self-regulation. In addition, the Dutch government and the UK Ministry of 
Justice stress the need for easier international transfers for law enforcement 
purposes. The approach is similar to that of multinational corporations, 
bearing in mind that the field in which the principles would be applied is quite 
different. One of the most important aspects of the big data paradigm is the 
ability to not only collect vast quantities of data but also use this data for any 
purpose that might emerge in the unforeseeable future (Lyon, 1994; Bogard, 
2012; Christl, 2017). This position is routinely criticised by the privacy 
advocates and largely ignored in the corporate position papers. Data 
maximisation is routinely assumed to be the most beneficial mode of operation 
from a societal perspective, as exemplified by Acxiom’s (Appendix 1: 2009) 
position paper that even included a case study explaining how transactional 
data are collected and processed across continents.  
The coinciding interests of governments and multinationals correspond to 
Simitis’s (1995) depiction of the Data Protection Directive’s legislative process, 
where the governments of the member states effectively weakened the level of 
protection across the board to make sure that the rights of public authorities 
                                                  
50  The Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC) was still in force at the time, requiring 
telecommunications companies to retain communications metadata on all of their customers. The 
Directive would later be declared invalid by the CJEU in 2014. 
51 Axciom, AmCham, BSA, CBI, CIPL, Digital Europe, IAB, the publishers’ associations ENPA and FAEP, 
Telefonica, Visa, ACRO, EuroISPA, EPOF, and the Dutch government. See Appendix 1. 
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to process data are not limited. In other words, the goals of surveillant 
administration and bureaucratic efficiency are adjoined with the business 
models of companies that rely on large-scale processing of personal data. It is 
also worth noting that the public consultations on data protection reveal an 
important aspect often ignored in interest group studies: that governments 
actively participated in the early stages of the policy-making process to 
influence the contents of the Commission’s proposal. Their participation 
critically undermines the representativeness criteria and participation as 
diversity arguments for including interest groups in the decision-making 
process. The governments of the member states should not be part of the 
public consultations because they will have the possibility to make further 
amendments when the proposal is passed to the Council.  
However, the research of Klüver, Mahoney, and Opper (2015) on frames 
suggesting that civil liberties frames are more prevalent when facing DGs such 
as DG Justice does not seem to hold in this case. The position papers in the 
present sample are more focused on their own needs and worries and more 
inclined to refer to the difficulties they face and the obstruction that 
procedural rules have to businesses; this corresponds to Cohen’s (2016) claim 
that data protection regulation is seen as a hindrance to innovation.  
6.3.1.2 Privacy advocates 
The concerns raised by privacy advocates are generally less sceptical of the 
procedural approach and are more focused on increasing the self-
determination of data subjects. Although the right to access one’s own data 
was already ensured in the Data Protection Directive, civil society 
organisations argued that obtaining access in practice was complicated. 
European Digital Rights (Appendix 1: EDRI, 2009, p. 3) suggests that data 
controllers should ‘(i) indicate in an easily accessible and user-friendly way 
how long they store personal data, (ii) keep logs of each time personal data is 
being accessed or processed, and (iii) provide data subjects access to the logs 
pertaining to their own data’. On the topic of how data breaches should be 
communicated, the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) proposes that 
the EU legislation should include a general obligation to disclose whenever 
there has been a data breach, a requirement which at the time of the 
consultation only concerned telecommunications companies (Appendix 1: 
BEUC, 2009, p. 18). 
The most radical position is presented by Privacy International (Appendix 
1: 2009) that criticises the way security frames have been used to advance 
exceptions to privacy laws, connecting government surveillance aims with 
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efforts to promote post-privacy positions in order to introduce more profiling 
of individuals: 
The way policymakers regard users of social networking as though 
they have abandoned all hopes and expectations of privacy is the same 
way they described the need to promote mining, profiling, and 
retention after terrorist attacks. Two years ago proponents of reduced 
privacy spoke of privacy as standing opposed to the survival of a free 
Internet, just as we hear proponents of body-scanning technologies 
speaking of processing naked scans of passengers is necessary to the 
survival of the air-travel industry. Privacy regulations are said to be 
standing in the way of progress while policymakers focus on 
regulating for public security. (Appendix 1: Privacy International, 
2009, p. 3) 
Privacy International also highlights that the primary focus of future 
regulation should be focused on the protection of information privacy rather 
than the relatively obscure language of ‘data protection’, a clear stand against 
the twin goal of data protection.  
Nevertheless, the position papers reveal that public authorities have very 
different views on how data protection regulation should be applied in 
practice, even within the same country. The UK National Information 
Governance Board for Health and Social Care (NIGB) was one of the most 
outspoken critics of international transfers of data and data aggregation 
technologies that endanger the anonymity of medical information. The NIGB 
(Appendix 1: 2009, p. 2) proposes that the EU legislation would include four 
additional safeguards which are present in UK data protection law:  
For person-level data which has been de-identified using 
pseudonymisation, the additional protections required include: 
an undertaking not to link the data provided with other person-level 
data which could render the data more identifiable; 
 Not to seek in other ways to render the information more 
identifiable;  
 Not to disclose the data onto other parties; 
 To provide a similar level of protection for pseudonymised 
data as would be given to identifiable personal data.  
The NIGB’s position is focused on the procedural approach to privacy in a way 
which is reminiscent of Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity model. Central to 
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Nissenbaum’s (2010) thesis is the appropriateness of information flows. 
Addressing the specific issue of medical data, NIGB stresses the need to 
contain such data within the medical context. This position is also in line with 
Ohm’s (2010) position that the biggest risks to the right to privacy are 
connected to the number of parties personal data are transmitted to. 
The joint submission by the WP29 and the Working Party on Police and 
Justice (WPPJ), ambitiously named ‘The Future of Privacy’, was focused on 
both informational self-determination and procedural approaches. The 
submission highlighted that ‘the challenges are immense’ and that current 
developments ‘may lead towards a more or less permanent surveillance 
society’ (Appendix 1: Article 29 Working Party & WPPJ, 2009, p. 26). To 
empower data subjects, the two working parties suggest increasing 
transparency and enabling collective action. However, while empowering data 
subjects was seen as part of the solution, the approach is not really reminiscent 
of informational self-determination. Testimony to this is the scepticism 
expressed towards the applicability of consent as a way to ensure an 
appropriate level of privacy. Most suggested applications were concerned with 
requiring procedures and documentation to enable enforcement by the DPAs. 
Some applications were also directly related to the procedural safeguards that 
data controllers need to implement. 
To summarise, aside for a few notable exceptions, operational principles 
were conspicuously absent in the position papers and were rather expressed 
indirectly by way of specific applications. These were frequently associated 
with the free movement of data and data maximisation. It shows that the 
inclusion of ‘the free movement of data’ in the title of the Data Protection 
Directive later enabled technical, applicational arguments to be used 
extensively when arguing for updates to data protection regulation. Given the 
uneven representation of stakeholders in the public consultation, the result is 
that far more concrete applications supporting the big data paradigm are 
suggested than the applications that would seek to enhance the protection of 
individual privacy. However, given the status of some of the civil society actors 
and public authorities, it is important to assess whether this imbalance had 
any concrete impact on the Commission’s policy proposal.  
6.3.2 THE CONSULTATION’S INFLUENCE ON THE COMMISSION’S 
COMMUNICATION ON PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 
Informed by the 2009 consultation, the Commission published a 
Communication in November 2010. The 20-page document served as an 
indication of what the final proposal for a new regulation would look like two 
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years later. Contrary to the positions presented by free data lobbyists, the 
Commission strongly favoured stricter data protection rules. While the 
Commission (2010a, p. 10) acknowledged the need for better harmonisation 
and less bureaucratic procedures, it did not support narrowing the scope of 
the Data Protection Directive simply because online business practices had 
become more surveillant in nature. 
Basic elements of transparency are … particularly relevant in the 
online environment, where quite often privacy notices are unclear, 
difficult to access, non-transparent and not always in full compliance 
with existing rules. A case where this might be so is online behavioural 
advertising, where both the proliferation of actors involved in the 
provision of behavioural advertising and the technological complexity 
of the practice make it difficult for an individual to know and 
understand if personal data are being collected, by whom, and for 
what purpose. (European Commission, 2010a, p. 6, emphasis added). 
The concerns that have been addressed by representatives from several 
different industries seem to have had the most impact on the Communication. 
The notification procedure is an example of this. The Commission recognises 
the following:  
There is general consensus amongst data controllers that the current 
general obligation to notify all data processing operations to the Data 
Protection Authorities is a rather cumbersome obligation which does 
not provide, in itself, any real added value for the protection of 
individuals’ personal data. (European Commission, 2010a, p. 10, 
emphasis added) 
Throughout the document, references are made to the rights of citizens and 
obligations of data controllers. While there were clearly more lobbyists 
representing various business interests as noted in the previous section, 
privacy advocates were just as successful in their attempts to influence the 
Commission. This would confirm Coen’s (2007) observation that cause groups 
may have privileged access to law-makers when their interests are aligned with 
the DG officials. For example, the right to be forgotten and data portability 
were only mentioned by BEUC, yet the Commission not only added these two 
concepts to the Communication but also gave them significant weight 
(European Commission, 2010a, p. 8).  
Although some corporations sought to soften the current level of legislation 
by promoting stronger self-regulatory rules and procedures, the Commission 
responded by promising to examine the possibility of enhancing data 
controllers’ responsibility by co-regulatory measures. Such initiatives include 
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making the appointment of independent data protection officers (DPOs) 
mandatory and including an obligation to carry out ‘privacy impact 
assessments’ before processing sensitive data (European Commission, 2010a, 
p. 12), both suggestions made by BEUC. Although the Commission failed to be 
explicit, it supported the accountability principle as a way to introduce more 
co-regulatory systems of control. Whereas the Data Protection Directive had 
required controllers to send fairly formalistic notifications to DPAs, the co-
regulatory accountability principle sets out that controllers should be able to 
demonstrate exactly how they process data and for what purposes. 
 In other words, the accountability principle does not include any new 
obligations per se but aims to clarify the old ones. As the Article 29 Working 
Party (2010) explains, ‘In sum, the new provision does not aim at subjecting 
data controllers to new principles but rather at ensuring de facto, effective 
compliance with existing ones’. Nevertheless, a move from notification 
obligations to an accountability regime is dependent on granting DPAs more 
powers to impose sanctions for efficiently enforcing data protection 
legislation. If DPAs are not strengthened, the accountability principle would 
likely weaken the privacy rights of citizens. 
6.3.3 THE 2011 CONSULTATION: THE OPPOSING INTERESTS OF 
FREE DATA LOBBYISTS AND PRIVACY ADVOCATES 
Whereas the 2009 public consultation sought answers to broad questions, 
‘what are the new challenges to data protection?’, ‘does the current framework 
meet these challenges?’, and ‘what would be needed to address them?’, the 
2011 consultation launched conjointly with the 2010 Communication, asking 
for specific input on the proposal. Owing to the increase in the number of 
submissions to the second consultation, I expanded the analysis to 44 papers 
mainly because a wider degree of sectors was included in the second 
consultation and I wanted to ensure that the most salient issues would be 
included. To complement the qualitative analysis, I used Boolean search 
strings to comb through the entire material for the keywords that appeared 
extensively in the papers. 
As with the position papers submitted to the previous consultation, the 
length and detail of the position papers significantly varied. Some submissions 
followed the same structure as the Commission’s Communication, whereas 
others focused on a much narrower set of policy issues. It may be noted that 
the position papers in the second consultation were notably more detailed and 
more extensive than the position papers in the 2009 consultation. Owing to 
the more concrete nature of the submissions, the papers in the 2011 
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consultation have been categorised in a more structured fashion with a greater 
focus on concrete policy proposals to trace whether the applications have also 
been included in the Commission’s draft GDPR.  
The analysis of the contents of the position papers allows me to put the 
different actors into three different categories with the twin goal of data 
protection as the basis for the categorisation. Drawing on Sabatier (1998), 
public and private actors are not categorised by their institutional status but 
by the position they wish to advocate (see table 6.3). As has been noted above, 
the categories do not indicate that all stakeholders within one group would be 
identical and equally concerned with the same issue. Instead, this division is 
an analytical tool to see the main reason for lobbying activity. Regardless, 
three actors were placed in the ‘mixed approach’ category because their 
position papers demonstrated a will to preserve the privacy of citizens yet at 
the same time facilitate data flows. Nevertheless, these entities are the 
exception, and most of the analysis is focused on determining how free data 
lobbyists and privacy advocates construct data protection and, in extension, 
the right to privacy. 
However, it may be noted that of the entities analysed, only public 
authorities were present in all three categories. Bearing in mind that this is by 
no means a complete list of participants to the consultation, it appears that 
sector adherence is highly indicative of the stakeholder’s position, regardless 
of how the entity is funded.  
The division of actors according to the primary operational principles of 
data privacy or free movement of data provides an entry-level analysis of the 
motivations of the entities involved in the legislative process. However, it is 
important to look at how these actors address more applicational principles 
that relate to data protection. In table 5.3, I determined whether a certain 
applicational principle and its observed variables relate to the operational 
principles of informational self-determination or the procedural approach to 
privacy. I will use this operational division to assess the different proposals by 
the interest representatives. 
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Table 6.3 Interest representatives in the legislative process. 52 
                                                  
52 Most of the abbreviated entities listed above are either international or European business networks, 
with some notable exceptions such as the European bar association (CCBE), the European Consumer 
Organisation (BEUC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Finnish national welfare authority THL 
and the European trade union ETUC. Please consult Appendix 1.  
Sector Free data 
lobbyists 
Privacy advocates Mixed 
approach 
Justice & Law Ministry of Justice 
(UK) 
CCBE LV 
Ministry of 
Justice 
(LV)   
Bar Council of 
England and Wales 
 
Workers’ rights 
 
ETUC 
 
 
UNI Europa 
 
Digital rights Data Protection at 
Centre for Socio-
Legal Studies, 
University of Oxford 
Datainspektionen 
 
EDPS 
 
Privacy International  
  EDRI  
Consumer 
rights 
 
BEUC FTC 
Healthcare Johnson & Johnson  THL  
IT BSA 
 
Symantec 
Microsoft 
 
 
Digital Europe 
EGDF 
  
Advertising and 
marketing 
IAB Europe 
  
WFA 
  
 
Data industry 
platform 
  
 EFAMRO and 
ESOMAR 
  
Finance and 
credit 
institutions 
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6.3.3.1 Free data lobbyists 
Informational self-determination 
The notion of strengthening people’s privacy by empowering them with 
certain data-related rights is, as noted in chapter three, an integral part of 
informational self-determination or the self-managerial approach to 
information privacy. The Data Protection Directive already awarded users 
significant data-related rights in the EU, but these rights were often not 
respected.  
For free data lobbyists, a regulatory framework which empowers users is 
highly undesirable. First, limiting data processing to situations where explicit 
consent has been provided may negatively impact the flow of information, thus 
actively limiting the number of information sources available and potentially 
                                                  
53 As General Electric operates in several sectors it was difficult to assign the company to a specific sector. 
As the company wields significant economic and political power the general category of foreign lobbying 
was deemed appropriate. 
Insurance CEA 
 
Retail Carrefour 
  
Foreign 
Business 
lobbying 
AmCham 
  
DCSI 
  
JBCE 
  
 CIPL    
General Electric53  
  
Telecom ETNO 
  
 
EuroISPA 
  
Social media Facebook 
  
Broadcasting ACT 
 
  
EBU 
  
 
BBC 
  
Audio-visual 
industry & 
publishing 
IFPI 
  
MPA, IVF,  FIAD & 
FIAPF (joint 
response) 
  
 ENPA & FAEP   
Aviation IATA 
 
 119 
 
challenging the quality of predictions. Second, these rights may introduce 
significant costs associated with putting systems in place that provide users 
with access and rectification rights, the right to be forgotten, and data 
portability. Third, especially dominant actors would be reluctant to allow for 
data portability because it would also be possible for users to more easily 
change to a competitor’s service if all of their data could be easily transmitted 
to another service. 
For example, the Business Software Alliance (Appendix 1: 2011) and 
Microsoft (Appendix 1: 2011) want to create separate rules for user-created 
and user-generated data that would require different levels of consent. While 
some of the free data lobbyists may accept that users should have some control 
over the pictures and texts they have uploaded to social networking sites, this 
would not extend to the data that is created in the course of their online 
activities. According to Andrejevic (2012), it is actually user-generated data 
that tends to be commodified and not the user-generated content, which 
should prompt legislators to limit the processing of user-generated data more 
and not less. The role of user-submitted data is marginal compared with the 
information that can be derived from web browsing or Facebook likes (cf. 
Kosinski, Stillwell, & Graepel, 2013). Moreover, the data a user generates is 
usually far more sensitive than the data he or she decides to upload.  
A common strategy among free data lobbyists is to move away from user 
rights and instead focus on ‘accountability’ (addressed below under processing 
obligations). Yet, the actors that are most vocal in their support of introducing 
more accountability instead of prescriptive rules or more user rights also 
heavily object to the introduction of collective redress mechanisms which 
would make it possible for the civil society to initiate class action lawsuits.  
The procedural approach to data protection 
From a privacy perspective, the most important processing obligation is the 
principle of data minimisation, which in theory requires that processing of 
data should be limited to a specific purpose for a specific time period. For data-
intensive industries, the whole idea of data minimisation goes against the 
supposed benefits of big data, according to which the processing of large data 
sets might lead to surprising insights that would be impossible to infer 
intuitively (Athique, 2018; Brown & Korff, 2009, p. 124; Pridmore & Zwick, 
2011, p. 272; Zwick & Knott, 2009, p. 234; Hildebrandt, 2006, p. 548). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the free data lobbyists are for a weaker 
application of the principle. However, how they choose to frame their 
viewpoint depends. 
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The World Federation of Advertisers (WFA) expresses that ‘the quantity of 
data processed is not a problem in itself. On the contrary, the wealth of data 
available in the digital era is arguably one of the greatest assets of a dynamic 
digital economy’ (Appendix 1: WFA, 2011, p. 4). The European Games 
Developer Foundation, on the contrary, repeats the ‘post-privacy’ paradigm as 
presented by Heller (2011) and Schramm (2012) and states that ‘It is well 
known fact that younger European generations have a very different attitude 
towards what is private and what is not than older generations’ (Appendix 1: 
EGDF, 2011, p. 3). Direct marketers and data brokerage companies express on 
their part that ‘Businesses are using data for the benefit of the European 
citizens’ (Appendix 1: Data Industry Platform, 2011, p. 7). Some, such as the 
airlines represented by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) 
(Appendix 1: 2011), cited other regulatory obligations. Others, such as the 
British Bankers’ Association (BBA) and the Association for Financial Markets 
in Europe (AFME) stated that they are ‘best placed to determine what personal 
data they need to keep and for how long, in light of their legal and regulatory 
obligations’ (Appendix 1: BBA & AFME, 2011, p. 5).  
The opposition to increase the transparency of data processing activities is 
not argued in terms of competitive disadvantages or unnecessary bureaucracy 
but with ‘notification fatigue’. According to the free data lobbyists, users get 
tired from reading privacy notices and eventually stop reading them altogether 
if they are displayed too frequently (Appendix 1: Microsoft, 2011; CBI, 2011; 
Nokia, 2011; BBC, 2011). The description of notification fatigue resembles 
Nissenbaum’s (2010, p. 36) ‘transparency paradox’, according to which 
privacy policies are less likely to be understood if they are detailed. Therefore, 
there is a slight change in tone compared with the previous consultation, 
where economic arguments were frequently used to motivate applications that 
favour industries. Similar reasons are cited when explaining why data breach 
reports should be limited to specific cases where users are at risk. The so-called 
risk-based approach is mentioned in AmCham’s (Appendix 1: 2011) and 
EPOF’s (Appendix 1: 2011) position papers, and some of its iterations can be 
found in several position papers by the representatives of the IT industry. 
According to the risk-based approach, users only have to be notified when 
there is a ‘significant risk of harm’ as a result of a data breach. If the data is 
encrypted or otherwise unreadable, the breach can be disregarded. 
Notwithstanding this argument, the free data lobbyists do not support 
introducing requirements to encrypt data because they are highly critical of 
any measures that might introduce technology mandates.  
The wide use of public interest framing to advocate for limited procedural 
obligations supports the findings of Klüver, Mahoney, and Opper (Appendix 
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1: 2015) that revealed that interest groups tend to use public interest frames 
when addressing DGs with a public interest focus. However, the free data 
lobbyists are less diplomatic when explaining their support for abolishing the 
general notification obligation, describing the procedure as ‘burdensome’, 
‘bureaucratic’, ‘cumbersome’, and ‘useless’ (see Appendix 1: DP socio-legal 
studies at Oxford, 2011).  
Limiting bureaucratic record-keeping is also consistent with a general 
hostility towards public interference in general. This means that private 
corporations are generally quite sceptical of the instruments that grant law 
enforcement unfettered access to personal data. The most notable exception is 
the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) (Appendix 
1: 2011) that wishes to limit privacy rights to enforce copyright and would 
therefore like to see that law enforcement had easier access to ISP data. This 
position is largely just a reiteration of what the copyright industries stated in 
the previous consultation. This particular concern sets the copyright 
industries apart from the online and telecommunications industries that, 
although generally in favour of intellectual property rights in the form of 
patents, are adamantly opposed of any enforcement provisions that require 
data retention or provide access to data for law enforcement purposes. 
Consequently, self-regulation is nearly always preferred over co-regulation or 
binding regulation. This might seem contradictory to the fact that big ICT 
companies want a Regulation to harmonise EU legislation. On a more 
applicational level, however, even the most multinational entities prefer self-
regulatory initiatives. For example, while privacy by design54 is universally 
supported, the free data lobbyists underline that the principles should not be 
binding or include technology mandates of any kind. The Interactive 
Advertising Bureau’s( IAB) position is reminiscent of the ‘surveillance-
innovation complex’ described by Cohen (2016), according to which any 
regulatory intervention is perceived to encumber innovation.  
 
IAB supports the application of privacy by design in internal processes, 
starting with educating developers about privacy. … Mandatory 
standards or measures would likely decrease this competitive element 
and ‘lock down’ innovation to a standard, which might increase privacy 
when it is adopted but might prevent more innovative solutions that 
would not be covered by that standard. (Appendix 1: IAB Europe, 2011, 
pp. 5-6)  
 
                                                  
54 See chapter 3, subsection 3.1.3 and 3.3. 
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Second, free data lobbyists want to move away from a prescriptive, rule-based, 
ex ante regime to an ex post legal system guided by an accountability 
principle.55 The Digital Europe (Appendix 1: 2011, pp. 15-16) lobby coalition 
provides an example of what this might entail: 
[Accountability] can be summarised as ‘the obligation and/or 
willingness to demonstrate and take responsibility for performance in 
light of agreed-upon objectives and as going beyond responsibility by 
obligating an organisation to be answerable for its actions’. 
The accountability regime was also mentioned in the submissions to the 2009 
consultation. For free data lobbyists, the accountability principle was 
proposed as a way of substituting formal rules for international data transfers. 
While accountability as such is often supported, accountability that takes the 
form of liability and criminal sanctions for failing to respect data protection 
legislation is met with strong opposition. Nevertheless, Microsoft (Appendix 
1: 2011, p. 15) supports the introduction of sanctions in the form of fines and 
cites the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) as a commendable 
example of a sanctions regime reserved for ‘truly bad actors’. Facebook was 
issued the maximum fine of £500,000 for its role in providing Cambridge 
Analytica access to personal data. Whether Microsoft would be inclined to 
consider Facebook a truly bad actor is questionable. 
However, in the Commission’s 2010 Communication, the accountability 
principle was based on the Opinion of the Article 29 Working Party (Appendix 
1: 2010, p. 3), which stated that ‘a statutory accountability principle would 
explicitly require data controllers to implement appropriate and effective 
measures to put into effect the principles and obligations of the Directive and 
demonstrate this on request’. 
Co-regulation proved to be a divisive issue among the free data lobbyists. 
Although there are many different kinds of co-regulation with various degrees 
of public involvement (see Marsden, 2011), the Commission’s Communication 
presented a solution where controller obligations can be supplanted through 
the appointment of an independent DPO and notification regimes replaced 
with data protection impact assessments (DPIAs). For bigger corporations, the 
appointment of a DPO is not an issue, and many would appoint one without it 
being an explicit requirement. Smaller businesses and their representatives 
are generally supportive of limiting controllers’ obligations through instating 
a DPO but heavily critical of the legal obligations to appoint one. Therefore, 
                                                  
55  The accountability principle first surfaced in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) privacy guidelines adopted in 1980. 
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the pressing question is when an entity’s processing activities are so pervasive 
that the appointment of DPOs and DPIAs is mandatory. For example, IAB 
Europe (Appendix 1: 2011, p. 5) and World-Check (Appendix 1: 2011) support 
the mandatory appointment of DPOs and DPIAs but only for large controllers 
(without specifying when a controller is ‘large’). Although there is a lack of 
consensus on whether DPOs and DPIAs should be mandatory, free data 
lobbyists wish that at least smaller companies should be exempt from this 
requirement.  
While the interest representatives do demonstrate differences in their 
approaches especially regarding emphasis, it is quite remarkable that such a 
wide set of entities have curiously aligned interests. Data processing is as 
central to the operations of businesses as accounting practice – regardless of 
industry, the same questions arise and the same needs are expressed. BBC’s 
(Appendix 1: 2011, p. 3) position even expressed that the original purpose of 
the Data Protection Directive was to ‘encourage the free passage of 
information inside a single market, whilst protecting the data and rights of 
individuals’ and expressed worry that ‘the dual purpose has become obscured’, 
effectively turning the priorities of data protection regulation on their head. 
While privacy is not directly opposed, it is clear that there is a fundamental 
incompatibility with privacy rights and maintaining the speed, variety, and 
complexity of information flows, which are an inherent part of the big data 
paradigm (Barocas & Nissenbaum, 2014; Kitchin, 2014).  
It is only on the level of industry-related exceptions that free data lobbyists 
propose significantly different solutions, such as when publishers wish to 
retain journalistic exceptions to data processing, when bankers seek to clarify 
how their obligations to report financial crimes are compatible with data 
protection clauses, or how airlines should limit transfers of private 
information while still complying with various border control regimes and 
immigration policy. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the advertising and data 
brokerage industries are becoming increasingly reliant on surveillant 
technologies and generally demonstrate the most adversarial attitudes 
towards the measures that aim to increase the information privacy of citizens. 
Profiling restrictions and consent requirements are generally met with 
suspicion. There is also a different perception of how people relate to privacy: 
especially industries that rely on online advertising tend to have a 
transactional view of privacy, where information about oneself can be traded 
for a service that benefits them. The critique against this view of privacy and 
the numerous studies that have debunked this claim are routinely ignored (cf. 
Turow, Hennessy, & Draper, 2015). 
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6.3.3.2 Privacy advocates 
The results from the previous section demonstrate why it is unlikely to find 
corporations among the privacy advocates. The retention, analysis, and 
transfer of personal information are so pervasive in all industries that more 
effective enforcement of data protection legislation unavoidably results in 
compliance costs. The privacy advocates in this sample are therefore 
professional associations in the form of one Pan-European and one national 
Bar Council, two European trade unions, the EDPS and the Swedish DPA, 
Privacy International and the European Digital Rights initiative (EDRI), and 
BEUC. The relevant sectors are law, workers’ rights, digital rights, and 
consumer rights (see table 6.1 above). The EDPS opinion differs from the civil 
society organisations in that they clearly support the provisions that were 
envisioned to facilitate some data transfers. However, it would be a mistake to 
label the EDPS’s approach as mixed because it is based on the realistic 
expectation that data transfers both happen and need to happen in an 
increasingly interconnected world. In contrast, Privacy International 
(Appendix 1: 2011, p. 3) questions the feasibility of having two conflicting goals 
(the protection and free movement of personal data), stating that ‘the 
effectiveness of personal information protection and effective enforcement 
should be the prime and overriding objectives, while lessening administrative 
burdens, making transfers simple, etc. should come as secondary objectives, 
albeit desirable’. 
Informational self-determination 
Privacy advocates tend to favour informational self-determination and often 
push for more self-determination. A closer examination of the interest 
representatives presented above reveals that this is not always the case. 
Although one would expect Privacy International and EDRI to have the same 
opinions on most matters, their approaches are surprisingly different. 
Whereas EDRI saw user consent as the most important piece of the puzzle, 
Privacy International was somewhat sceptical towards the measures that are 
focused on user consent and instead encouraged direct intervention with 
dubious practices. Privacy International’s position is therefore more 
reminiscent of the views taken by Gandy (1989), Obar (2015, p. 5) and Cohen 
(2016), promoting public oversight instead of individual agency. While EDRI 
supports the abolition of the general notification obligation, both Privacy 
International and BEUC support the notification procedure. 
The diverging approaches could be explained by looking at their ideological 
foundations. EDRI can be conceived as a digital rights group that adheres to 
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libertarian ideals which stress personal autonomy. Privacy International, in 
contrast, represents a more social and liberal approach to privacy, where a 
strong DPA should protect the interests of the collective (cf. Venturelli, 2002, 
p. 76). Privacy International has historically focused broadly on the questions 
of surveillance, regardless of technology involved. In the consultations, 
Privacy International was more focused on the obligations of data controllers 
and the enforcement of rules and remained sceptical towards awareness-
raising campaigns and that more explicit rules of consent would have a 
meaningful impact on the right to privacy of citizens. BEUC (Appendix 1: 2011, 
p. 10) had similar views and was largely in favour of the procedural approach 
to privacy instead of informational self-determination. They highlighted that 
people are rarely aware of what behavioural advertising is and criticise the 
initiatives that would put a ‘disproportionate burden on users to protect 
themselves’. 
The EDPS, Peter Hustinx, also contributed to the consultation, even 
though the EDPS has numerous other ways of affecting the outcome. The 
position paper spans over 36 pages and is a lot more explicit and detailed than 
most position papers. It is not possible to address all the questions that were 
addressed in the position paper, but one of the most important points raised 
was the need to place the fundamental rights perspective ‘at the heart of the 
review process’ (Appendix 1: EDPS, 2011, p. 34). Whereas his approach was 
clearly grounded in what is happening in the sphere of data processing, it was 
also highly normative. While the legitimate interests of businesses must be 
considered, the rights of users take precedence. For example, Hustinx 
advocated for data portability, additional rules for consent, and a collective 
redress mechanism (Appendix 1: EDPS, 2011, pp. 18-20).  
The trade unions’ submissions are quite unique to the process as they do 
not emanate from a perspective of consumption or citizenship but labour 
rights. Both of the trade unions in the sample underlined the importance of 
considering how data processing in the workplace affects worker’s rights 
(Appendix 1: ETUC, 56  2011; Uni Europa, 57  2011), an issue that is often 
highlighted in the surveillance literature (see e.g. Dandeker, 1994; Gandy, 
1989; Lyon, 1994).58 They criticised the Commission for ignoring the question 
altogether in its Communication. Workplace communications surveillance is 
                                                  
56 The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) represents most trade unions in Europe.  
57 Represents services workers. 
58 Seven trade unions participated in the Consultation – three from Austria, one from Germany and one 
from Sweden. The two trade unions selected for the sample are umbrella associations with a Pan-
European reach. 
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not as commonplace in Europe as it is in the U.S., but there is a clear fear of 
U.S. practices extending to the EU as well. ETUC (Appendix 1: 2011, p. 2) was 
especially concerned with the blurring of work and private life, in part driven 
by technological change. Moreover, ETUC was concerned with employers 
forcing workers to accept workplace surveillance as a condition for 
employment. Both trade unions agreed that a collective redress mechanism 
should be instated.  
The procedural approach to data protection 
The privacy of citizens can also be enhanced through imposing obligations on 
whoever is processing personal information. The principle of data 
minimisation was fully supported by the privacy advocates, and they also 
addressed that data retention periods should be kept to a minimum. The EDPS 
even stated that data should have an expiration date (Appendix 1: EDPS, 2011, 
p. 19). 
The processing obligations suggested by the privacy advocates can best be 
described as various requirements of ‘privacy by default’. This is clearly 
reflected in Privacy International’s (Appendix 1: 2011, p. 4) position paper, 
where they advocated not only for privacy by design but also for a ‘maximum 
privacy by default’. Whereas privacy by design relates to how applications are 
programmed, privacy by default suggests how settings are calibrated.  
How the different privacy advocates see the role of transparency also 
depends on if they primarily rely on data self-determination or the procedural 
approach to privacy. Transparency can be viewed from both perspectives: 
either as a requirement to log and demonstrate exactly how data processing 
takes place or as a requirement to communicate data processing practices 
when soliciting user consent. A sceptical take on privacy notices reminiscent 
of the ‘transparency paradox’ critique by Nissenbaum (2010, p. 36) need not 
indicate that transparency as such is irrelevant but that such information 
should never be directed at data subjects. The requirements to issue privacy 
notices were supported by the trade unions ETUC and UNI Europa and BEUC, 
but Privacy International was less enthusiastic. Privacy International 
(Appendix 1: 2011, p. 5) remained ‘cynical’, as the language of privacy notices 
had not improved significantly despite ‘years of relatively fruitless 
discussions’. However, Privacy International fully supported mandatory 
breach notifications which are handled by DPAs.  
Even the privacy advocates were positive towards the introduction of a 
statutory principle of accountability. However, they underlined that they wish 
to see it as an ‘additional obligation’ (Appendix 1: Privacy International, 2011, 
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p. 9). Thus, they agreed with the proposition to make the appointment of DPOs 
and DPIAs mandatory, with some threshold limits. 
Therefore, the pressing question is whether the introduction of an 
accountability principle would exclude or include specific obligations for 
controllers and more powers for DPAs. Without a strong legal regime, the 
accountability principle would be a dead letter, and enforcement would be 
impossible if DPAs lacked resources and a mandate to issue meaningful 
sanctions. The privacy advocates were aware of this, which is why they 
supported the introduction of collective redress mechanisms, heavy sanctions, 
and fines for the controllers that fail to comply with data protection legislation 
in addition to privacy by design and default as explicitly recognised principles.  
Because one of the main arguments of the privacy advocates was that DPAs 
should have more authority, it is revealing to look at the opinions of the 
Swedish DPA that would be directly affected by these amendments. On a 
general note, the Swedish DPA’s opinions were highly in line with both the 
EDPS and the above-mentioned NGOs: DPAs should be able to issue stronger 
sanctions and have powers over data controllers as well as processors. They 
should also be able to represent individual data subjects in court (Appendix 1: 
Datainspektionen, 2011). The Swedish DPA agreed with EDRI that the 
notification obligation is unnecessary, highlighting that only an estimated 10% 
of all registers were even notified to the DPA. 
The submission by the Swedish DPA reflects Klüver’s (2013) proposition 
that interest groups seek to advance their own position in a rational manner, 
as the Swedish DPA aimed to advance its own powers yet reduce its 
administrative burden. However, the Swedish DPA also issued the need for 
‘simplified rules for the everyday processing of personal data’ that is 
‘unstructured’, citing the updated Swedish data protection legislation as a 
source. This particular amendment is not without its critics because it opened 
a loophole. Businesses have been known to store personal data outside of 
databases in ‘unstructured’ documents to avoid being subject to data 
protection legislation.59 It is also precisely these kinds of national solutions 
that were cited as a challenge to full harmonisation.  
After looking at both the procedural and self-managerial applications 
promoted by both free data lobbyists and privacy advocates, it is worth looking 
at some of the approaches that contain elements of both the camps.  
                                                  
59 This information was provided during informal interviews with industry representatives. 
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6.3.3.3 Mixed approach advocates 
It is telling that of the 44 position papers selected for closer analysis, only four 
could be labelled as ‘mixed approach’: the FTC’s contribution, Latvia’s 
Ministry of Justice, Symantec, and the Finnish National Institute for Health 
and Welfare (THL). They are in the mixed approach category because the 
positions they advanced can be both supportive of stronger privacy regulations 
and advocate for the free movement of data. However, it must be stressed that 
the four actors did not raise the same issues and have highly conflicting views 
in some areas. 
Even businesses that are literally in the trade of protecting people’s 
personal communications, such as Symantec, the security software company, 
are for the free movement of data. This is understandable, because Symantec 
is dependent on detailed information about possible computer viruses in order 
to be able to provide an effective service.  On the one hand, Symantec 
(Appendix 1: 2011: 4-5) welcomed the proposition that processing should be 
more transparent, recognized access and rectification rights, and that there 
should be additional security requirements for entities that process children’s 
data. On the other hand, Symantec (Appendix 1: 2011: 3, 7) was critical of 
narrowing the scope of legitimate grounds for processing without explicit 
consent and wanted to include a different category of data, ‘attributable data’, 
that would merit some protection but not to the same extent as personal data. 
This position can be traced to the U.S privacy law that makes a distinction 
between ‘identifiers’ and ‘protected information’. 60  It also highlights the 
critique raised by Ohm (2010) that the European definition of personal data 
can expand almost ad infinitum owing to the increasingly sophisticated 
identification techniques, possibly losing track of what is truly ‘personal’.  
Latvia’s Ministry of Justice (Appendix 1: 2011) was noticeably most 
concerned with retaining national exceptions to the general approach, but 
carefully supportive of strengthening the rights of individuals, citing the right 
to be forgotten as ‘an issue that needs to be dealt with’ and that strengthening 
the rules of consent should be reviewed, while critical of the need to expand 
the sensitive categories of data. 
THL (Appendix 1: 2011), which processes large quantities of health-related 
data, was critical of access and rectification rights as well as expanding the role 
of consent – in many ways the opposite of Symantec, which was generally 
positive towards user empowerment and informational self-determination. 
THL stressed the need for exemptions for research purposes but was at the 
same time positive towards expanding the categories of sensitive data.  
                                                  
60 The HIPAA Privacy Rule distinguishes between protected health information (PHI) and identifiers.  
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The FTC’s contribution is one of the most interesting submissions of the 
entire consultation – a foreign consumer protection agency participates in a 
consultation on legislation which it will neither be subject to nor have any 
obligations to enforce, except indirectly through the Safe Harbor agreement. 
Their participation supports Slaughter’s (2005) depiction of regulators as the 
new diplomats and Raab’s (2010) argument that these networks are growing 
in importance. The FTC’s position paper reveals that the Commission and the 
FTC had been meeting each other at regular intervals (Appendix 1: FTC, 2011). 
For example, the FTC (Appendix 1: 2011, p. 1) disclosed the following:  
In July 2010, EC Vice President Viviane Reding (EU Commissioner for 
Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship) and the Director-
General for Justice, Françoise Le Bail, visited the FTC and met with 
FTC Commissioner Edith Ramirez, Bureau of Consumer Protection 
Director David Vladeck, and other FTC staff.  
This was only a few months before the call for the second consultation was 
initiated and the Commission published its Communication. Such a high-level, 
private meeting with a Commissioner and the DG Justice would not be 
accessible to most parties to the consultation. The FTC’s position paper was 
neither nearly as extensive as the ones submitted by, for example, AmCham or 
Microsoft nor was it in agreement with the EDPS’s submission. The duality 
comes from the FTC’s mission to protect consumers yet at the same time 
promote competition. That can also entail ensuring that American companies 
are not overburdened by European legislation. Therefore, the goal of the FTC 
is to align the U.S. and EU data protection legislation – not to the extent that 
EU data protection legislation would be identical to U.S. legislation but to such 
a degree that the two would not be completely incompatible.  
The FTC (Appendix 1: 2011, p. 4) supported the data minimisation 
principle and increased transparency and stressed that consumers need more 
choice mechanisms to opt-out of data processing. Furthermore, the FTC 
stressed that security breach notifications should be mandatory, highlighting 
that 45 states in the U.S. had passed legislation which requires breach 
notification.  
Regarding access rights, the FTC was slightly more sceptical. Although 
generally supportive, the FTC (Appendix 1: 2011, p. 7) was ‘mindful … of the 
significant costs associated with access’. The FTC would like to know whether 
companies should be able to charge for access, and while generally positive 
towards transparent processing, the FTC wondered whether companies 
should be required to inform consumers of the identity of the third parties with 
whom the controller has shared data and whether there should be a difference 
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between consumer-facing and non-consumer-facing entities. Moreover, the 
FTC stressed that the adequacy framework – which does not include the U.S. 
– has demonstrated ‘significant shortcomings’. Instead, the FTC stressed the 
need for better enforcement cooperation globally. 
Had the FTC been entirely focused on consumer protection, its submission 
would have been perceived as slightly odd – such an agency would not 
advocate for the possibility to charge users for realising their data protection 
rights and would not be wary of introducing more transparency requirements. 
Therefore, it must be stressed that the FTC has a dual purpose and that 
internationally, its role is not to promote the interests of American consumers 
but rather to make sure that American companies remain competitive also on 
a European market. This might also explain why the FTC has been quite 
reluctant to issue fines to big tech companies despite significant shortcomings 
in how especially Facebook has been processing data.61 
6.3.3.4 Summary of positions: incompatible interests? 
The free data lobbyists and privacy advocates have little in common in terms 
of how data protection legislation should be updated. One may conclude that 
the free data lobbyists are a much more diverse group; yet on the main topics, 
there is nearly full agreement. The privacy advocates are a lot more united in 
their approach, which can partly be explained by their similar raison d’être. A 
closer look at the positions advocated by the two camps has also revealed what 
a quantitative text analysis could not have – on a superficial level, privacy 
advocates and free data lobbyists might be in agreement, such as in their 
expressed support for an ‘accountability principle’, privacy by design, and the 
need to update definitions. However, closer analysis reveals that while the 
former expects the accountability principle to be an additional obligation and 
co-regulatory in nature, free data lobbyists see it as mostly self-regulatory. The 
same can be said of privacy by design. While both groups see an opportunity 
to update the main data protection definitions to their liking, there is rarely 
agreement on the contents of those definitions. For example, privacy 
advocates want consent to be explicit and are generally critical of other 
indicators of consent. Conversely, free data lobbyists are of the opinion that 
‘implicit consent’ through continuing the use of a service, for example, is just 
as valid.  
                                                  
61 In July, 2019 Facebook was finally issued a $5 billion fine due to various privacy 
violations (Patel 2019).  
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To conclude, while there is some agreement on the operational level – that 
a principled, technology-neutral omnibus approach is preferable to a more 
U.S.-oriented sectoral approach – there are fundamental disagreements on 
the applicational level. The disagreements are most pronounced in relation to 
the applications related to the procedural approach to privacy, where privacy 
advocates, both public and non-governmental, support more documentation 
and more transparency, whereas free data lobbyists would rather replace 
bureaucratic requirements with self-regulatory compliance measures. While 
updated legislation is an opportunity to lobby for more favourable legislation, 
it is also a risk that threatens the current ways of doing business and might 
entail significant compliance costs. Therefore, before turning to the question 
of influence, the question of what particular regulatory avenue to pursue 
should be addressed. 
6.3.4 LOBBY POSITIONS ON CHOOSING A REGULATORY 
INSTRUMENT 
One of the more important questions that the Commission faced when 
drafting the new Regulation was whether to update the regulatory framework 
by drafting a new Directive, drafting a Regulation, or simply relying on the 
existing Data Protection Directive and supplementing it with soft law 
measures.  
It was clear from the outset that the Commission was going to update the 
regulatory framework and not only rely on policy instruments. The wording in 
the consultations was strong and the Commission does not launch public 
consultations unless it considers changing the law itself. However, the 
regulatory form it would choose was far from obvious. Although the 
Commission criticised the member states’ divergent implementations of the 
original Data Protection Directive, the Commission refrained from stating 
what kind of legal instrument it would use in its 2010 Communication 
(European Commission, 2010a, p. 10). 
The benefits associated with drafting a Regulation are obvious from a 
supranational perspective. A Regulation enters into force two years after the 
Parliament and the Council have agreed upon its contents, and a Regulation 
does not need to be transposed into the member states’ national legislation. A 
Regulation guarantees harmonisation and is far easier to enforce than a 
Directive because there is no need to evaluate whether the national 
implementations match the original legal document. However, this also means 
that the drafting process of a Regulation can be protracted, as the member 
states want to make sure that the new law does not impede on their 
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sovereignty. This partially explains why it took the EU institutions four years 
to sign off on the new GDPR.  
A Directive, on the contrary, will have to be transposed into the national 
legislation of each member state within one to three years, depending on the 
Directive. The Commission is vested with the task of ensuring that the 
Directive has been correctly transposed. Member states have only failed to 
transpose less than 1% of all Directives, which is a reasonable transposition 
rate according to EU goals (European Commission, 2015c). However, the 
original Data Protection Directive was significantly delayed in several member 
states (European Commission, 2016c). 
Notwithstanding low non-compliance rates, Directives still grant member 
states a wider margin of appreciation than Regulations. Although many 
member states had transposed the Data Protection Directive into their 
legislation by 2002, closer analysis revealed significant differences between 
the national implementations (Korff, 2002; Löfgren & Webster, 2009). These 
differences led to an increasingly fragmented regulatory environment and a 
significant lack of harmonisation, resulting in highly bureaucratic notification 
schemes for multinational organisations and businesses. The choice of 
regulatory instrument bears with it significant consequences for data 
controllers. For this reason, it is imperative to examine interest 
representatives’ positions on this issue.  
6.3.4.1 A Regulation is necessary  
The most avid supporters of a GDPR were international technology companies 
that wanted jurisdictional clarity and data privacy advocates. Although this 
particular overlap of interests might seem strange on the outset, global IT 
companies have been known to have aligned interests with some digital rights 
advocacy groups, most famously concerning copyright enforcement. 62  A 
similar tendency can be witnessed in the case of data protection. Whereas 
there would be wide disagreement on the actual contents of the new 
legislation, a Regulation would, first and foremost, harmonise the existing 
patchwork of national data protection frameworks so that these companies 
would only have to deal with one set of bureaucratic procedures.  
Data privacy advocates have also realised that diverging rules within the 
EU in combination with transnational data flows leave citizens perplexed and 
confused as it is not clear which DPA one should turn to if there has been a 
                                                  
62  For example, Google has frequently aligned with Internet activists in issues related to copyright 
enforcement, such as in the debates surrounding the controversial update to the Copyright Directive. 
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breach of data protection rules. Among the supporters of a Regulation, one can 
find the Business Software Alliance, Digital Europe, and AmCham, who all 
represent some of the most influential ICT companies in the world, the 
American pharmaceutical and medical devices multinational Johnson and 
Johnson, as well as the EDPS, the Bar Council of England and Wales, EDRI, 
and Privacy International. Although the ICT companies have the explicit goal 
of facilitating the free flow of personal data and the privacy advocates wish to 
minimise data processing and transfers, these groups can see the benefit of 
agreeing on a uniform standard. 
The Commission would be more inclined to introduce a Regulation when 
politically feasible. By getting support from both the highly influential and 
financially important ICT industry and respectable privacy advocates, such as 
the EDPS and Privacy International, the Commission could argue that a 
Regulation had a wide basis of support that strengthened the legitimacy of 
their choice of legal instrument. After all, the entire purpose of introducing 
consultations to the legislative process is to gain legitimacy, and legitimacy 
cannot be gained with reference to a single interest group. By showing that 
parties on both sides of the spectrum can agree on a position would seem to 
demonstrate the deliberative character of the policy process (cf. Schmidt, 
2013). 
6.3.4.2 A Regulation would be counter-productive 
The stakeholders who were mostly critical of proposing new legislation as a 
Regulation had different reasons for doing so. This group can be further 
divided into two factions, entities who believe that legislative reform is 
necessary and entities who wish to introduce light changes with soft law 
instruments.  
The Latvian Ministry of Justice (Appendix 1: 2011) was, for example, 
supportive of a new Directive but concerned that a Regulation would impede 
on the nation’s sovereignty to draft rules appropriate to the Latvian regulatory 
environment. The Data Protection Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at the 
University of Oxford (Appendix 1: 2011, p. 18) was seemingly critical of 
introducing ‘a façade of absolute harmony’ and instead favoured an updated 
Directive that is more concerned with establishing data protection principles 
rather than detailed provisions. Similarly, BEUC (Appendix 1: 2011, p. 14), 
otherwise supportive of radical data protection measures, advised against a 
Regulation because it ‘would make the resulting rules less flexible, while it may 
compromise the legislation of those Member States where data subjects enjoy 
a high level of protection’. 
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The actors who were reluctant to admit that a new Directive was necessary 
can be broadly categorised as companies who have benefitted from legal 
uncertainty in the past. These include the BBA and AFME, national direct 
marketing associations, publishers and digital marketers, Axciom, one of the 
world’s largest data brokerage companies, as well as IFPI, the global recording 
industry representative. The finance and banking associations were unwilling 
to be subjected to yet another set of limiting rules. The marketing professionals 
undoubtedly realised that a new Regulation would introduce more restrictive 
rules regarding the processing of personal data for advertising purposes, as the 
Commission was outspokenly critical of especially behavioural advertising in 
its 2010 Communication. Thus, any updated legislation would impact the 
advertising industry negatively. IFPI, on the contrary, feared that an updated 
and strengthened data protection law would make it more difficult to gather 
evidence for legal claims against copyright infringers. 
6.3.4.3 No opinion / Neutral 
Apart from these clear positions for and against a Regulation, influential 
actors from other sectors, such as EBF, the French retail giant Carrefour, and 
the European trade union UNI Europa, were fairly unconcerned with the 
legislative instrument but instead focused on the contents (or lack of) in the 
Commission’s proposal. Interestingly enough, the EBF and the BBA seem to 
have diverging opinions on this particular issue, where the BBA is against the 
introduction of new legislation and the EBF welcomes increased 
harmonisation. Many stakeholders who participated in the consultation 
accepted that the data protection framework would be updated but chose not 
to meddle in the political issue of what type of law to put forth.  
6.4 INSTITUTIONALISED DELIBERATION OR MERE LIP 
SERVICE? 
The quantitative categorisation of the submissions to the two public 
consultations clearly demonstrates how formally open public consultations 
still lead to unequal participation. The public consultations favour resource-
rich associations and firms, and although this does not preclude other actors 
from participating, civil society participants are in the clear minority. As the 
throughput legitimacy of legislative processes is reviewed based on whether 
interest representatives sufficiently represent different societal actors, one can 
conclude that the GDPR’s public consultations did not fulfil this function. 
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Whether Schmidt’s (2013) ideal throughput legitimacy is achievable on the EU 
level is also questionable. Business entities are directly affected by data 
protection regulation and will always be more attentive to regulatory change 
than regular citizens who adapt to the regulatory environment. Civil society 
organisations that operate within the sphere of communication rights will 
never be able to muster the same resources as businesses. Therefore, it is not 
plausible that civil society organisations would participate to a much higher 
degree than what they already have. To guarantee more balanced 
participation, one would instead need to restrict business entities’ access to 
public consultations. That might also prove problematic from a democratic 
point of view.  
If one considers the role of public consultations as a platform for 
deliberation rather than an avenue to increase political participation and 
ameliorate representation, the public consultations are perceived in a slightly 
more positive light. The public consultations have allowed a diverse set of 
actors to raise issues connected to how data protection regulation will impact 
practices and rights. Nevertheless, regardless of the diversity of actors, the 
positions are highly similar on an operational level. The position papers 
demonstrate that most interest representatives adhere to either of the two 
operational goals of data protection: free movement of data or protection of 
individuals. Supporting one of the two goals generally indicates what 
applicational instruments an interest representative is eager to support. 
However, whether data protection should be achieved through procedural 
requirements or informational self-determination set some interest 
representatives apart.  
While free data lobbyists rarely approve of any sort of legally binding 
procedural obligations, they can, at times, approve of some self-managerial 
instruments connected to the notions of ‘implicit consent’ and self-regulatory 
transparency initiatives. It is understandable that corporations choose to 
advance the informational self-determination approach to privacy. Even 
though some aspects of the approach might make operations slightly more 
difficult for corporations, they can rest assured that the vast majority of people 
will do nothing in accordance with the so-called privacy paradox. 
Nevertheless, this means that business lobbyists are very wary of class-action 
redress and sanctions that privacy activists might use to their advantage 
because a few individuals could potentially cause a lot of harm. Therefore, the 
rights are rarely backed up by meaningful sanctions in the free data lobbyists’ 
proposals. The interests of free data lobbyists and privacy advocates are largely 
incompatible and only superficially overlap.  
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These stark differences in the positions are not easily balanced. The public 
consultations clearly fall short of democratic deliberation because they do not 
provide any interaction between the parties (Quittkat & Kohler-Koch, 2013, p. 
181). Rather, they are instrumental in increasing the diversity of opinions and 
concrete applications, contributing to a more diverse set of policy input. 
However, that input is meaningless if it does not translate into policy output. 
The 2010 Communication showed that some actors have been influential in 
introducing key concepts, but the biggest question is whether this influence 
has been transposed into the actual Regulation. The following chapter will 
examine the different versions of the EU institutions and compare the 
regulatory output with the regulatory applications favoured by the different 
interest representatives.  
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7 INTEREST REPRESENTATIVE’S INPUT 
AND POLICY OUTPUT 
After presenting the way interest representatives were institutionally included 
in the early stages of the GDPR’s legislative process and analysing how their 
positions differed, I now move on to the main purpose of this study: the 
question of influence. To what extent can the influence of interest 
representatives be traced down to actual regulatory initiatives in the sphere of 
data protection law? It is a study of how the right to privacy is operationalised 
and whether the codification of data protection is characterised by the 
suggestions made by industry lobbyists and privacy advocates. The following 
are the research questions presented in the introductory chapter:  
3. What policy alternatives were put forth by the EU institutions in the 
course of the GDPR’s legislative process, and how did they correspond 
to the ideas, issues, and frames promoted by interest representatives?  
4. What does the influence of organised interests and stakeholders in 
GDPR decision-making reveal about the democratic legitimacy of the 
process? 
The answer to the first research question is therefore indicative of the second. 
The policy output under study includes the following documents: 
1. the Commission’s Proposal for a General Data Protection 
Regulation (2012);  
2. the European Parliament’s first reading (2014);  
3. the EU Council’s adopted version (2015); and 
4. the finalised Regulation (2016). 
The first step is to elaborate on the contents of the Commission’s original draft, 
on which subsequent iterations are based. This draft is compared to the 
interest representatives’ position papers. The second step is to address how 
the Parliament’s and the Council’s versions differ from the Commission’s 
original and whether these amendments can be traced back to the positions 
promoted by lobbyists and advocates during the public consultations. Finally, 
I will conclude by discussing the impact of the compromise, the final GDPR. 
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7.1 THE COMMISSION’S ONE-STOP SHOP AGENDA 
7.1.1 PROBLEMS AND POLICY OPTIONS 
DG Justice published its proposals for a GDPR and a Directive on the 
processing of data related to law enforcement on January 25, 2012. Because 
introducing new data protection legislation through either a Regulation or a 
Directive would be either politically difficult or ineffective from a 
supranational standpoint, the Commission settled for a dual approach. Private 
and public routine processing of data was to be covered by a Regulation, 
whereas the rules governing the protection of personal data in the realm of law 
enforcement would be confined to a Directive. As the above analysis 
demonstrates, the decision to put forth a Regulation instead of a Directive was 
openly supported by quite a limited group of stakeholders, but these interest 
representatives were also the ones who would be needed for the Commission 
to be able to demonstrate that the new initiative had both the industry’s 
support and were on the side of the communication rights’ activists. Through 
promoting two separate regulatory instruments, one for routine data 
processing and another for law enforcement, the Commission also managed 
to avoid the politically fraught issue of appeasing the governments prone to 
use surveillant technologies without simultaneously completely eroding the 
right to privacy.  
The underlying political considerations are impossible to miss. Whereas it 
was clear that the Commission preferred a Regulation, it would have been 
challenging to get the member states to sign off on a Regulation that also 
covered law enforcement. By dividing the new law into two separate legal 
instruments, the Commission was thus able to steer clear of a head-on collision 
with the governments of the member states and yet maintain a higher level of 
harmonisation regarding other forms of data processing. It may be noted that 
while the UK Ministry of Justice (Appendix 1: 2011) did not explicitly suggest 
a specific legislative instrument in its position paper, it did suggest that law 
enforcement should be covered by a separate law.  
The proposals were accompanied with a comprehensive market impact 
assessment report. The report outlines different policy options for addressing 
the two objectives of data protection: (1) enhancing the internal market 
dimension of data protection and (2) increasing the effectiveness of data 
protection rights.  
In the market impact report, the Commission engages in the framing of 
data protection policy responses. Following van Hulst and Yanow’s (2016) 
typology of framing, the Commission had used the public consultations and 
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the EU-wide study on data protection to make sense of the issue, whereas the 
market impact report was used to select which issues to focus on and then to 
name and categorise them. The market impact report lists three problems 
associated with data protection. The first problem relates to the internal 
market dimension. According to the Commission, there were ‘[b]arriers for 
business and public authorities due to fragmentation, legal uncertainty and 
inconsistent enforcement’ (European Commission, 2012b, p. 11). The impact 
assessment stated that legal fragmentation costs businesses almost €3 billion 
per year, which is about half of the overall administrative burdens that were 
linked to the Directive (about €5.3 billion) (European Commission, 2012b, p. 
19). Therefore, unharmonised data protection law is seen as a barrier to data 
trade – a very clear economic framing of the issue. 
The second problem relates to the goal of protecting citizens’ data 
protection rights. Simply put, there are ‘[d]ifficulties for individuals to stay in 
control of their personal data’ (European Commission, 2012b, p. 21). The 
Commission noted that cloud computing and international data transfers 
make it increasingly difficult for citizens to stay in control. At the time, the use 
of software services was starting to be increasingly connected to servers as 
fewer of the functions were performed locally. Furthermore, the Commission 
justifies a new Regulation with reference to the ‘privacy as control’ 
conceptualisation, which has been influential in the privacy literature (see 
Nissenbaum, 2010; Westin, 1967). The Commission cited the Eurobarometer 
survey from 2011, according to which ‘Two thirds of European citizens feel that 
the disclosure of personal data is a major concern for them and six in ten 
citizens consider that nowadays there is no alternative to disclosing personal 
data in order to obtain products and services’ (European Commission, 2011b, 
p. 22). This problem is associated with both the privacy paradox (Utz & 
Krämer, 2009) as well as the resulting feelings of resignation (Turow, 
Hennessy, & Draper, 2015).  
The problem description goes on to list the concerns related to the 
complexity of privacy notices, the difficulties associated with exercising rights, 
citizens’ unease with behavioural advertising, data breaches, and the general 
aggregation of online activities and location information which can lead to the 
identification of individuals (European Commission, 2012b, pp. 21-28). 
Many of the fundamental freedoms can only be fully exercised if the 
individual is reassured that it is not subject of permanent surveillance 
and observation by authorities and other powerful organisations. … 
Where the individual suspects that his or her interactions are subject of 
surveillance, collection and analysis by authorities, service operators 
or others, it loses partly the possibility of exercising some fundamental 
rights. This chilling effect can already be caused by the perception of 
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surveillance, which may or may not exist. The lack of transparency of 
processing and of accessible means to effectively enforce data 
protection rules is therefore directly affecting individuals' fundamental 
rights. 
(European Commission, 2012b, p. 30) 
The quote shows that the Commission is highly aware of the risks associated 
with the increasing processing and aggregation of data from a wide variety of 
sources. The Commission uses public interest frames to address these 
concerns and refers to citizens as individuals. The ‘chilling effect’ that the 
Commission refers to is reminiscent of the disciplinary effects of Foucault’s 
(1977) panoptic diagram. Where such an effect might be laudable for some 
(like the copyright industries), surveillance in the online sphere also creates 
uncertainty which can be an obstacle to the growth of ecommerce. The 
Commission states that consumers’ lack of trust in service results in a slow 
uptake of audio-visual services and reluctance of consumers to shop online.  
 The 75% of individuals currently not feeling in complete control of their 
personal data on social networking sites (and 80% when shopping 
online) is not likely to decrease without regulatory intervention which 
can support the confidence of individuals. Such a development could 
counteract the key performance target of the Digital Agenda for 
Europe for 50 % of the population to buy online by 2015.”  
(European Commission, 2012b, p. 37) 
It is worth noting that the main issue does not seem to be privacy concerns but 
the economic consequences of the uneasiness that online surveillance 
contributes to. The position confirms the critical accounts on data protection 
regulation that argue that the fundamental rights perspective is often lost (cf. 
Burkart & Andersson Schwarz, 2013). It also shows that the focus on the 
economic ramifications of policy that has dominated European media policy 
(Harcourt, 2005, p. 199; Hirsch & Petersen, 2007, p. 31) is equally noticeable 
in this policy domain. 
The third problem relates to ‘Gaps and inconsistencies in the protection of 
personal data in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters’ 
(European Commission, 2012b, p. 31). This problem lies outside the scope of 
this study, but it is clear that this particular issue also impacts citizens and 
companies to a great extent. This problem was subsequently included in the 
third objective of the EU data protection legislation: ‘To establish a 
comprehensive EU data protection framework and enhance the coherence and 
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consistency of EU data protection rules, including in the field of police 
cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters’ (European 
Commission, 2012b, p. 43).  
The Commission proposed three policy options to address these problems. 
The first policy option was focused on strengthening self-regulatory measures, 
introducing technical tools, and increasing the coordination of national DPAs 
(European Commission, 2012b, pp. 63-64). It is clear from the outset that the 
Commission did not support this policy option. While it acknowledged that 
citizens would be slightly more aware of their rights, the Commission was 
sceptical of this option’s positive impact on fundamental rights. Furthermore, 
while self-regulation could provide additional legal certainty for data 
controllers, national member states would still interpret rules in a divergent 
manner, resulting in more costs for businesses. 
The second policy option contained legislative amendments that would 
reduce the room for the manoeuvre of member states and specify how key 
definitions should be interpreted (European Commission, 2012b, pp. 65-71). 
The Commission stated that it would be possible to draft both a Regulation 
and a new Directive, but a Directive could lead to ‘gold-plating’ by the member 
states, meaning that the extent of the rules and obligations under the Directive 
could be extended when the law is transposed into national legislation. The 
second option was focused on accountability in its co-regulatory sense, as the 
DPAs’ powers are strengthened and they would be able to issue sanctions. In 
addition, larger organisations would be required to appoint DPOs and issue 
data protection risk assessments. This approach also included the creation of 
a ‘one-stop shop’, where controllers would only need to deal with one DPA 
despite having operations in several member states. 
One important addition to this approach is the inclusion of ‘delegated acts’, 
which mean that the Commission can specify implementing measures with 
binding obligations. The Commission directly referred to the benefits of this 
approach by stating that privacy by design principles is unlikely to have a 
significant impact unless the Commission can draft some additional binding 
obligations (European Commission, 2012b, p. 70). This is partly reflective of 
the positions held by many privacy advocates, with the exception that these 
did not advocate for enforcement by the Commission but by national 
regulators.  
According to the Commission (2012b, p. 70), the proposed measures in 
second policy option would lead to net savings of around ‘€2.3 billion per 
annum, arising from the elimination of legal fragmentation and the 
simplification of notifications’. Although the Commission only briefly 
mentioned the impact the clarified definitions will have on citizens, they 
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claimed that these measures would strengthen ‘several individual 
fundamental rights’. While the second policy option seems to include several 
new obligations, the argument goes that the removal of notifications and other 
‘red tape’ would result in significant savings for companies. Although it would 
seem that risk assessments and appointing DPOs would be quite expensive, 
the Commission’s calculations in Appendix 6 seem to prove the opposite. 
However, these calculations are based on surmised assumptions that 90% of 
larger companies had already appointed DPOs.  
The third policy option goes further than the second and includes more 
detailed rules for different sectors, new categories of sensitive data, and 
consent as the basis for all processing (European Commission, 2012b, p. 71). 
In the third option, an EU Data Protection Agency would be established and 
notification obligations would be completely removed. It also included a 
collective redress mechanism and criminal sanctions for data protection 
breaches. While the Commission noted that this approach would ‘maximise 
harmonisation’, it is clear that the Commission did not support it. First, too 
much detail in the legal document would possibly lead to more non-
compliance and confusion. Second, an EU Data Protection Agency would be 
expensive. Third, it would be too ‘inflexible’ for national circumstances and 
possibly hinder law enforcement to complete their tasks.  
The first and third policy options are purposely unrealistic versions of the 
policy proposals made by businesses and civil society. While the goal of 
introducing the first policy option is to show free data lobbyists that they have 
considered self-regulatory measures, they want to stress that this option would 
not significantly reduce administrative costs. Similarly, the third policy option 
is presented as something admirable yet unachievable. Thus, the only logical 
conclusion is to support the second policy option; however, to provide an 
illusion of deliberation, the Commission included some elements of the first 
and third options in their ‘preferred policy option’. From the first policy 
option, the Commission included awareness-raising and new self-regulatory 
measures. The Commission also removed the notification requirement 
entirely from its preferred option, similar to the third policy option. Most of 
the other approaches in the third option were ignored. One of the options that 
were heavily supported by civil society was collective redress in the realm of 
data protection. The Commission acknowledged the benefits of collective 
redress but did not wish to include joint judicial remedy until there are general 
EU rules on the subject.63  
                                                  
63 At the time of writing, in October 2019, those rules were still being debated. 
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Why the Commission would go to such lengths explaining different 
alternatives is perplexing from a legitimacy perspective based on policy 
output. As the Commission is free to draft laws regardless of what interest 
representatives say, it does not need to explain why it does not advocate for 
different approaches and only needs to show why the chosen approach is 
suitable for the problems that the new law aims to address. Therefore, the 
Commission knowingly departs from an output legitimacy perspective, 
instead acknowledging the deliberative aspects of the policy process. 
Therefore, the goal of presenting different policy options seems to have been 
to demonstrate that the public consultations are an integral part of the policy 
process by way of deliberation contributing to the legitimacy of the 
Commission’s decision. To this end, Grossman’s (2004) critique that the 
Commission merely uses stakeholders in an instrumental fashion does ring 
true, as very little would indicate that the preferred policy option would be a 
result of true deliberation. 
Similarly, the calculations that serve as a basis for the market impact 
assessment are the products of behavioural confirmation. While legal 
fragmentation undoubtedly results in more red tape, the costs that the 
Commission associated with DPOs and DPIAs seem wildly optimistic. 
Nevertheless, the focus here is not to assess the feasibility of the Commission’s 
calculations. I shall now turn to the Commission’s proposal and demonstrate 
where there are traces of interest representatives’ suggestions. 
7.1.2 TRACES OF INTEREST REPRESENTATIVES’ PROPOSALS IN 
THE COMMISSION’S DRAFT 
The proposed Regulation does not depart radically from the Data Protection 
Directive, but rather it clarifies many unclear provisions. Provisions, which do 
not significantly differ from the old laws, are more a sign of path dependence 
than examples of influence by the actors who benefit from the status quo. 
Nevertheless, one significant change is the weight given to the right to data 
protection. The right is included both in the Lisbon Treaty64 and in Article 8 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Thus, since the adoption of 
the Data Protection Directive, data protection has been elevated to a 
fundamental right. Another significant change was the added complexity of 
the new Regulation. Whereas the original Data Protection Directive contained 
72 recitals and 34 articles, the proposed GDPR contained 139 recitals and 91 
articles. While the underlying goals did not fundamentally change and one can 
                                                  
64 Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
Interest representative’s input and policy output 
 
144 
 
therefore view the GDPR as path-dependent, the wide-ranging additions to the 
GDPR suggest that path-dependence is an insufficient explanation. 
Following the structure of the previous section, I will go through the 
proposed changes related to informational self-determination and the 
procedural approach to data protection. Because the scope of the proposal is 
much wider than what was presented in any of the position papers, it would 
be impossible to review the entire proposal as thoroughly as the lobby papers. 
Thus, my attempt is not to assess each and every article and recital in the 
proposal but to create an overview of its most important elements in the 
themes already presented above. 
7.1.2.1 Informational self-determination 
The Commission clearly wanted to clarify the rights of citizens and did so by 
introducing several explicit principles that were perhaps only tacitly 
recognised by the old Directive. One of the most important additions to the 
new Regulation was the inclusion of a requirement of ‘explicit’ consent. In the 
Commission’s (2012a, p. 8) own words, ‘the criterion “explicit” is added to 
avoid confusing parallelism with “unambiguous” consent and in order to have 
one single and consistent definition of consent’.  
Whether consent should be explicit was one of the most important 
questions in the interest representatives’ proposals, which clearly 
distinguished free data lobbyists from privacy advocates. It is important to 
note that there were far more lobbyists who wished to omit any reference to 
explicit consent and even include ‘implicit consent’ as a valid way of obtaining 
a data subject’s permission. This particular amendment shows that the 
Commission was not swayed by the arguments of free data lobbyists.  
Enshrining consent as a founding principle for the processing of personal 
data can be directly related to the two mechanisms that form the core of the 
information privacy highlighted by privacy scholars: the questions of access 
and control (Nissenbaum, 2010; Westin, 1967; Reiman, 1976). Through 
consent, citizens exercise control over their own data. In theory, the data 
minimisation requirement that data should only be collected for a specific 
purpose should strengthen the informational self-determination of citizens 
because access to data is then decided on a case-by-case basis. In practice, this 
is rarely the case, and citizens are only left with a control mechanism that 
allows them to determine who will act as the gatekeepers of access. In many 
cases, privacy policies look more like a carte blanche than meaningful consent. 
The notion of explicit consent is heavily associated with informational self-
determination. It presupposes that whenever an issue that is important for the 
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data subject arises, they should be able to make an informed decision and 
choose accordingly. Nevertheless, the approach is fundamentally misguided 
because the choice is often between accepting privacy invasive collection of 
personal data and complete refusal that might result in unwanted social or 
economic consequences (Gandy, 1989). 
This inherent weakness of consent was partly recognised by the 
Commission (2012a) in the Recitals 32 and 34 of the draft GPDR, which state 
that ‘consent does not provide a valid legal ground where … [there is] no 
genuine and free choice’ and that consent is not a ‘valid legal ground … where 
there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller’, for 
example, between an employee and an employer. This last addition is 
remarkable considering the trade unions’ concern that data processing in the 
employment context was not taken into account in the Commission’s 2010 
Communication. More specifically, ETUC65 was concerned by the possibility 
of employees being forced to consent to workplace surveillance. Under the 
draft GDPR, such surveillance would not be permissible with reference to 
consent. This paternalistic approach to consent, while slightly detached from 
informational self-determination, is representative of the EU’s liberal market 
tradition (see Venturelli, 2002). Instead, such provisions require a strong 
public authority that can efficiently enforce the rules. Thus, the Commission’s 
proposal has a procedural character to the consent mechanism as well, as data 
controllers would need to provide evidence that consent was freely given. 
Although the Data Protection Directive did contain significant data subject 
rights related to access and rectification and the right to object, these rights 
were rarely respected (Norris, de Hert, L'Hoiry, & Galleta, 2017). The draft 
Regulation consequently detailed exactly what the right of access entailed and 
introduced the new right of erasure (Article 17) and right to data portability 
(Article 18). The right to be forgotten was later famously upheld by the 
European Court of Justice in Google v Costeja González, which set a precedent 
for requesting search engines to delete search results. Nevertheless, at the time 
of the draft Regulation, the right to be forgotten did not exist, and the explicit 
right was in fact wider in scope than what could be deduced from the court’s 
decision. The origins of the right to be forgotten and the right to portability are 
all the more interesting; they were introduced in the 2010 Communication 
after having surfaced in the position paper by BEUC in 2009. In 2011, the right 
to be forgotten was addressed by over 100 interest representatives and 
portability by over 60, often in negative terms.  
                                                  
65 The European Trade Union Confederation. 
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One of the more ambiguous elements of the previous Data Protection 
Directive was the lawfulness of processing according to the ‘legitimate 
interests’ of the data controller. What those interests might be were not clearly 
defined in the instrument itself, and the Article 29 Working Party (2014) did 
not address the question until 2014. Although the Commission strengthened 
the rights of users, ‘legitimate interests’ remained a valid ground for 
processing in addition to user consent in the draft Regulation. These legitimate 
interests may even override the right to object to processing as long as the 
controller can demonstrate that the interests or fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the data subject do not override the legitimate interests.  
Although this leaves data controllers with quite a bit of leeway, the 
Commission introduced some safeguards regarding the protection of children 
and more specific transparency requirements so that the data subject would at 
least be aware of what these legitimate interests are (Recitals 38 and 56). 
Furthermore, the Commission empowered itself to introduce ‘delegated acts’ 
which would further specify acceptable legitimate interests. The validity of 
using legitimate interests as grounds for processing were not really questioned 
by the privacy advocates, but the free data proponents generally underlined 
their importance. The inclusion of legitimate interests as a legal ground for 
processing further exemplifies that the Commission’s approach to privacy is 
very detached from the ideas of control despite what was said in the impact 
assessment report. Therefore, the impact assessment can be judged as 
primarily a rhetorical framing device, although it was also used to inform the 
action frames. It is equally obvious that Reiman’s (1976) privacy-as-access is 
more reminiscent of the internal logic of the draft GDPR. That approach is 
easier to reconcile with the dual goal of data protection, to both share data 
within the Union as well as protect it. Nevertheless, a strict reading of the 
provision requires documentation that proves that a data controller has 
carefully balanced the fundamental rights of the data subjects, further 
underlining the importance of the procedural approach in the Commission’s 
draft. 
Much to the detriment of privacy advocates, the Commission did not 
include collective redress in the proposal, the reasons which were outlined in 
the accompanying impact assessment. This was perhaps one of the more 
important victories for the free data lobbyists. Judicial collective redress could 
be a potent tool for addressing privacy issues – questions of data protection 
are highly complex and require expert knowledge, and any misconduct is likely 
to affect a large number of people. If NGOs and other privacy advocates could 
lodge class action lawsuits against companies, it could carry significantly more 
weight than any fine or sanction issued by a DPA. In 2013, the Commission 
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issued non-binding recommendations on collective redress (European 
Commission, 2013), but the issue has not really developed since then. Some 
countries include collective redress mechanisms in cases that involve 
consumer protection, which could arguably also cover data protection issues. 
The Commission did, however, include the right to lodge a complaint to a DPA 
on behalf of a data subject, thus potentially triggering administrative fines. 
7.1.2.2 The procedural approach to data protection 
The most ambitious parts of the draft Regulation are concerned with the 
obligations and responsibilities related to data processing. While many of the 
principles were at least in part present in the original Directive, the draft 
Regulation promises stricter principles of data minimisation, a clearer 
purpose limitation, and more transparency. Where the Article 6(1)(c) of the 
Directive stated that data should be ‘adequate, relevant and not excessive’, the 
draft proposal required that it must be ‘adequate, relevant, and limited to the 
minimum necessary’ (emphasis added), in direct contrast to the data 
maximisation aspirations of free data lobbyists. 
These principles were further outlined in Article 23 which lays down the 
provisions concerning ‘Data protection by design and by default’. While the 
concept of privacy by design was almost universally supported as a non-
binding measure by the participating stakeholders, the Commission decided 
to follow the recommendation by privacy advocates such as the WP29, Privacy 
International, the Bar Council of England and Wales, BEUC, and EDPS to 
make privacy by default a binding obligation. As noted above, the foundational 
principles of privacy by design had been introduced to the data protection 
policy community by the Canadian privacy commissioner of Ontario, Ann 
Cavoukian, and by the time of GDPR’s proposal, they had received widespread 
recognition. Cavoukian herself submitted a position paper to the consultation, 
which might be perceived as a little odd: why did a regional Canadian privacy 
commissioner want to participate in the development of EU law? One 
explanation is the desire to promote a policy concept she herself had coined.  
Nevertheless, strengthening the default element of privacy by design was 
new. The introduction of this explicit principle is in stark contrast to what the 
industry supported, and AmCham, Microsoft, and the World Federation of 
Advertisers were highly critical of the notion. These differing accounts are 
noticeable because the Commission did not explicitly mention the principle in 
its 2010 Communication. Thus, it is plausible that the privacy advocates and 
DPAs managed to influence the Commission. 
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Data protection by default extends the general data minimisation and 
purpose limitation principles to the realm of technical design and 
configuration. Whereas ‘privacy by design’ can mean almost anything related 
to technical design, processes, and user experience design, privacy by default 
has different connotations. Following the principles of privacy by design might 
mean that databases of customers should be pseudonymised, whereas privacy 
by default requires that the least amount of data should be collected in the first 
place.  
This is potentially revolutionary as the opposite has often been the case. 
During Facebook’s first five years of existence, it gradually expanded the 
availability of user information to a wider circle of users. In 2005, the default 
settings limited the availability of information such as pictures, friends, 
gender, and other profile data to the user’s own friends. In 2010, the default 
settings made this information available to the entire Internet (McKeon, 
2010). Facebook eventually dialled back some of these settings, but developers 
could still syphon a considerable amount of data from users, as was 
demonstrated by the Cambridge Analytica scandal (see chapter 2). The 
question of the importance of default settings has also surfaced in the 
academic literature (Shah & Sandvig, 2008), perhaps most famously by 
Lawrence Lessig (2006) who stated that code is law. Rather than giving people 
the tools to change privacy settings, it seems to be more important to set a 
standard for privacy to begin with, which is what the Commission was aiming 
for. Moreover, an explicit principle would limit the amount of data that the 
service provider itself could retain on users, possibly limiting the scope of what 
information a service provider can argue is within its legitimate interests.  
As noted in chapter 3, a fundamental problem of privacy law is that more 
transparency in the form of reports and notices results in fewer people actually 
reading the notices (Nissenbaum, 2011, p. 36). The transparency paradox is a 
fundamental dilemma for EU privacy law because the whole notion of consent 
is based on people being informed subjects. The Commission acknowledges 
this problem in its impact assessment of the draft Regulation, referring to the 
problem of ‘notification fatigue’ (European Commission, 2012b, p. 100), which 
was raised originally by BBC, Nokia, CBI, and Microsoft in the 2011 
consultation (see the previous section). 
The question of ‘data subject fatigue’ surfaced primarily in the context of 
data breach notifications. It was argued that very strict thresholds for notices 
would result in people not knowing when to take precautions while very loose 
thresholds would leave them drowning in a sea of notifications and not 
knowing which to take seriously. Here the Commission had adopted a policy 
frame promoted by the lobbyists, telling a story about a flood of notices leading 
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to apathic citizens unable to distinguish between real danger and minor 
inconvenience. 
The Commission’s solution was to create different thresholds for notifying 
DPAs and the users. DPAs should be notified within 24 h on all occasions 
(Article 31), whereas users should be notified if the breach is ‘likely to 
adversely affect’ their privacy (Article 32). The notion of notification fatigue 
paints a fairly bleak picture of the security of databases. If security breaches 
occur on a daily basis such that users would find themselves numbed and 
disinterested, surely the biggest problem is not notification fatigue but the 
security precautions of data controllers? The Commission’s willingness to 
accept this framing of the issue is slightly worrisome. On the contrary, the 
actual wording of the article detailing the obligations of controllers in case of 
a data breach need not result in a poorer outcome for consumers, in the sense 
that DPAs would have to be notified in any case, and a DPA could make the 
judgement that individual users should be notified as well. While contrary to 
the wishes of privacy proponents who prefer informational self-
determination, whether this is a substantial policy loss for privacy advocates 
overall is questionable.  
7.1.2.3 Enforcement of both approaches 
The question of how the Regulation should be enforced was one of the 
cornerstones of the draft legislation. The lack of harmonised legislation and 
diverse enforcement of the Data Protection Directive’s provision had resulted 
in an unpredictable regulatory environment. For the Commission, four goals 
stand out. First, the amount of ‘red tape’ should be cut; second, the regulation 
should be applied consistently across the EU; third, the data protection 
principles should be enforced by independent regulators with the power to 
issue administrative sanctions; and finally, the GDPR should have extra-
territorial application.  
Noting that the notification procedure emanated from the French tradition 
and was not applied elsewhere prior to the Data Protection Directive (Simitis, 
1995), it was probably a self-evident starting point to ease the bureaucratic 
burden of data controllers. Some of the DPAs were already opposed of the 
procedure (like the Swedish Datainspektionen), virtually all companies 
regarded it as useless, and even some civil society organisations did not see it 
as contributing to the privacy of individuals. However, it did have some 
supporters. The UK Ministry of Justice was against abolishing the notification 
procedure because the fees helped fund the Information Commissioner’s 
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Office (ICO). Removing the notification procedure would, in the view of the 
Ministry of Justice, challenge the independence of the ICO.  
The notification procedure was replaced by a system where certain 
situations trigger prior consultation and authorisation with the DPA (Article 
34). This system is co-regulatory by nature because the controllers themselves 
decide whether a DPIA is needed owing to specific risks (Article 33), but once 
a high risk has been identified, the DPA may prohibit the intended processing. 
The arrangement is partly reminiscent of the approaches advocated by free 
data lobbyists – more flexibility, more self-regulation, and focus on ‘harms’ 
and ‘risks’. On the contrary, the Commission’s draft makes privacy impact 
assessments obligatory in some cases (Article 33.2) and transfers the final 
decision to the DPAs (Article 34). Mandatory DPIAs were opposed by most 
free data lobbyists, including the UK Ministry of Justice, and generally 
approved by privacy advocates. It can be argued, then, that while some 
concessions were made for the industry, the draft proposal generally 
supported the privacy advocates’ agenda. However, the proposed framework 
may be criticised from the point of view of privacy advocates as well because 
there are clear deterrents to judge a processing activity as high risk.  
Arguably, the most supported of all proposals was the inclusion of the so-
called one-stop shop, where a lead authority is designated in cases where 
processing of personal data takes place in several member states (Article 51). 
Therefore, the DPA of the main establishment of the controller is designated 
the lead authority. However, citizens may still lodge a complaint in any 
member state. The inconsistency of application, a common critique by both 
free data lobbyists and privacy advocates, is further addressed through 
formally recognising and requiring DPAs to co-operate and assist each other, 
most importantly through the establishment of a ‘European Data Protection 
Board’ (EDPB). The establishment of the Board to replace the WP29 marks an 
important shift in terms of transnational governance. While the WP29 was 
influential, its mandate was limited to an advisory function. The Commission 
gave the EDPB formal powers to decide whether a measure issued by a DPA 
should be approved according to the so-called consistency mechanism. The 
opinions are decided via simple majority and are jointly overseen by the 
Commission. This arrangement further strengthens the supranational aspect 
of data protection governance, to a point where one can question whether the 
subsidiarity principle was respected. The common grievance among free data 
lobbyists, that access and insight to the WP29’s decision-making process is 
virtually non-existent, did not seem to persuade the Commission into 
including a formal obligation of the Board to consult with third parties.  
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Another enforcement-related measure worth highlighting is the level of 
Commission involvement in interpreting the rules and providing additional 
regulation. The Commission’s draft empowered itself to issue delegated acts 
on a range of issues concerning everything from further specifying exceptions 
to outlining acceptable safeguards and requiring technical standards. In other 
words, the Commission would have been able to determine the exact contents 
of the provisions. These powers are an even stronger departure from the 
principle of subsidiarity. While delegated acts were introduced in the Lisbon 
Agenda in Article 290 of the TFEU, they were supposed to ‘supplement or 
amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act’. The Commission 
evidently went further in the draft GDPR, essentially giving itself the power to 
issue interpretations of key definitions in the law (such as legitimate interests 
or safeguards).  
Evidently, the most significant departure from the earlier Data Protection 
Directive was the inclusion of administrative sanctions. While many member 
states had empowered DPAs to issue fines, the size of the administrative 
sanctions in the Commission’s draft was considerably larger. While the UK’s 
administrative sanctions amounted to a maximum of £500,000, the sanctions 
proposed in the Commission’s draft ranged from either €250,000 or 0.5%, 
whichever is greater, to €1,000,000 or 2% of the global annual turnover of a 
company, reminiscent of the sanctions used in the competition regulation. 
While the scope of the sanctions raised considerable debate, an important 
point that is often missed is that the Commission’s draft did not include a 
maximum figure. The fines are connected to individual incidents, which 
means that a fine between 0.5% and 2% of the annual turnover may be issued 
for each regulatory infraction. The administrative sanctions are heavily 
damning for infringers and set a very high standard for following the rules of 
the GDPR. The sanctions apply in all cases where a data controller or processor 
has acted either intentionally or negligently.  
Given the severity of the sanctions involved, the extension of the 
territoriality principle is of fundamental importance. In the Commission’s 
draft proposal, Article 3 was extended to include not only processing that takes 
place in the EU but also all cases where the personal data of ‘data subjects 
residing in the Union’ were processed in relation to the offering of goods or 
services to data subjects in the Union or ‘monitoring their behaviour’, clearly 
a reference to behavioural advertising that the Commission had criticised in 
its 2010 Communication. While the previous directive did contain an incentive 
for third countries to update data protection regulation in a fashion which 
imitates the EU to receive a favourable adequacy decision (Bradford, 2012), 
this level of extra-territoriality is unparalleled. The idea that questions of 
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jurisdictional ambiguity can be unilaterally solved is a rather bold proposition, 
a proposition which was, coincidentally, strongly supported by the 
telecommunications companies who are in many ways in direct competition 
with the American IT companies. 
In sum, the Commission’s proposal was more aligned with the interests of 
privacy advocates, with one important exception, the strong role of the 
Commission as an arbiter of regulatory standards by way of delegated acts. 
Rossi (2018, p. 101) has also demonstrated that digital rights groups were 
pleased with the proposal, whereas many companies and trade organisations 
were unhappy with the result. 
The proposal demonstrates significant path dependence vis-à-vis the 
original Data Protection Directive, the biggest departure being the inclusion of 
administrative sanctions. While behavioural advertising has been addressed 
by many updated provisions in the proposal, other potential pitfalls have been 
ignored, such as the broad exception to scientific research that was criticised 
by Simitis (1995). Despite broadly recognising the concerns associated with 
information privacy and trying to remedy them with the help of data 
protection regulation, the Commission’s proposal still operated within the 
confines of the big data paradigm. While recognising and to some extent 
limiting the extent of profiling, the fundamental issues regarding such 
practices as raised by scholars of surveillance studies are not really addressed. 
The proposed solution, Article 20, rather extends the informational self-
determination to profiling as well, granting natural persons ‘the right not to be 
subject’ but ignoring the more systemic problems with such systems: their 
opaqueness (Pasquale, 2015), the tendencies to reproduce bias (Gandy, 1993), 
discrimination (Turow, 1997), false positives (Brown & Korff, 2009), the 
inability to challenge decisions, and the fundamental question of whether 
there are any meaningful limits to what extent profiles may be commodified 
and further repurposed (Lyon, 1994). It shows that while data protection and 
information privacy may be used as a tool to limit some aspects of the big data 
paradigm, the present dominant frameworks of information privacy are 
incapable of fundamentally challenging the underlying framework.  
Figure 7.1 provides an overview of the Commission’s proposal and its 
approach to several key issues. The review of the proposal by Schwartz (2013) 
confirms the main points raised in this study’s analysis: the strengthening of 
individual rights, the centralisation of power in terms of both DPA 
coordination and Commission powers, and the increased powers of the DPAs 
represented by the sanctions and increased focus on co-regulation.  
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Figure 7.1 Key applications in the Commission's draft proposal graded on a 
scale ranging from highly opposed (1) to highly in favour (5). 
 
The Commission’s draft GDPR was, however, merely the baseline for data 
protection reform. In the ordinary legislative procedure, both the Parliament 
and the Council have the power to suggest amendments to the final text, and 
the approved Regulation is undoubtedly a compromise to some degree. I will 
now proceed with presenting the main differences between the Parliament’s 
and the Commission’s versions, and to what extent interest representatives 
were able to obtain beneficial amendments to the Parliament’s first reading. 
7.2 THE PARLIAMENT’S ELEGY TO SELF-
DETERMINATION 
Most of the reporting and research on the GDPR’s legislative process focused 
on the influence of lobbyists during the Parliament’s first reading. Rossi 
(2018) outlines how the Silicon Valley giants had recruited former European 
politicians and policy advisors to lead their lobbying campaigns and hired 
external lobbying firms to advance their agenda. Many MEPs have declared 
that the lobbying was fierce. ‘I had never experienced such lobbying in my life’, 
said Austrian MEP Josef Weidenholzer in an article in the Financial Times 
(Fontanella-Khan, 2013). 
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The process leading up to the Parliament’s first reading was drawn-out, 
and the MEPs in the committees submitted a significant amount of 
amendments. It should be noted that the committee in charge of drafting the 
Parliament’s version was not concerned with business but with civil liberties. 
The Rapporteur, Jan-Philipp Albrecht (Greens/EFA), is an outspoken privacy 
activist who affected the result to a great extent. He later described that ‘the 
influence of the lobby of major IT businesses from Silicon Valley and the 
powerful advertising industry made itself felt from the outset’ (Albrecht, 2016, 
p. 476). 
The influence of lobbyists on single MEPs in the GDPR’s legislative process 
was comprehensively documented by privacy activists. Some of the results are 
worth highlighting here. Lobbyplag (2013), an initiative by Austrian digital 
rights activists including Max Schrems, extensively analysed over 3,100 
amendments proposed by the Committee on LIBE. All amendments were 
rated as positive, neutral, or negative in terms of their impact on the right to 
privacy. On an aggregate level, the results were somewhat negative: 1,263 
amendments were rated as weaker, 953 as neutral, and 943 as stronger.  
Figure 7.2 Aggregate scores for amendments to the General Data Protection 
Regulation (Lobbyplag 2014). 
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Lobbyplag’s overview of how the political groups in the European Parliament 
proposed amendments shows that the green group Greens/EFA (including the 
Pirate party), the social democrats (S&D), and the left (GUE/NGL) submitted 
amendments that were predominantly stronger. The groups on the right, the 
centre-right European’s People’s Party (EPP), the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe Group (ALDE), and European Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR), proposed predominantly negative amendments according 
to Lobbyplag’s analysis (see figure 7.2).  
 
Passages in some lobby papers ended up nearly unedited in some of the MEPs 
proposals. Through word-by-word comparison, Lobbyplag’s (2013) analysis 
shows that it is not uncommon for amendments to follow the exact wording of 
the lobbyists’ proposals (76 were leaked in total). The documents submitted to 
MEPs by lobbyists contained precise amendments to the Regulation, whereas 
the Commission consultation papers were more general in scope. While the 
documents from the consultations provide insight into how the Commission’s 
proposal came into being, the documents available on Lobbyplag look at the 
second stage, i.e. how lobbyists attempted to encourage MEPs to add 
favourable amendments to the Regulation.  
The following companies and NGOs were successful in influencing 
legislators: NGOs European Digital Rights and Bits of Freedom, 
telecommunications and Internet organisation EuroISPA, AmCham, the 
business interest association Digital Europe, the European Federation of 
Finance House Associations (Eurofinas), the EBF, retailers eBay and Amazon, 
and credit information umbrella organisation ACCIS (see table 7.1) All except 
Bits of Freedom, Amazon,66 and ACCIS had participated in the earlier public 
consultations. 
The results are revealing on a more detailed level. A comparison of the 
proposed amendments in the consulting committees shows that several of the 
MEPs had copied parts of their amendments directly from the documents the 
lobbyists had provided them (Lobbyplag, 2013). For example, Sajjad Karim 
(ECR), Klaus-Heiner Lehne (EPP), and Marielle Gallo (EPP) submitted 
separate amendments that added pseudonymous data to the definitions. One 
could argue that this was just a case of comparing notes as they were all 
members of the same committee (ITRE), but Michael Harbour and Adam 
Bielan (ECR) of the Internal Market committee also submitted the exact same 
definition.  
                                                  
66  It is, however, likely that Amazon participated through one or several of the business interest 
associations such as AmCham or Digital Europe. 
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These amendments were identical to the proposal made by AmCham and 
highly similar to EuroISPA’s proposal, whose membership also overlaps to 
some degree. It shows that strategic ad hoc coalitions were formed on specific 
topics. The idea behind adding pseudonymous data as separate category is to 
leave the door open for loosening data processing obligations. It is a textbook 
example of loophole lobbying (cf. Dür, Marshall, & Bernhagen, 2019, p. 85). 
While pseudonymisation is usually presented as a measure that will 
increase the level of protection awarded to data, if pseudonymous data is 
awarded less strict processing requirements, the result might be the opposite. 
In many cases, identifying information such as names or social security 
numbers is replaced with pseudonyms. However, as Ohm (2010) 
demonstrates, the possibility to identify persons is not limited if the database 
is otherwise rich in information that can be compared to other datasets. If 
names or social security numbers are replaced with pseudonymous identifiers, 
two things must be considered. First, who has the keys connecting the 
pseudonymous data to the identified individual? Second, is there anything else 
in the database that will make identification possible? The concern is that by 
creating a weaker set of obligations for pseudonymous data, privacy rights are 
de facto weakened as the material difficulty to identify a data subject is not 
sufficiently increased by pseudonymisation.  
On the contrary, Green party MEP Eva Lichtenberger and Pirate party 
MEPs Amelia Andersdotter and Christian Engström of the Green/EFA group 
also copied extensively from the proposals made by Bits for Freedom and 
EDRI. Although the leaked lobbyist proposals do not constitute a complete 
sample, the comparisons paint a clear picture: MEPs on the left copy 
amendments from civil rights groups and MEPs on the right copy from 
amendments suggested by multinational corporations (see table 7.1).67 While 
there are some exceptions to this rule, they are rare.  
Thus, the question of whether lobbyists exert influence over MEPs has 
partly been answered. The fact that several MEPs copied amendments from 
the lobbyists is indicative of the structural dependency of politicians on the 
information provided by lobbyists, as raised by Coen (2007), and it is difficult 
to see how Klüver’s (2013) notion of ‘mutual benefit’ can be supported. The 
rapporteur, Jan-Philipp Albrecht’s (2016, p. 481) testimony of the lobbying 
that took place in the Parliament paints a clear picture: 
                                                  
67 It is of course possible to challenge the notion that Green or Pirate parties are on the ‘left’, as they 
would not be consistently in favour of policies presented by the traditional left. However, a significant 
part of their political agenda clearly draws of a more social liberal tradition historically associated with 
the left. For a more detailed discussion on contemporary Pirate politics, see Jääsaari and Hildén (2015). 
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Consumer protection organisations, with their totally inadequate 
resources, described consumers’ interests quite differently [than 
industry lobbyists] – and far more accurately – often did not even 
succeed in reaching Members of the European Parliament with their 
arguments. Members’ agendas were already full of meetings requested 
by industry lobbyists. 
These results put the legitimacy of the EU’s legislative process to test. 
However, it is not the throughput aspect of legitimacy that is fundamentally 
challenged because MEP lobbying is not formally institutionalised similarly to 
the public consultations organised by the Commission. Therefore, it could be 
argued that the lack of institutionalisation is precisely what drives unequal 
access and influence. While civil rights organisations had considerable access 
to some politicians, they were mostly from fringe parties with limited political 
power – except for the fact that a Green had been designated special 
rapporteur. This also suggests that access to the politicians who are 
sympathetic to one’s cause is an important explanation in the European 
Parliament as well as in the Commission. It also shows that parliamentary 
committee membership is less decisive than party adherence. 
What is not entirely clear, however, is to what extent the amendments 
suggested by lobbyists were included in the Parliament’s final proposal. The 
fact that individual MEPs have copied their amendments directly from the 
proposals by unelected parties does not mean that the process as a whole lacks 
legitimacy. In a sense, the vast number of amendments may be an indication 
that the process is self-correcting: even though some MEPs decide to copy-
paste lobbyists’ proposals, the final version will be different from the 
individual lobbyists’ proposals. However, an unprecedented event took place 
during the Parliament’s reading, which according to earlier research on the 
GDPR had a decisive influence on the legislative process: the Snowden 
revelations of 7 June, 2013.  
Rossi (2018) and Kalyanpur and Newman (2019) highlight that prior to the 
Snowden revelations in 2013, MEPs were submitting amendments that were 
watering down the Commission’s initial proposal. After Snowden, the 
dynamics changed. According to Kalyanpur and Newman (2019, p. 461), the 
Snowden revelations did not directly result in a change in attitude among the 
MEPs, but the activists, among them the EDPS Peter Hustinx, and privacy-
oriented MEPs could capitalise on the high salience environment to push for 
stricter amendments. In Kalyanpur and Newman’s (2019) view, MEPs were 
afraid to see their legitimacy questioned by their association to the IT 
companies that were pointed out as enablers of the NSA’s PRISM programme.  
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Table 7.1 Influential lobbyists (Lobbyplag, 2013). 
 
According to Rossi (2018, p. 106), the debate evolved from being only about 
Internet privacy to becoming about the protection from American 
surveillance. This frustrated lobbyists, who argued that they were being 
unfairly associated with the spying scandal (Rossi, 2018, p. 106). A major turn 
was Angela Merkel’s public support of the GDPR. Kalyanpur and Newman 
(2019) also underline that Commissioner Reding’s position was remarkably 
hardened after the revelations. With the help of discourse network analysis of 
103 actors, Laurer and Seidl (forthcoming) demonstrate that prior to 
Snowden, the coalition comprising GDPR supporters was much smaller and 
less dense than the group lobbying against the GDPR. After June 2013, the 
discourse coalitions changed, making the ‘pro-GDPR’ coalition stronger and 
denser than the coalition against the GDPR. 
Earlier research has mostly focused on how the tide turned for privacy 
activists owing to the Snowden revelations, but they have largely overlooked 
to what extent the final first reading of the Parliament contained lobbyists’ 
proposals. To assess this, I created a separate text document containing only 
the amendments made by the Parliament. I then used the open source 
plagiarism software Wcopyfind (Bloomfield, 2016) to look for similarities in 
the lobbyists’ leaked proposals. The settings used for the study are provided in 
table 7.2. Some aspects of the analysis challenge the validity of the results. 
First, lobbyists tend to include the original Commission proposal in addition 
Lobbyist Sector Type of 
advocate 
Influenced 
MEPs  
Bits of 
Freedom 
Digital rights Privacy  Greens/EFA, S&D, 
EPP  
EuroISPA Telecommunications Free data  EPP, ECR  
AmCham Business advocacy Free data EPP, ECR 
Digital 
Europe 
IT Free data ECR 
Eurofinas Finance and credit Free data ECR, EPP, S&D 
EBF Finance and credit Free data ECR, EPP, ALDE, 
S&D 
eBay Retail Free data EPP, ECR, ALDE 
Amazon Retail Free data EPP, ECR, ALDE 
ACCIS Data brokerage (credit 
data) 
Free data ALDE, EPP, ECR 
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to their amendments. This means that similarities between the Parliament’s 
amendments and the Commission’s original would be included as false 
positives. Second, small amendments to the text might not be included in the 
results owing to the sensitivity settings of the plagiarism analysis (minimum 
of six words, 80% accuracy). Lowering the sensitivity of the analysis would, 
however, result in a much higher rate of false positives. Third, the document 
containing Parliament proposals does not include omissions, which means 
that some significant amendments have not been included.68 
Table 7.2 Wcopyfind settings used for the computerised plagiarism analysis. 
Setting Value 
Shortest Phrase to Match  6  
Fewest Matches to Report  5  
Ignore Punctuation  No  
Ignore Outer Punctuation  No  
Ignore Numbers  No  
Ignore Letter Case  Yes  
Skip Non-Words  No  
Skip Long Words  No  
Most Imperfections to Allow  2  
Minimum % of Matching Words  80 
 
The results show a relatively low direct overlap between the Parliament’s 
amendments and the leaked lobbyists’ papers. 69  Owing to the problems 
associated with the validity of such a computerised analysis, individual 
percentages are not worth reporting. However, the results do suggest that 
while there are similarities, these are primarily on a conceptual level, and few 
longer word-by-word copied parts made it through to the final proposal. 
                                                  
68 The aforementioned problems were addressed by Lobbyplag by coding all insertions and omissions 
separately for each article and recital in large .json files. In this way, it was possible to compare individual 
submissions on the website. It would be possible to copy their methodology and use their materials for 
a more accurate plagiarism analysis. However, this would require setting up the entire site infrastructure 
as Lobbyplag did. It is also as labour-intensive as a completely manual analysis, defeating the purpose 
the computerised analysis serves here: to provide a quick overview. 
69 The full table is provided in Appendix 2. The highest measured match was 16% between EDRI’s 
proposal and the Parliament’s amendments. There was a 12% match between the Parliament’s 
amendments and AmCham’s proposal, but many of the hits were simply phrases and terminology that 
had also been used in the Commission’s proposal. Upon examining the two documents qualitatively, 
only one hit appeared to be sufficiently identical to be considered ‘lobby plagiarism’.  
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Nevertheless, as the Lobbyplag analysis shows, the resulting document is a 
patchwork of amendments that both increase and decrease the data protection 
of citizens.  
The approved version contained 207 changes to the original draft 
Regulation, meaning that nearly all recitals and articles were somewhat 
amended. Therefore, it is imperative to both analyse the Parliament’s first 
reading in its entirety and compare it to the earlier lobbyist proposals that 
were of a more conceptual nature. In the next section, I will outline the main 
changes in the Parliament’s proposal according to the operational principles 
of informational self-determination and bureaucratic proceduralism as well as 
questions of enforcement that cover both approaches. The results from this 
analysis will then be compared with the earlier study results of the interest 
representatives’ positions, including some of the lobbyists who were successful 
in influencing individual MEPs in the Lobbyplag study. 
7.2.1 TRACES OF LOBBY PROPOSALS IN THE PARLIAMENT’S 
DRAFT 
7.2.1.1 Informational self-determination 
Compared with the Commission’s proposal, the Parliament’s reading 
strengthened the rights of data subjects and was, in general, quite in line with 
what privacy advocates recommended in their proposals. Some of the key 
differences compared with the Commission’s approach include the addition of 
more categories to the list of special categories of data, such as philosophical 
beliefs, sexual orientation or gender identity, trade union activities, biometric 
data, data on administrative sanctions, judgements, and suspected offences. 
Another noteworthy amendment was the addition that consent (Article 7) 
should be clearly distinguishable from other questions and ‘as easy to 
withdraw … as to give it’. Similarly, as in the Commission’s proposal, consent 
must be explicitly given.  
In other words, the Parliament’s approach was inspired by informational 
self-determination. Credence is given to the data subject’s ability to represent 
their own interests and make informed choices. Some of the substantial rights 
related to rectification, access, right to erasure, and right to object are changed 
to reflect this position. For example, the right to erasure carries with it a 
significantly more extensive right to have data removed from third parties, 
essentially extending the data controller’s obligations. Moreover, everyone has 
the right to object (instead of not be subject to as in the Commission’s 
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proposal) to profiling and be informed of this right ‘in a highly visible manner’. 
Profiling is also less explicitly defined than in the Commission’s proposal, 
indicating that a wider degree of activities would be covered by the provision. 
The Parliament also explicitly requires that profiling that produces ‘legal 
effects’ shall only be allowed when it is authorised by law and includes a 
human assessment and an explanation of the decision reached. Nevertheless, 
an important exception to this rule was provided in Recital 58a, which 
explicitly states that profiling based on pseudonymous data is presumed not 
to significantly affect data subjects. In other words, such processing would 
require neither authorisation by law nor a human assessment. 
Pseudonymisation as a way to lower data protection requirements was an 
approach frequently advocated for by free data lobbyists. 
The member states’ mandate to limit user rights is also somewhat 
restricted in the Parliament’s proposal. The general principles related to 
processing in Article 5 are not awarded any margin of appreciation in contrast 
to the Commission’s proposal. When restrictions to user rights are introduced 
into member state law, these restrictions must be not only necessary and 
proportionate but also with a ‘clearly defined objective of public interest’ 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, the public interest definition excludes the 
economic or financial interests that were present in the Commission’s draft. 
Therefore, the supranational aspects of the proposal are strengthened. 
However, not all amendments would be graded as positive from a privacy 
perspective. While the list of categories of sensitive data was expanded, the 
Parliament added that processing necessary for the performance of a contract 
is a permissible exception to the general prohibition. The Parliament also 
added the legitimate interests of third parties to the list of legal grounds of 
processing in Article 6, a suggestion made by free data lobby coalition Digital 
Europe, among others. Moreover, the Parliament’s reading removed the 
provision stating that power imbalances should be taken into account when 
reviewing whether consent had been freely given, an omission specifically 
supported by AmCham, Eurofinas, and Insurance Europe in position papers 
submitted to MEPs.  
Another interesting addition to the Parliament’s first reading is the 
inclusion of collective agreements as a permissible exception to the 
prohibition of processing in the employment context. While this is certainly 
reflective of the strong role trade unions have, particularly in the Nordic 
countries, the inclusion of such an exception means that trade unions are 
granted the authority to negotiate the fundamental rights of their members. 
As some trade union contracts may affect non-members as well, this means 
that trade unions can set the standard for people who have not granted them 
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authority to negotiate. Nevertheless, this provision is in line with what the 
trade unions UNI Europa and ETUC pushed for in the 2011 consultation, 
wishing for increased possibilities of trade unions to represent their members. 
The trade unions were also successful judging by the inclusion of slightly 
stronger minimum employee rights, resulting in a prohibition of surveillance 
in private areas such as bathrooms, and that employees shall be aware of the 
data collection and provided with a notice of use. These questions were, to 
some extent, also addressed later in the 2017 Barbulescu v Romania case 
before the European Court of Human Rights. 
7.2.1.2 The procedural approach to data protection 
Many of the user rights would be largely inadequate were it not for the 
processing obligations of data controllers. As noted above, I choose to define 
the obligations that relate to transparency as processing obligations instead of 
data subject rights. The Parliament’s take on transparency is quite revealing, 
as Article 14, information to the data subject, was heavily amended. The 
Parliament added, for example, two provisions related to information on 
profiling, one requiring that controllers should disclose the existence of 
profiling, its measures, and the envisaged effects and another requiring 
‘meaningful information about the logic involved in any automated 
processing’. Another addition was the requirement to disclose whether 
personal data had been provided to public authorities in the past 12 months 
and information on whether a data impact assessment had indicated that there 
may be a high risk with the processing. The risk-based approach put forth by 
certain lobbyists is otherwise largely absent in the Parliament’s proposal. 
All in all, the transparency requirements further fortify the reliance on 
informational self-determination, indicating that by providing sufficient 
information on the data processing involved, users can exercise their rights 
and make meaningful choices. The Parliament’s proposal appears less 
concerned with the paradoxes of privacy (Nissenbaum, 2010; Turow, 
Hennessy, & Draper, 2015) and more interested in establishing mechanisms 
of individual control. However, the Parliament decided to add that uses of data 
in the realm of historical, statistical, or scientific research purposes are exempt 
from the transparency requirement – a decision that was undoubtedly 
welcomed by some of the research institutions that participated in the 2011 
consultation, such as Finland’s THL. The transparency requirements do not 
apply to persons bound by professional secrecy unless the data has been 
directly collected from the data subject. This is reflective of the point raised by 
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the European Bar Council (CCBE), who stated that ‘the lawyer’s professional 
secrecy must prevail over all data protection rules’.  
The Parliament had a clear desire to introduce less formalistic and more 
flexible compliance measures. Increased attention is given to the role of DPOs, 
and the factors that trigger DPIAs are more explicit. Article 32a, a new article, 
introduces the concept of risk analysis. The article stipulates, among other 
things, that a risk analysis should be performed when data on more than 5,000 
data subjects are processed, special categories of data are processed in large 
scale filing systems, or when profiling that produces legal effects is 
implemented – largely repeating what was stated as situations which are likely 
to trigger a DPIA. Overall, the Parliament does not grant the same exceptions 
that the Commission awarded to SMEs employing fewer than 250 people but 
instead draws the limit at processing affecting 5,000 people or more. Exactly 
why the Parliament introduced a separate risk analysis article instead of 
relying on the DPIA introduced in Article 33 is not entirely clear.70 All in all, 
the DPIA and risk analysis are outlined in much more detail than in the 
Commission’s proposal. There is a clear focus on data protection by design and 
by default instead of documentation, and security policy requirements are 
harsher than in the Commission’s proposal. 
For privacy advocates, the decision to include a category of pseudonymous 
data as well as a new definition of ‘encrypted data’ was less than ideal. As I 
have demonstrated above, the concept of pseudonymous data was not original 
to one specific actor, but it is clear that including a separate level of protection 
for pseudonymous and personal data was very much in the interest of IT 
companies. The Business Software Alliance and Johnson & Johnson both 
advocated for this two-tiered system, and a later position paper by AmCham 
also included this proposal. 
It is possible to find a common thread in all the provisions that could be 
categorised as contrary to the ideals promoted by privacy advocates. The 
justifications provided in the Committee on LIBE’s (2012, p. 64) draft report 
on the Parliament’s amendments are especially informative and indicate that 
most of these exceptions to an otherwise strong privacy framework relate to 
processing for research purposes. The justification for including 
pseudonymous data states that ‘there could be alleviations with regard to 
obligations for the data controller’. However, while research activities do 
benefit from less strict data protection obligations obtained through 
                                                  
70 The parliament also added a separate bi-annual ‘data protection compliance review’, Article 33a, 
which stipulates that the controller or processor shall evaluate whether the results from the DPIAs have 
been taken into account. 
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pseudonymisation, this does not mean that only research-oriented actors 
would benefit from this inclusion. For example, Google uses an ‘advertising 
ID’ to gather data on users who use smartphones that employ the company’s 
Android operating system to target ads based on app usage. In many cases, an 
advertising ID might be much more informative than a social security number. 
It shows how data protection regulation can also be instrumental in 
legitimising function creep, to use Lyon’s (1994) terminology. 
One of the more salient issues in the legislative process was the question of 
data transfers outside the EU, as noted above. One of the main points raised 
by private industries was naturally to ease the international transfers of 
personal data. However, the timing could not have been worse – the Snowden 
revelations showed how data from big American tech companies had flowed 
directly to the NSA. Prior to the revelations, privacy activists as well as 
Commissioner Reding and special rapporteur Albrecht were concerned that 
the proposal was being watered down (Rossi, 2018; Kalyanpur & Newman, 
2019).  
Therefore, a key question is to what extent the Snowden revelations had an 
impact on the outcome. One consequence was the overwhelming support for 
the tightening of transfer rules and the inclusion of whistle-blower protection. 
First and foremost, this is demonstrated by the Parliament’s insistence on 
increased requirements to review the adequacy decisions and the inclusion of 
the EDPB in the decision-making process. The Parliament included a new 
article to this end, Article 43a, stating that ‘No judgment of a court or tribunal 
and no decision of an administrative authority of a third country requiring a 
controller or processor to disclose personal data shall be recognised or be 
enforceable in any manner’ unless there is a legal assistance treaty. Another 
major amendment was the inclusion of employee representatives when 
employee data transfers are drawn up in BCRs.  
While the list of derogations to the transfer rules is in many respects 
identical to the Commission’s proposal, the deletion of legitimate interests as 
valid grounds for derogation is a radical departure from the original. The 
derogations are in many ways drafted as the mirror image of the legal grounds 
for processing in Article 6, which explains why legitimate interests were 
included. Where the Commission largely uses the derogations as an 
instrument among the other safeguards, the Parliament seems to regard them 
as an instrument to be used in more exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless, 
such an amendment would also result in data subjects assuming more 
responsibility for international data transfers because consent would likely 
replace legitimate interests as grounds for processing abroad.   
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7.2.1.3 Enforcement of both approaches 
One of the more significant amendments to the approach taken by the 
Commission was to include a specific reference to the ‘accountability 
principle’. Exactly what the accountability principle entails has been subject to 
debate, as demonstrated above in section 6.2. The problem with accountability 
is that it can hardly be seen as one principle because there are different 
interpretations of what it entails. In the form advocated by the Article 29 
Working Party (Appendix 1: 2010, p. 9), the accountability principle is heavily 
associated with the (bureaucratic) procedural approach, where compliance to 
rules should be demonstrated upon request. In other words, the WP29 
accountability principle requires documentation and the introduction of 
formal policies. Crucially, the purpose of accountability is not to supplement 
substantive provisions.  
In the Parliament’s first reading, accountability was not implemented 
exactly as the WP29 had envisioned. While the principle is definitely present, 
the Parliament’s reading contains fewer requirements related to the 
documentation associated with data processing (Article 28) than the 
Commission’s proposal. This is slightly surprising when noting the extensive 
transparency obligations, but it simply shows that the Parliament relies less 
on the procedural approach than the Commission. While some information 
must be provided to data subjects so that they can make rational decisions, 
documentation can be replaced by other ways of demonstrating compliance. 
This means that the enforcement mechanisms are slightly different.  
Rather than connecting administrative sanctions to specific failures to 
follow procedure, the Parliament focuses on the resources of DPAs, broadened 
mandate of the EDPB, and more limited powers of the Commission. The 
Parliament did not want to trust the Commission with the task of specifying 
the provisions more clearly and wanted to hand over the power to the EDPB 
instead.71 Nonetheless, some of the concerns of lobbyists have been heard. A 
frequent point of concern was the opaqueness of the WP29 and the lack of 
industry input in its decision-making procedure. In the Parliament’s version, 
the EDPB must consult with interested parties and its proceedings should be 
more transparent. 
The administrative sanctions were also significantly amended by the 
Parliament. In the Parliament’s reading, fines for failure to comply with the 
GDPR would be either €100 million or 5% of the global annual turnover, a 
higher level than what the Commission had proposed. Whether the total 
                                                  
71 For example, the EDPB does not have to issue opinions on the Commission’s request but can do so 
freely; the Commission has no right to give opinions or suspend the EDPB’s decisions. 
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sanction available would be higher is somewhat unclear because the 
Commission’s proposal had included specific sanctions for specific acts of non-
compliance, whereas the Parliament simply provided a maximum level for all 
breaches of the GDPR. Instead, many of the softer compliance measures could 
have a mitigating effect on the sanctions, giving DPAs more room to 
manoeuvre and an incentive to data controllers to implement data protection 
by design and default, complete DPIAs, and designate DPOs. Moreover, the 
sanctions are not only reserved for intentional or negligent non-compliance, 
except for cases where a controller has obtained the Parliament’s proposed 
‘data protection seal’.    
7.2.2 SELF-DETERMINATION, TO A POINT 
Despite the alarming amount of lobbying activities in the Parliament, the final 
document was not significantly weaker than the Commission’s proposal. The 
Parliament’s position is fundamentally supportive of informational self-
determination, with some important exceptions awarded to free data 
lobbyists. A few key differences of the Parliament’s proposal to the 
Commission’s proposal are worth pointing out. First, there is an increased 
focus on self-determination, clearly supporting some of the digital rights 
advocacy visions of how to strengthen information privacy. Second, a 
significant win for free data lobbyists was the inclusion of pseudonymous data 
as a separate category. It is not unthinkable that their success can partly be 
attributed to the fact that research institutions would also support such a 
measure. Parliamentarians could therefore be perceived as ‘pro-research’ 
while supporting data-intensive business activities.  
Third, one of the most visible departures from the Commission’s draft was 
the inclusion of extensive transparency provisions regarding whether public 
authorities had been provided access to personal data – the Snowden 
revelations serving as a clear window of opportunity for privacy activists both 
within and outside the Parliament to introduce stricter amendments. Fourth, 
the procedural and co-regulatory nature of enforcement was partly reduced 
and replaced by self-regulatory initiatives, but the initiatives were somewhat 
uneven.72  
                                                  
72 While the mandatory consultation with DPAs as a result of certain impact assessments was removed, 
the requirements for how DPIAs should be conducted were much more detailed.  
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Figure 7.3 Key applications in the Parliament's draft proposal graded on a 
scale ranging from highly opposed (1) to highly in favour (5). 
 
It is worth pointing out that while facing the choice between protecting 
information privacy with reference to self-managerial initiatives and 
procedural approaches, the former would in most cases be preferred by free 
data lobbyists. While user rights may add some complexity to data processing, 
they are in many respects less invasive than procedural approaches. This is 
mainly because informational self-determination does not address the 
paradoxes of privacy. Because people are generally not inclined to advance the 
protection of their privacy themselves even if they regard privacy as important 
(Pew Research Center, 2015a, 2015b, 2016; European Commission, 2015a; 
Turow, 2003; Debatin, Lovejoy, Horn, & Hughes, 2009; Halbert & Larsson, 
2015; Kennedy, Elgesem, & Miguel, 2015), the initiatives that aim to increase 
the self-determination of data subjects are often meaningless.  
Nevertheless, there is one important exception. If these rights are 
combined with sanctions owing to non-compliance and collective judicial 
redress mechanisms, they can be used very efficiently by digital rights 
activists. For this reason, it becomes imperative for free data lobbyists to lobby 
against sanctions and joint judicial redress, which were much more 
vehemently opposed by lobbyists than various requirements for consent and 
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further challenged by supporting notions such as legitimate interests and 
contract-based processing. 
The sheer number of amendments and MEPs’ propensity to use lobbyists’ 
submitted amendments demonstrate that MEPs are dependent on their 
expertise and therefore a suitable target for lobbyists. Coen’s (1997) depiction 
of lobbying as a resource dependency is therefore a more apt description of 
what takes place rather than Klüver’s (2013) idea of mutual benefit. 
Lobbyplag’s data also demonstrate that political allegiance is indicative of 
what position MEPs hold and, in extension, what lobbyists they will listen to. 
Owing to the diversity of the Parliament, this did not mean that the first 
reading was riddled with amendments from free data lobbyists but that 
suggestions made by civil society were also accepted to a high degree. 
However, as earlier research by Rossi (2018), Kalyanpur and Newman (2019), 
and Laurer and Seidl (forthcoming) have pointed out, it appears that the 
propensity to listen to cause groups was highly increased after the Snowden 
revelations. Therefore, there appears to be a dual dynamic, where interest 
group influence is determined partly by whether MEPs can be considered 
friendly and partly by the legitimacy risk politicians might bear if they follow 
the lobbyists’ advice. This is conclusive with Dür, Marshall, and Bernhagen’s 
(2019) research that businesses tend to be less successful than cause groups 
and especially so when the policy issues are highly salient. 
It is also possible that the resulting public debate on online surveillance 
spurred what could be perceived a European public mood against surveillance. 
Although I argue that Zahariadis’ (2008) concept of a European public mood 
is difficult to establish empirically, the backlash against NSA surveillance was 
strong and media reports on the issue were extensive in all EU member states. 
If one is less inclined to follow the rational choice rationale of politicians 
changing positions because they are afraid to be seen as the lackeys of 
lobbyists, it could be argued that the extensive public debate on surveillance 
was actual policy input from the electorate. In that regard, it would be 
democratically unjustified for MEPs to not amend their positions. At the same 
time, as Kalyanpur and Newman (2019) and Rossi (2018) highlight, policy 
entrepreneurs used the sudden interest in surveillance to their advantage in 
the policy process, actively framing the opposition to data protection as 
support of big American tech and surveillance companies. A window was 
opened, policy entrepreneurs capitalised on it, and the lobbyists’ influence was 
largely overturned – except for a few loopholes. 
However, if one accepts either of the two theses – that the Snowden 
revelations provided MEPs with policy input swaying their positions or policy 
entrepreneurs exploited a window of opportunity created by the scandal – the 
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result is damning for the idea of throughput legitimacy. If the diversity of 
viewpoints heard during the consultative stages and the representativeness of 
interest groups can be undone with heavy lobbying from industry insiders, the 
institutions in place to guarantee that such policy capture does not occur 
appear to be weak. Not every legislative proposal is accompanied with a 
scandal as remarkable as the NSA leak. Moreover, the effects of windows of 
opportunity tend not to last (Kingdon, 2013, p. 168), and the momentum 
gained by the Snowden revelations would wane.   
7.3 THE COUNCIL ADHERES TO SUBSIDIARITY, 
STRESSES SECURITY 
The Council significantly amended the Commission’s proposed legislation. 
The final draft, signed at Brussels on 11 June, 2015, contained amendments to 
most articles and recitals in the Commission’s draft GDPR. Lobbyplag (2016) 
managed to obtain 11,000 pages of classified documents containing not only 
the amendments but also how different member states argued for different 
solutions. According to their analysis, most of the member states were for 
limiting the scope of information privacy rights.  
Although both social democrats and conservative-liberals voted for 
restricting modifications, the centre-right bloc was unquestionably more in 
favour of limiting data protection rights in Lobbyplag’s analysis (2016). It may 
be noted that the Swedish and Czech social-democratic ministers of justice 
were more closely aligned with the centre-right positions. These results 
correspond to the earlier analysis of the Parliament’s amendments, further 
strengthening the conclusion that party allegiance and position on the left–
right scale is indicative of the position one takes towards digital rights. 
Regardless of the individual positions on specific amendments, the Council’s 
position was accepted by all but Austria and Slovakia. Excluding the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) member states that also participated in the 
negotiations, five ministers were associated with centrist ALDE, one with 
centre-right to right-wing ECR, eight with centre-right EPP, one with centre-
left to left-wing Greens/EFA, twelve with centre-left S&D, and one with left-
wing GUE-NGL (table 7.3).  
With a few exceptions, the Council representatives were the member states’ 
ministers of justice (see table 7.3). I will not proceed with a closer analysis of 
the positions of the individual member states because that would require 
either limiting the scope of analysis to a specific issue or a specific member 
state. As my objective is to find evidence of lobbying influence, I am only 
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concerned with the text that was eventually approved by the Council, 
individual objections aside. That being said, many influential publishers, 
telecommunications companies, and broadcasters are based in Germany and 
the UK, and several powerful U.S.-based IT companies have their European 
headquarters in Ireland. The fact that these governments are prone to 
introduce favourable amendments to legislation that may affect these 
industries negatively should come as no surprise. Journalistic reports on 
Facebook’s lobbying activity during the GDPR’s legislative process highlight a 
very close relationship between Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg and Irish 
Prime Minister Enda Kenny (Carroll, 2017). Whether the amendments that 
are beneficial to certain interest representatives are a direct result of successful 
lobbying is not always completely clear, but their very presence and the fact 
that these amendments required active involvement by the governments of the 
European member states would suggest that the results are not merely 
coincidental.  
 
Table 7.3 Participating ministers and their corresponding political 
affiliation. 
Member state 
(EFTA*) 
Title /  Ministry Politician Party Europarty 
affiliation 
Austria Bundekanzleramt Werner 
Faymann 
SDP S&D 
Belgium Secretary of State 
for Privacy 
Bart 
Tommelein 
Open VLD ALDE 
Bulgaria Ministry of the 
Interior 
Vesselin 
Vuchkov 
GERB EPP 
Croatia Ministry of Justice Orsat 
Miljanić 
SDP S&D 
Cyprus Ministry of Justice 
and Public Order 
Ionas 
Nicolaou 
DISY EPP 
Czech 
Republic 
Ministerstvo 
vnitra České 
republiky 
Milan 
Chovanec 
ČSSD S&D 
Denmark Justitsministeriet Mette 
Frederiksen 
Socialdem
okratiet 
S&D 
Estonia Ministry of Justice Andres 
Anvelt 
SDE S&D 
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Member state 
(EFTA*) 
Title /  Ministry Politician Party Europarty 
affiliation 
Finland Ministry of Justice Anna-Maja 
Henriksson 
SFP ALDE 
France Ministry of Justice Christiane 
Taubira 
Walwari 
(PS 
governmen
t) 
S&D73 
Germany Bundesministeriu
m des Inneren 
Thomas De 
Maizière 
CDU EPP 
Greece Ministry of 
Justice, 
Transparency and 
Human Rights 
Nikos 
Paraskevopo
ulos 
Syriza GUE/NGL 
Hungary Ministry of Public 
Administration 
and Justice 
László 
Trócsányi 
Non-
partisan 
(Fidesz 
governmen
t) 
EPP 
Iceland* Minister of 
Interior 
Ólöf Nordal IP ECR 
Ireland Minister for 
Justice and 
Equality 
Frances 
Fitzgerald 
Fine Gayl EPP 
Italy Presidenza del 
Consiglio 
Mateo Renzi PD S&D 
Latvia Minister for 
Justice 
Dzintars 
Rasnačs 
LNNK ECR 
Liechtenstein* Minister of Home 
Affairs, Justice 
and Economic 
Affairs 
Thomas 
Zwiefelhofer 
VU (EPP) 
Lithuania Ministry of Justice Juozas 
Bernatonis 
LSDP S&D 
Luxembourg Minister for 
Justice 
Félix Braz Greens Greens/EFA 
                                                  
73 Since Walwari is a Guyanese party it does not have a clear Europarty affiliation. However, as Taubira 
was part of the socialist government, S&D was designated as the Eurogroup. It may be noted that Taubira 
was further on the left than the rest of the government. 
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Member state 
(EFTA*) 
Title /  Ministry Politician Party Europarty 
affiliation 
Malta Minister for 
Justice 
Owen 
Bonnici 
PL S&D 
Netherlands Ministerie van 
Veiligheid en 
Justitie 
Ivo 
Opstelten 
VVD ALDE 
Norway* Ministry of Justice 
and Public 
Security 
Anders 
Anundsen 
FrP (Right-
wing) 
Poland Minister 
Administracji i 
Cyfryzacji 
Andrzej 
Halicki 
PO EPP 
Portugal Ministry of Justice Paula 
Teixeira da 
Cruz 
PSD EPP 
Romania Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Bogdan 
Aurescu 
Non-
partisan 
(PSD 
governmen
t) 
S&D 
Slovakia Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Miroslav 
Lajčák 
Non-
partisan 
(Smer-SD 
governmen
t) 
S&D 
Slovenia Ministry of Justice Goran 
Klemenčič 
SMC ALDE 
Spain Minister of Justice Rafael 
Catalá Polo 
PP EPP 
Sweden Minister of Justice Morgan 
Johansson 
S S&D 
Switzerland* Minister of Justice Simonetta 
Sommaruga 
SP (S&D) 
United 
Kingdom 
Minister of State 
for Justice and 
Civil Liberties 
Simon 
Hughes 
Lib Dems ALDE 
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Earlier policy studies have shown that the Council is not an ideal target for 
lobbyists in Brussels (Eising, 2007; Coen, 2007). The relevant ministries 
convene to discuss certain issues and do not have a permanent presence in 
Brussels, which makes scheduling appointments difficult. However, even 
though the ministries are rarely lobbied because of their activities within the 
Council, this does not mean that they would not be targeted by lobbyists within 
their own member states (Klüver, 2013, p. 39). Representatives of digital 
rights NGO Bits of Freedom managed to find proof of such lobbying with the 
help of freedom of information requests to the Dutch government (Kreiken, 
2016a). The Dutch business network VNO-NCW was the most active lobbyist 
in terms of messages sent. Kreiken (2016a) also points out that many 
corporations are included in multiple coalitions, some of which have been 
created specifically for the purpose of lobbying against data protection 
regulation. Although reluctant to address whether the lobbyists were 
successful, there was a significant degree of congruence between the lobbyists’ 
positions and the Dutch governments approach (Kreiken, 2016b):  
Although there are visible similarities between the lobby letters and the 
position of the Dutch government, it is difficult to produce evidence for 
the fact that representatives of the government have listened to 
lobbyists too much. We simply can’t know what has been said in 
meetings between government representatives and lobbyists. It’s also 
difficult to prove a causal link: maybe policymakers had already 
agreed on a specific position before the lobby letters arrived. 
As such, it would be fair to say that European NGOs without significant 
national presence in the member states would be at a disadvantage in relation 
to large national firms. Whether this is reflected in the Council’s position is 
something that needs to be examined. I will now proceed with addressing how 
informational self-determination, the procedural approach, and questions of 
enforcement have been addressed by the Council. I aim to provide an overview 
of the key changes and how they relate to the interests of different industries 
and advocacy groups. 
7.3.1 TRACES OF INTEREST REPRESENTATIVES’ PROPOSALS IN 
THE COUNCIL’S DRAFT 
7.3.1.1 Informational self-determination 
The previous sections have demonstrated how the consent mechanism is at 
the core of informational self-determination, with a clear connection to the 
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theoretical considerations of privacy that focus on control. The consent 
mechanism went through significant changes in the Council’s draft. While the 
Commission’s proposal required the explicit consent of users, the Council 
advocates for unambiguous consent unless the data in question is sensitive 
(see Council, 2015, Article 6(1)(a)). The term unambiguous originates from the 
Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) and was at that time also provided by 
the Council (Article 29 Working Party, 2011, p. 5). The Commission changed 
the definition to ‘explicit’ precisely for the reason that data controllers had 
interpreted the term ‘unambiguous’ in a fairly broad manner. For example, 
continuing to use a service has been considered unambiguous consent.  
While the change in wording might seem trivial, it is in fact of great 
importance. The position paper of the World Federation of Advertisers 
(Appendix 1: 2011, p. 5) is revealing: 
There is an important distinction between ‘unambiguous’ and ‘explicit’ 
consent, applicable respectively to personal and sensitive data. The 
distinction between two different levels of consent, with a tougher 
requirement for sensitive data, is therefore useful and should not be 
abandoned. 
The same views were echoed by all marketers in the sample, namely: IAB 
Europe, 74  EFAMRO and ESOMAR, 75  and the Digital Industry Platform. 76 
EuroISPA77 (Appendix 1: 2011, p. 4) even claimed ‘explicit prior consent for all 
processing will ultimately undermine privacy’. It may also be noted that 
several entities advocated for the inclusion of ‘implicit consent’, and 
AmCham’s and Digital Europe’s submissions contained a nearly identical 
paragraph (see Appendix 1: AmCham, 2011,p. 19; Johnson & Johnson, 2011, 
p. 4; Digital Europe, 2011, p. 11; BDMA, 2011, p. 6).78 Conversely, Privacy 
International (2011, p. 7) fundamentally opposed this division, arguing that 
                                                  
74 The Interactive Advertising Bureau Europe is the European subsidiary of the global online advertising 
association. 
75 Both EFAMRO and ESOMAR can be categorised as market research associations. 
76A lobby coalition including direct marketers and data brokers such as Acxiom. 
77 European Association of Internet Service Providers. 
78 Digital Europe company members as of 2012: Acer, Alcatel-Lucent, AMD, APC by Schneider Electric, 
Apple, Bang & Olufsen, BenQ Europa BV, Bose, Brother, Canon, Cassidian, Cisco, Dell, Epson, Ericsson, 
Fujitsu, Hitachi, HP, Huawei, IBM, Ingram Micro, Intel, JVC Kenwood Group, Kodak, Konica Minolta, 
Kyocera Mita, Lexmark, LG, Loewe, Microsoft, Mitsubishi Electric, Motorola Mobility, Motorola 
Solutions, NEC, Nokia, Nokia Siemens Networks, Océ, Oki, Optoma, Oracle, Panasonic, Philips, Pioneer, 
Qualcomm, Research In Motion, Ricoh International, Samsung, SAP, Sharp, Siemens, Smart 
Technologies, Sony, Sony Ericsson, Swatch Group, Technicolor, Texas Instruments, Toshiba, Xerox, and 
ZTE Corporation. 
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‘any data can become sensitive in certain circumstances and/or if linked to 
other available data; we consider that all personal information should be 
treated equally and have strong protection’. Privacy International’s framing of 
the issue was more in line with Ohm’s (2010) illustration of how individuals in 
anonymised databases may be re-identified. 
Furthermore, the Council significantly amended the provision stating that 
a power imbalance between the subject and data processor indicates that 
consent has not been given freely and should not be valid. The Council 
removed the provision from the article, and although it was mentioned in the 
recitals, the principle was severely weakened because recitals cannot add new 
rules but are merely used to help with the interpretation of the articles. The 
question of power imbalances is a principle that was brought to the table by 
the trade unions and opposed by free data lobbyists such as AmCham. The 
rights of employees were further undermined by the Council. Although there 
was no mention of it in the Commission’s 2010 Communication, the 
Commission’s proposal included a separate article on the rights of workers and 
the processing of data in the workplace. The article laying out the conditions 
for processing in the employment context was also significantly weakened in 
the Council’s draft, citing employer property rights as a reason for discharge 
of obligations (Article 82). This indicates that trade unions had less traction 
with national governments, which should not come as a surprise noting that 
many of the European governments at the time were centre/right.  
Another important amendment that weakened the scope of data subject 
rights was added to the list of restrictions in Article 21: the enforcement of civil 
law claims (Article 21(1)(g)). This particular amendment is remarkable in the 
light of the position papers submitted by the publishing audio-visual industry, 
represented by IFPI and a joint reply from MPA, IV, FIAD and FIAPF. In their 
submissions to the 2011 consultation on data protection, the representatives 
of the so-called copyright industries forcefully stressed that ‘[a]n excessively 
wide interpretation of data protection rules has permitted illegal operators to 
hide behind privacy while engaging in IPR infringement’ (Appendix 1: IFPI, 
2011, p. 3).79 By including civil law claims to the list of exceptions, property 
rights arguably take precedence over privacy rights. It may also be noted that 
the other position papers made no reference to this allegedly adverse character 
of privacy rights. 
Turning to other areas of processing in the public interest, the Council 
significantly strengthened the research exceptions and opened for national 
                                                  
79 The wording in the FIAD, FIAPF, IVF, and MPA reply was slightly different, stressing that ‘rogue’ 
operators had been able to hide behind privacy rules. 
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interpretations. Whereas the Commission’s proposal contained exceptions for 
‘historical, statistical or scientific research purposes’, the Council’s draft 
omitted the word ‘research’, granting even wider exceptions and also including 
archiving (Council, 2015, Article 6(2), Article 83). In addition, the 
anonymisation requirements of the Commission’s proposal and most data 
subject rights were subjected to derogations. The Commission’s proposal also 
contained significant exceptions to data subject rights in the realm of scientific 
processing but with one key difference: although several of the rights would 
not apply in such situations, data subjects still had the right to obtain 
information on whether personal data were being processed. That was no 
longer the case in the Council’s version, with the added specification that 
member states must include the derogation in its own law.  
The proposition is in line with research institutions’ position paper, but it 
would arguably also support larger companies with some sort of research 
departments. This position can be exemplified by the position paper of 
Finland’s THL. THL (Appendix 1: 2011), which processes large quantities of 
health-related data, is critical of access and rectification rights as well as 
expanding the role of consent. 
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, civil society organisations’ right to 
lodge complaints on behalf of data subjects was removed from Article 73. 
Instead, this right was limited to situations where a data subject had explicitly 
mandated such an organisation to represent them (Article 76), unless member 
state law provides otherwise.  
The consequences of the Council’s amendments are difficult to assess on a 
more general level owing to the numerous public interest clauses and other 
member state exceptions which the Council added. Depending on the country 
involved, the exceptions can be either highly restrictive or moderately 
disabling. Notwithstanding the national exceptions, the Council weakened the 
rights of citizens in many respects. The changes are numerous and often only 
slightly decremental, but the overall privacy rights of citizens were 
undoubtedly weakened. The most heavily amended principles relate to user 
rights, transparency, the liability of data processors and controllers, and 
privacy by default. These rights need to be addressed in parallel with how they 
would be enforced at the member state level.  
7.3.1.2 The procedural approach to data protection 
Noting that the Council included favourable amendments especially for public 
institutions and authorities by limiting the scope of data subject rights, it is 
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even more important to address how the Council amended the procedural 
safeguards in its version.  
On the outset, it is worth noting that the Council deviated from the original 
principle of data minimisation in Article 5(c). The Commission’s draft stated 
that data should be ‘adequate, relevant, and limited to the minimum 
necessary’, whereas the new proposal stated that data should be ‘adequate, 
relevant, and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
processed’. The view that an explicit principle of data minimisation should be 
excluded from the law was present in most of the proposals from the 
advertising and data brokerage industries (see Appendix 1: WFA, 2011; Data 
Industry Platform, 2011; World-Check, 2011; AmCham, 2011). Somewhat 
surprisingly, Microsoft advocated for the principle in connection to the 
principle of privacy by design. Another issue directly related to the question of 
data minimisation was the addition of legitimate interests of third parties as 
suggested by the Parliament. Although citizens have the right to object to such 
processing, the Council (2015, Article 19(2)) deleted the provision stating that 
citizens may object free of charge. 
One of the more conceptual innovations in the Council’s draft was the so-
called risk-based approach, according to which the obligations related to 
DPIAs, data breaches, and prior consultations are triggered by activities 
determined to be ‘high risk’ (Council, 2015, Article 31–34). High risk is defined 
as follows: ‘discrimination, identity theft or fraud, financial loss, damage to the 
reputation, unauthorized reversal of pseudonymisation, loss of confidentiality 
of data protected by professional secrecy or any other significant economic or 
social disadvantage’ (Council, 2015, Article 33). 
The risk-based approach is explicitly mentioned in AmCham’s and EPOF’s 
position papers, and some of its iterations can be found in several position 
papers by representatives of the IT industry. As can be deduced from the 
definition of high risk in the Council’s draft, the inclusion leads to less 
oversight by public authorities as the data controllers can determine the risk 
level themselves. Because data breaches that are not categorised as ‘high risk’ 
will not result in a data breach report to consumers, the Council is actually 
advocating for less transparency in their draft.  
While the co-regulatory measures, such as the mandatory appointment of 
DPOs and the employment of DPIAs, have been weakened owing to the risk-
based approach, the Council increased the importance of self-regulatory 
measures. The Council’s draft introduced the accreditation of the bodies that 
oversee privacy certifications and codes of conduct. In the Commission’s 
proposal, the Commission accepted the validity of codes of conduct and 
certifications. In the Council’s draft, the DPAs accredit bodies to oversee the 
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codes of conduct and certifications. It is difficult to foresee what consequences 
this would have. The EDPS also supported the inclusion of accredited bodies, 
which suggests that such self-regulatory measures could have a positive effect 
on the protection of personal data. Nevertheless, the effects are highly 
dependent on DPAs being able to assess the accredited bodies in a credible 
manner, and that, in turn, is dependent on the level of funding the DPAs 
receive.  
The Council’s response can thus be categorised as fairly positive towards 
the retention of personal data, and although some transparency requirements 
are reinforced in the form of privacy notices, the weakened data breach report 
requirements raise some concerns. The primary concern of the Council seems 
to have been to lessen the administrative burdens of data controllers, but this 
was often done at the expense of citizens, much to the detriment of the privacy 
advocates. 
7.3.1.3 Enforcement of both approaches 
The most obvious consequence of the Council’s draft is that it challenges the 
Commission’s authority on a number of issues and limits the Commission’s 
powers accordingly. The Commission’s draft contained 26 different cases 
where the Commission was empowered to adopt delegated acts regarding 
specific processing activities and transparency requirements. All but one 
article related to the criteria and requirements for data protection certification 
mechanisms were removed from the Council’s draft (Council, 2015, Article 
87). 
Moreover, the supranational aspects of the Regulation were severely 
limited, challenging the initial purpose of the Regulation to create a ‘one-stop 
shop’ for data protection. EDRI, a participant in the public consultations, 
counted 48 exceptions for member states and went as far to state that ‘Article 
21 has broadened government powers so much that they can effectively run a 
coach and horses through all the rights and protection in this piece of 
legislation and render it null and void’ (EDRI, 2015).  
EDRI’s strongly worded analysis of the draft is not without merit. The 
exceptions based on public interest and law enforcement are wide-reaching 
and poorly defined, leaving most exact definitions to the member states. This 
approach seems to be central in other policy domains as well, as earlier 
research has shown that the Council is predominantly concerned with the 
domestic consequences of policies and legislation (Bouwen, 2002). From a 
privacy standpoint, the consequences are difficult to foresee because it would 
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be up to the member states to decide what level of public interest would 
override the rights of citizens.  
By rejecting the transferral of power to the Commission and adding several 
exceptions to member states, the Council created an executive void, which in 
the draft is filled partly with the increased responsibility of the new EDPB and 
partly through an updated self-regulatory framework. As was the case in the 
legislative process of the Data Protection Directive (see Simitis, 1995), national 
regulators were used as a vehicle for sovereignty. However, the extension of 
powers is not as vast as in the Parliament’s proposal. The role of DPAs is 
clearer and more extensive than in the Commission’s proposal, yet there is 
more national budget control over their operations regardless of the original 
ambition to ensure that the authorities remain independent from the 
pressures of the government. The DPAs have stronger jurisdictional claims 
than in the Commission’s version, and their investigative and corrective 
powers are similar. However, the threshold for issuing fines is higher, and the 
DPAs are no longer empowered to prohibit processing completely but can only 
limit processing for a certain time period.  
7.3.2 FAREWELL, ONE-STOP SHOP 
The analysis results of the influence of interest representatives on the 
Council’s draft can be categorised as ambivalent. Drawing on the conclusions 
made by the positions advanced in the public consultations, neither the 
multinational IT corporations nor the digital rights groups were likely pleased 
with the Council’s amended proposal. The multinational IT companies were 
undoubtedly unhappy because of the piecemeal character of the Regulation 
and the broad range of national exceptions, which effectively undermines the 
ambition to create a single set of rules for all controllers within the Union. The 
digital rights groups and trade unions, on the contrary, saw a large part of their 
platform get undermined because data subject rights, the principle of data 
minimisation, and transparency requirements regarding data breaches were 
significantly weakened – the largest threat being the abuse by public 
authorities that can refer to a number of exceptions in the public interest.  
In the end, national publishers and direct marketing companies gained the 
most and lost the least in the Council’s draft. They benefit from the explicit 
reference to direct marketing as a legitimate interest in the recitals as well as 
the addition of the legitimate interests of third parties. These companies are 
not as heavily affected by the lack of EU harmonisation as global IT companies 
because their business operations are closely tied to national environments. 
Market research companies could also employ the widened research 
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exceptions when processing data. Moreover, the copyright industries managed 
to persuade governments to include an important exception for the data 
processed in civil law claims.  
It should still be noted that the Council’s draft provided some clarity that 
the original Directive failed to deliver and that quite significant sanctions were 
still in place, although weaker than in the Parliament’s and the Commission’s 
versions. The Council’s draft would perhaps not be seen as such a let-down for 
privacy advocates if the Commission would not have proposed a significantly 
more ambitious document in the first place. The proposed amendments and 
the dynamics of interest group influence reflect the Data Protection Directive’s 
legislative process as described by Simitis (1995): whereas the early versions 
of the draft legislation were ambitious, the Council inserted serious loopholes, 
often at the suggestion of lobbyists. This is consistent with earlier studies on 
business groups’ proficiency at loophole lobbying (cf. Dür, Marshall, & 
Bernhagen, 2019). Similarly, it is possible to see that many of the proposed 
amendments were added to protect national solutions to data protection and 
national uses of data that would otherwise be deemed incompatible with the 
GDPR. Nevertheless, some of the amendments had no relation with public 
administration and were close to what free data lobbyists were lobbying for.  
Figure 7.4 Key applications in the Council's draft proposal graded on a scale 
ranging from highly opposed (1) to highly in favour (5). 
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Overall, the Council’s draft was more aligned with the positions associated 
with free data lobbyists and the big data paradigm in general. What does this 
indicate about the realization of citizens’ information privacy? The results 
confirm that surveillant practices within the public sector are becoming highly 
normalised and are definitely not limited to national security exceptions. The 
bureaucratic nature of surveillance is especially visible in areas of public 
administration (cf. Foucault, 1977; Dandeker, 1994; Lyon, 1994; Webster, 
2012; Gandy, 1989), and the Council’s wish to extend national exceptions to a 
wide variety of areas is indicative of how integral record-keeping is to the 
modern nation state. Moreover, the Council not only wanted to safeguard the 
present solutions but also made sure that public authorities would be able 
apply profiling technologies to sensitive data. Regardless of the original 
purpose of the new GDPR to strengthen the rights of citizens, the Council’s 
draft demonstrates that the datafication of society is relatively unhindered by 
privacy concerns, at least on a governmental level.  
7.4 THE GDPR: BUMPY HARMONIZATION OF DATA 
PROTECTION RULES 
Burton et al. (2016) and Burri and Schär (2016) argued that the data 
protection regulation was impacted by three seminal decisions by the 
European Court of Justice(ECJ)), Google Spain, Digital Rights Ireland, and 
Schrems. However, while it can be argued that these decisions affected the 
salience of data protection policy, the evidence from the legislative process 
does not appear to support their claim in the first two cases. First, the Google 
Spain case set a precedent for requesting search engines to delete search 
results, but it referred to the previous Data Protection Directive, and a similar 
right had already been proposed by the Commission in its 2012 proposal. 
Second, the Digital Rights Ireland judgement that rendered the Data 
Retention Directive void was issued on 16 May, 2015. The judgement did not 
appear to affect the Council’s position on data protection in any meaningful 
way – besides, many member states were inclined to continue their mass 
surveillance programmes regardless of the ECJ’s decision.  
The Schrems decision is different, however, because it is directly related to 
international transfers of data and the notion of ‘adequacy’. The Schrems 
decision was issued in the midst of the trilogue negotiations, but I argue that 
its impact on the contents of the GDPR was not profound. The context is worth 
reviewing in more detail. As I explained in chapter three, the U.S. was never 
officially regarded as adequate by European standards, and the Safe Harbor 
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agreement was instated to circumvent this apparent shortcoming. However, 
the agreement was never regarded as a success. Nevertheless, it was allowed 
to continue until the Snowden revelations shed new light on the obvious 
inadequacy of the arrangement. After 15 years of concerns regarding its 
efficiency, the ECJ finally ruled in October 2015 that the Safe Harbor 
agreement was invalid.80 In light of the Snowden revelations and the national 
security exceptions provided by the agreement itself, the court expressed that 
the Safe Harbor scheme had enabled interference of the fundamental rights of 
EU citizens by U.S. public authorities and could thus not be valid. The goal of 
the Safe Harbor agreement had been to strengthen EU citizens’ information 
privacy, but without the agreement, data transfers to the U.S. would not have 
been legally permissible and the data would have to be stored in the EU. If no 
data had been transferred to the U.S., the mass surveillance of European 
communications would have been significantly more difficult.  
In the months after the Safe Harbor agreement was declared invalid, in the 
midst of the GDPR’s final negotiations, the EU Commission negotiated and 
then presented a new ‘Privacy Shield’ to replace the old agreement. The 
Privacy Shield contains some improvements regarding the rights of European 
citizens, but the same national security exception, which forced the CJEU to 
invalidate the Safe Harbor agreement, is still in place. According to the 
Commission, however, U.S. law now contains limitations on the access and use 
of personal data for national security purposes and should be regarded as 
adequate (European Commission, 2016b).81 Whether the ECJ agrees remains 
to be seen. 
                                                  
80  Judgment of 6 October 2015, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, C-362/14, 
EU:C:2015:650. Schrems issued prior complaints to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner in 2011, 
but the Commissioner was reluctant to address the complaints and did not investigate the issue (Europe 
v. Facebook, 2014). After the Snowden revelations, Schrems filed new complaints, claiming that the new 
evidence clearly showed that the Safe Harbor did not constitute ‘adequate protection’ and that the data 
transfers were not permissible. The Commissioner rejected the complaint, but Schrems filed an 
application for judicial review in the Irish High Court that referred the question to the CJEU (Europe v. 
Facebook, 2015). 
81 The Commission primarily refers to Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28) on limitations on signal 
intelligence issued by President Obama on January 17, 2014 (Executive Office of the President, 2014). 
The PPD-28 extends the same level of protection to non-U.S. citizens as U.S. citizens. Before the Privacy 
Shield was presented, the late privacy activist Caspar Bowden pointed out that future presidents could 
overturn the PPD-28 at any time. The amended Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) still permits 
the surveillance of non-U.S. nationals (FISA, sec. 702). Essentially, the PPD-28 requires that the NSA 
should ignore the FISA provisions on foreign surveillance. The problem with presidential directives is 
that they are often classified, which means that the PPD-28 could be overturned at any moment without 
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For present purposes, it is important to acknowledge a few aspects of the 
Safe Harbor agreement and the Schrems decision. First, the Safe Harbor 
agreement was already considered a failure within the data protection policy 
community. Second, the Snowden revelations themselves encouraged the 
Parliament and the Council to strengthen the adequacy provisions in Article 
45.82 Third, the Safe Harbor agreement and its successor are both diplomatic 
solutions to avoid data protection rules from obstructing trade with the U.S. 
On the higher levels of EU politics, there was no intention to let data protection 
rules trump trade, which is why, despite constant critique, the Safe Harbor 
agreement was left in place until the court’s decision. While the Schrems 
decision might have emboldened the privacy proponents in the trilogue 
agreements, it is difficult to see that it would further amplify the impact the 
Snowden revelations already had. A comparison of the Parliament’s and the 
Council’s draft proposals’ articles on adequacy decisions and the final text 
supports this claim. The strengthened position on adequacy was not provoked 
by the CJEU but by the Snowden revelations themselves. 
The final version of the GDPR was ultimately approved on April 27, 2016. 
As established above in sections 7.1–7.3, the three versions significantly 
differed in terms of the scope of consent, the data subject rights, the level of 
procedural obligations that apply to data controllers, the use of delegated acts, 
and the scope of member state exceptions. The final draft expanded the 
number of recitals from the original 139 to 173 and articles from 91 to 99, 
adding further complexity to an already intricate piece of legislation. While 
some of the additions were mere subparagraphs elevated to separate articles, 
some entirely new concepts were also introduced. It is worth highlighting 
Article 48, a suggestion by the Parliament that was clearly inspired by the 
Snowden revelations outlining the NSA’s access to personal data held by 
American IT companies (cf. Greenwald, 2014). 83  According to Article 48, 
transfers that are not authorised by Union law have to be based on 
international agreements such as mutual legal assistance treaties. Another 
addition worth emphasising is the Council’s suggestion to allow data 
protection certification by independent certification bodies (Article 43), 
further strengthening the self-regulatory elements of the GDPR.  
                                                  
European legislators being informed. Even if the PPD-28 would be allowed to stay in force, it still 
endorses the mass collection of data. By its very nature, bulk collection means that all data is retained 
and accessible by the intelligence community, and there is no effective oversight on how that data is 
used. It is thus likely that the CJEU will invalidate the Privacy Shield as well. 
82 Article 41 in the draft proposals. 
83 See chapter two, section 2.1. 
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The introduction of new articles suggests that Boräng and Naurin’s (2015) 
position that it is difficult to introduce new concepts in the later stages of the 
policy process is not completely unassailable. The signalling significance of 
new articles is by itself noteworthy, but at the same time, it is also true that the 
fundamental structure of the Commission’s draft did not change. While this 
proves the importance of the Commission’s agenda-setting capabilities (cf. 
Eising, 2007), nearly all substantial provisions were amended in the GDPR. 
Taking into account that both the Parliament and the Council amended nearly 
all articles of the Commission’s draft, it should not come as a surprise that the 
final GDPR was manifestly different from the original on which it was based. 
While the Snowden revelations caused an exogenous shock that somewhat 
shaped the contents of the GDPR, other changes cannot be attributed to clear 
windows of opportunity. 
While the primary focus of this study has been to highlight to what extent 
interest representatives exert influence over the EU institutions, the question 
of the power relations between the EU institutions is worth addressing. As 
noted in chapter four, the EU’s democratic deficit has been addressed by the 
introduction of the ordinary legislative procedure. While the Parliament is at 
least formally on equal standing with the Council, a closer comparison of the 
GDPR with the different versions put forth by the Commission, the Council, 
and the Parliament reveal that the Council was far more successful in 
introducing significant amendments to the Commission’s proposal.  
Where the Council and the Parliament had suggested different 
amendments to a provision, in most cases, the Council’s suggestion would be 
the one ultimately approved. There might be several explanations as to why a 
single article ended up looking the way it did, but the overall tendency is 
abundantly clear. As previous research on lobbying in the Parliament has 
pointed out, MEPs are, to a higher degree, dependent on the information 
provided by lobbyists owing to their comparably more moderate resources 
than the other EU institutions (Kohler-Koch, 1997; Coen, 2007; Klüver, 2013). 
The informational disadvantage of MEPs versus the justice ministries of the 
member states is evident, and it is formally reflected by the approved 
amendments by the GDPR. The question is important because of the 
tendencies of the different EU institutions to adhere to the wishes expressed 
by lobbyists. The previous sections outlined how the Council was more likely 
to advance the positions associated with the free data lobbyist approach. The 
Council was able to advance its position to a higher degree than the 
Parliament, meaning that the end result was more in line with what many free 
data lobbyists wished for. However, owing to the wide range of member state 
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exceptions required by the Council, the GDPR is far more fragmented than 
what companies operating on a global scale would have hoped for.  
Turning to some of the material changes to the GDPR, Recital 6 is worth 
quoting at length: 
Technology has transformed both the economy and social life, and 
should further facilitate the free flow of personal data within the Union 
and the transfer to third countries and international organisations, 
while ensuring a high level of the protection of personal data.  
    
This particular recital was originally provided by the Commission, never 
challenged, and ultimately strengthened by the Council, replacing ‘requires 
that’ with ‘should further facilitate’, thus transforming data sharing from a 
necessary evil for the information society to a function to a desirable feature. 
While the legal status of recitals is secondary, they denote in what light the 
binding articles should be interpreted. The wish to extend data sharing beyond 
the EU is reflected by how more instruments were added to enable such 
distribution than were available in the Commission’s draft.  
These amendments also increased the self-regulatory aspects of how such 
transfers are regulated by allowing codes of conduct and certification 
mechanisms to function as safeguards for data sharing. While the GDPR 
generally requires that the safeguards, whether they are inscribed in codes of 
conduct, BCRs, or other contracts, should grant the same rights as in the 
Regulation, these are only enforceable between parties. Importantly, this 
means that any national security exceptions that provide authorities access to 
data in third countries are unfettered by them. The safeguards may thus 
guarantee, for example, that data subjects have access to their data, but the 
security provisions or breach reporting requirements are undermined in 
practice. Per Council’s amendment, such actors have a duty to report the legal 
obligations that might undermine the rights of data subjects. Nevertheless, 
such a requirement can hardly be seen as an adequate safeguard and the 
consequence is, regardless of such disclosures, that the privacy of data subjects 
is undermined.  
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Figure 7.5 Key applications in the final General Data Protection Regulation 
graded on a scale ranging from highly opposed (1) to highly in favour (5). 
 
On a schematic level, the GDPR resembles the Council’s draft with slightly 
stronger user rights and procedural obligations (see figure 7.5). While the 
supranational elements are less pronounced than in the Commission’s original 
draft, the role of national regulators is elevated through the new, legally 
binding decision-making powers of the EDPB. From an enforcement 
perspective, the change is remarkable and demonstrates how the EU is moving 
towards formalising transnational cooperation between regulatory 
authorities.  
While the EU has a long history of institutionalised enforcement networks 
(Slaughter, 2005, p. 56), granting such networks binding decision-making 
powers elevates the governance structures to another level, evolving from 
mere information networks to enforcement networks. As such, the move 
further solidifies the importance of DPAs that had a strong impact on the 
legislative process of the Data Protection Directive (Newman, 2008b; Simitis, 
1995). The decisions of the EDPB may also be challenged in court, which raises 
interesting jurisdictional questions. While the GDPR stipulates that the 
Board’s binding decisions may be challenged in national court, Article 263 of 
the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union provides that any binding 
decisions by an EU body can be challenged in the CJEU. Therefore, it is 
possible that disdained controllers may seek redress in the General Court 
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directly, although it is far more likely that most will choose the speedier 
national courts. The role of national courts in enforcing data protection 
regulation is therefore elevated in practice.  
Owing to the large number of member state exceptions available for 
research, public health, and employment, the GDPR more closely resembles 
the U.S. sectoral approach. The differences between the omnibus and sectoral 
approach as noted by American legal scholars such as Nissenbaum (2010), 
Ohm (2010), and Schwartz (2013) are more theoretical. The difference is 
rather that the GDPR provides a principled baseline that is partly replaced by 
national solutions.84  On the one hand, the contextual integrity framework 
might be easier to apply by regulating on a sectoral basis (Nissenbaum, 2010); 
on the other hand, it means that the consistency and predictability of the 
principle-based approach is challenged to a point where only experts in data 
protection law can draw meaningful conclusions about the contents of the law. 
The GPDR correspondingly draws on both informational self-
determination and procedural approaches. While the Commission’s initial 
proposal did provide individuals with relatively strong user rights, the draft 
similarly expressed concerns with the various paradoxes associated with 
people’s disconnected (and often disillusioned) approaches to online privacy. 
To that end, the procedural approach with its co-regulatory elements was used 
to counter the drawbacks of the self-managerial approach. The Parliament, on 
the contrary, often replaced the requirements to communicate with DPAs with 
the requirements to communicate with data subjects, further strengthening 
the self-managerial approach. The GDPR is, however, more reminiscent of the 
Council’s approach, with stronger self-regulatory elements and relatively 
weaker user rights. While Recital 7 provides that ‘natural persons should have 
control of their own personal data’, a clear reference to the information-
privacy-as-control paradigm advocated especially by earlier privacy scholars 
such as Westin (1967), the articles in the Regulation more closely resemble 
Reiman’s (1976) conceptualisation of information-privacy-as-access, where 
individuals can sometimes restrict access to some personal information but 
control resides with other societal actors.  
For example, the notion that all consent should be ‘explicit’ was removed 
upon the Council’s request, a sign of both path dependence from the Data 
Protection Directive and the influence of free data lobbyists. Moreover, the 
ability of privacy organisations to act on behalf of data subjects was further 
                                                  
84 See, for example, Recital 10 which provides that ‘this Regulation does not exclude Member State law 
that sets out the circumstances for specific processing situations, including determining more precisely 
the conditions under which the processing of personal data is lawful’. 
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restricted to situations where they have been mandated to do so. While the 
Commission was clear in why joint judicial redress could not be provided for 
in the GDPR, neither the Commission nor the Parliament saw reason to 
restrict activists from making complaints to DPAs on behalf of data subjects. 
Nevertheless, the Council did open for the possibility of allowing member 
states to allow for collective action. Bearing in mind that the GDPR already 
provides for a number of national exceptions, the possibility of joint judicial 
redress in some member states would entail a clear deterrent to set up shop in 
such countries.  
While some important changes were made that somewhat undermined the 
informational self-determination of data subjects, the biggest changes 
compared with the Commission’s draft were undeniably associated with the 
procedural approach that has often been perceived as bureaucratic by industry 
lobbyists. First, the data minimisation requirements were weakened; second, 
the legitimate interests of third parties were recognised; and third, further 
processing was enabled to a greater extent, greatly reminiscent of the position 
advanced by the Council and clearly favoured by free data lobbyists. Moreover, 
the most demonstrably visible aspect of lobbyist influence was the inclusion of 
the so-called risk-based approach, visible in the Council’s draft, according to 
which different levels of perceived risk merit different action (see e.g. Recitals 
73–77). The risk-based approach was clearly advocated for by lobbyists such 
as AmCham, EPOF, and CIPL. Importantly, the risk-based approach 
heightens the threshold for DPA involvement and data breach reporting. Table 
7.4 demonstrates how some concepts that were introduced by lobbyists in the 
early stages of the legislative process can be found in the different versions of 
the GDPR.  
However, not all procedural aspects of the Commission’s draft were 
weakened. One notable addition was the legally binding obligation to 
introduce ‘privacy by default’, an obligation highly supported by privacy 
activists and first mentioned by the WP29 and BEUC. Another was the 
Parliament’s amendment requiring that profilers demonstrate ‘the meaningful 
logic involved’.  
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Table 7.4 Lobby concepts in the different versions of the GDPR. 
Concept Promoted 
by 
Commission? Parlia
ment? 
Council? GDPR? 
“notification 
fatigue” 
caused by 
data breach 
reports 
CBI, 
Microsoft, 
Nokia, BBC, 
EDRI1 
Yes (impact 
assessment) 
Yes 
(found in 
justificat
ions) 
Yes 
(leaked 
document
s) 
(Indirect
ly in Art. 
34) 
Risk-based 
approach  
AmCham, 
EPOF 
No No Yes Article 
33, 34 
Unambiguous 
consent 
Microsoft, 
EFAMRO, 
AmCham etc. 
No No Yes Recital 
32 
Privacy by 
default 
Art. 29 WP, 
BEUC2  
Yes Yes Yes Article 
25 
“Pseudonymo
us data” as 
separate 
category 
BSA, 
AmCham, 
Yahoo3 
No Yes No No 
Employee 
codeterminati
on 
ETUC, UNI 
Europa 
No Yes No No4 
“Reasonable 
expectations” 
test for 
secondary 
processing 
Microsoft No Yes No Recital 
50 
1 EDRI mentioned ‘breach fatigue’ in its proposal submitted to the MEPs and proposed that the breach 
notification deadline should be extended to 72 h. Curiously, no free data lobbyists proposed extending 
the deadline but rather preferred removing the hard deadline altogether. 
2 Several others mentioned privacy by default after it was mentioned in the Commission’s 2010 
Communication. A Google (2019) trends search reveals that the concept did not surface until 2011.  
3 Proposed in a leaked lobby proposal. 
4 Could be allowed for by national exceptions. 
 
In the end, the Commission’s goal to restrict the online advertising ecosystem 
endured, although slightly weakened by a Council amendment specifying that 
legitimate interests could be used as a legal basis for direct marketing. 
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Nevertheless, the tracking and targeting of consumers online are subject to the 
updated consent rules that were backed up with new sanctions. However, 
whether the self-managerial approach will be sufficient to restrict the online 
advertising economy is debatable. Although the sanctions definitely caused a 
scare, whether the GDPR has been able to challenge the surveillance logic on 
a more profound level is questionable. Scholars such as Bermejo (2009), 
Turow (2011), Webster (2014), Schneier (2015), and Pasquale (2015) have 
shown how the media advertising system has evolved from a fairly simple two-
sided market comprising audiences and advertisers into a complex web of 
middlemen. Nothing in the GDPR inherently challenges this model of online 
surveillance, but it does create an added strain for the consumer-facing entry 
to obtain verifiable consent to online targeting. For this reason, the industry’s 
largest players with the most targeting power in the form of consumer-facing 
platforms are at an advantage because they can target their users directly 
through multiple avenues of communication.  
When the GDPR entered into force on May 25, 2018, the consequences of 
the updated transparency and consent requirements were felt in practice. 
People received dozens of emails requesting their consent to various 
newsletters, and sites expanded their cookie notices with minute preferences 
that regular users had difficulties understanding. Many of these requests were 
highly deceptive, popularly called ‘dark patterns’ 85  that nudge users into 
making choices that are privacy invasive. These include making privacy 
settings difficult to find, enticing users into consenting, making it easier to 
accept than to refuse, obscuring the dissenting choice while highlighting the 
affirmative one, or requesting sign-in when such action is not needed. Some 
of these practices have been tested by the European DPAs.  
On the day the GDPR entered into force, Max Schrems’ digital rights 
organisation NOYB cooperated with other NGOs to lodge complaints with four 
European DPAs regarding so-called forced consent mechanisms. The 
complaints initiated a French investigation into the consent practices of 
Google, resulting in a €50 million fine. As some commentators have noted, the 
fine amounts to about four hours of Google’s revenue, but the more wide-
reaching consequences are the invalidation of the ways Google solicits consent 
to tracking. Some of the early sanctions issued by DPAs indicate that the GDPR 
has created hurdles for behavioural targeting by way of its detailed consent 
and transparency requirements. At the same time, however, it is possible that 
bigger actors will leverage their position to shift liability on smaller ones. For 
                                                  
85 The term was coined by Brignull (2019). Brignull maintains a ‘hall of shame’ on his twitter handle 
@darkpatterns.  
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example, Google has strong-handed publishers into bearing the burden of 
soliciting consent to data collection and bearing the responsibility for doing so 
while Google reaps the benefits, an approach which publishers criticised in a 
public letter to Google CEO Sundar Pichai (Kint, Mills Wade, Chavern, & 
Newell, 2018).  
A key underlying logic that underpins the GDPR is that while there are 
reasons behind granting individuals more control over their personal data and 
some procedural obligations support these goals, there are always other, more 
important societal goals that are perceived as legitimate exceptions to the right 
to privacy. Turning to the conceptual notions and fundamental rights origins 
of privacy, it is easy to see how the big data paradigm has clearly expanded the 
range of acceptable exceptions. While regulating the processing of data in a 
separate legal instrument with far more restricted rights for individuals is 
compatible with a rights-based approach to privacy, the security creep into the 
GDPR goes further, meaning that essentially any data collected for legitimate 
purposes within a private enterprise can be accessed by the security agencies, 
provided such an option exists in national law. The participatory turn in 
surveillance thus feeds additional data into the surveillant diagram (Cohen, 
2012). To a lesser extent, such exceptions are also granted for the enforcement 
of lower-level crimes and breaches of contract, as demonstrated by the 
exceptions that were added for the ‘establishment, exercise or defence of legal 
claims’, reminiscent of the copyright lobby’s critique of bad actors ‘hiding 
behind privacy laws’.  
Moreover, the rationale of extending the bureaucratisation of society by 
introducing more data points is not only a mere requirement to fulfil welfare 
programmes (Giddens, 1985) but also used for more experimental societal 
control (Gandy, 1989). Perhaps most evident in the sphere of employment, the 
GDPR gives equal possibilities to disregard data protection rights for uses that 
advance the rights of the individual as well as those that are to their detriment. 
Finally, the big data paradigm is nowhere as present as in the provisions that 
lay out broad exceptions for scientific research. The broad exceptions, already 
criticised under the Data Protection Directive (Simitis, 1995), seem to indicate 
that while privacy rights are worthy of protection in the regular course of 
business, they cannot be used to hinder innovation. The surveillance-
innovation complex, as denoted by Cohen (2016), can only partially be 
restricted by reference to fundamental rights.
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8 CONCLUSION 
The GDPR could not have been more aptly timed. During the years leading up 
to the Commission’s draft Regulation, the online advertising economy took off, 
smartphones became ubiquitous, several ICT giants began offering cloud 
services, and social networking sites became an integral part of how people 
communicate. In 2013, a year after the Commission submitted its draft 
Regulation, Edward Snowden revealed that millions of Europeans had been 
affected by the NSA’s and GCHQ’s surveillance programmes. In March 2018, 
two months before the GDPR entered into force, Facebook was discovered to 
have allowed third party developers, including Cambridge Analytica, access to 
millions of Facebook users’ personal data. Data protection moved from the 
fringes of information society policy to its very centre.  
From the perspective of EU decision-making, the GDPR was drafted at a 
time when the lobbying efforts in the EU were becoming more pronounced. 
An integral aspect of this trend is that the Silicon Valley IT giants, many of 
which are regarded as the most valuable companies on the planet, brought the 
full range of Washington lobbying strategies to Brussels.  
The GDPR is about more than a new set of data protection rules: it is about 
privacy, datafication, and power. This study has sought to examine how these 
trends were reflected in the regulatory output of the EU institutions. In 
particular, I have attempted to answer the following research questions: 
1. What policy alternatives were put forth by the EU institutions in the 
course of the GDPR’s legislative process, and how did they correspond 
to the ideas, issues, and frames promoted by interest representatives?  
2. What does the influence of organised interests and stakeholders in 
GDPR decision-making reveal about the democratic legitimacy of the 
process? 
This final chapter is devoted to distilling the main findings of this study and 
providing some suggestions for further research. I will address the first 
question by looking at how the different regulatory drafts were shaped by 
earlier events, the influence of interest representatives, and the paradigms 
structuring and constraining the EU’s data protection reform. Based on the 
answers to the first research question, the second question addresses whether 
the GDPR can be perceived as democratically legitimate. Finally, I will 
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conclude by elevating the main contributions of this study and discussing what 
this means for the legitimacy of EU decision-making in general and for future 
policy within this domain. 
 
8.1 THE POLITICS OF DATAFICATION 
What does the process leading up to the GDPR say of media and 
communication regulation in the 21st century? In some respects, the regulation 
of data transfers is reminiscent of the problems associated with transnational 
television – how can sovereign states remain in control when communication 
technologies do not respect geographical borders? The EU’s answer has always 
been part fantasy and part geopolitics: within the single market, there are no 
borders, but to breach the outer border as an outsider, one must adjust to the 
EU’s rules. The fantasy of the single market fractured in the events leading up 
to the original Data Protection Directive. As Newman (2008a, 2008b) and 
Simitis (1995) demonstrated, DPAs in member states with data protection 
laws in place obstructed data transfers to the member states that lacked 
legislation and forced the Commission to act.  
Through this intervention, the level of data protection regulation in the EU 
became more consistent. Nevertheless, while there was agreement on the level 
of principle, a closer examination of how the Directive was implemented 
would soon reveal that the national solutions were wildly different (Korff, 
2002) and the level of privacy protections not quite comparable. The idea that 
the EU favours a principle-based approach while the U.S. employs a sectoral 
approach to data protection does not quite hold upon closer scrutiny. While 
the reason to draft a new law, whether a directive or a regulation, was 
motivated with reference to the diverging implementations of the previous 
Directive, the GDPR fell short of both the Commission’s and the multinational 
corporations’ expectations to harmonise European data protection law. For 
the governments of member states, such an ambition might never have existed 
to begin with.  
Apart from the differences between the EU institutions’ approaches to data 
protection, this study has mainly been focused on the role of interest 
representatives in the legislative process. Intergovernmentalists such as 
Moravcsik (2002) argue that national ways for assessing legitimacy are not 
applicable in the EU context, but the legitimacy of EU-policy-making should 
instead be the efficiency of supranational decision-making. While output 
legitimacy is not sufficient to deal with the EU’s democratic deficit for reasons 
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outlined in chapter four, whether the GDPR achieved what it was set to do and 
why it came to look like it did is worth considering. In particular, drawing on 
new institutionalists such as Campbell (2004) and Schmidt (2008), to what 
extent is the GDPR path-dependent of the earlier Data Protection Directive, 
what was the role of interest representatives in shaping its contents, and what 
paradigms shaped and constrained the policy options available?  
The path dependence of the GDPR is adamantly clear. As was highlighted 
in chapter three, the Data Protection Directive was in many ways a more 
revolutionary piece of legislation than the GDPR. The GDPR draws on many 
of the key principles from the Data Protection Directive, but the differences lie 
in the level of detail and in the GDPR’s extra-territorial application. Whereas 
the Data Protection Directive mostly operated on a level of principle, the 
GDPR further evolves both the bureaucratic proceduralism and informational 
self-determination approaches to information privacy legislation. The extent 
to which the GDPR can be traced to its antecedent is worth addressing. First, 
the data protection reform was unlikely to depart radically from the omnibus 
approach to data protection regulation. Stakeholder and DPA reviews of the 
Directive in 2002 did not focus on upending the logic of the regulatory 
intervention but focused on clarifying and harmonising provisions. True to 
form, business networks were not advocating for major overhaul; nonetheless, 
they were not proponents of the status quo but wanted to see regulatory 
change. There were no positive feedback loops for companies in a situation 
where data protection regulation was interpreted inconsistently in the 
different member states. In sum, there were clear calls for complexity to 
provide further certainty but no radical departure from the original.  
Second, as with the Data Protection Directive, the role of national DPAs 
was pronounced. Although they did not use their powers to coerce the 
Commission to act, they did provide commentary and expertise, which were 
taken into consideration by DG Justice. The decision to make DG Justice the 
secretariat of the WP29 appears to have had a profound impact on the 
legislative process, as Laurer and Seidl (forthcoming) argue. The 
institutionalised cooperation made DG Justice the likely lead DG for the data 
protection reform, despite DG INFSO (now Connect) and DG Internal Market 
(now Growth) being serious contenders. The WP29 had been providing 
authoritative opinions on data protection legislation for years, and the traces 
of these opinions can be seen in the Commission’s draft GDPR. However, the 
GDPR’s legislative process is different from that of the Data Protection 
Directive in one important regard. In the drafting of the Directive, the DPAs 
had a pronounced role from the beginning, whereas other stakeholders were 
largely excluded from the agenda-setting stage. Therefore, the lobbying did 
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not really commence until the draft Data Protection Directive had been 
submitted. When the data protection reform was initiated in 2009, the 
Commission had a different perspective on stakeholder participation. 
Stakeholders were included from the very beginning, providing their positions 
on everything from specific provisions to the general approach. Nevertheless, 
the influence of interest representatives looked very different at different 
stages of the process. 
 As pointed out by earlier research on interest group participation and the 
effects of lobbying, separately addressing each EU institution is necessary. 
Based on how susceptible the different EU institutions have been to the 
influence of interest representatives, a few observations can be made. First, 
conclusive with earlier research on interest group participation (Klüver, 2013; 
Dür, Bernhagen, & Marshall, 2019), it is possible to conclude that while the 
resources of interest representatives certainly impact their ability to 
participate in the legislative process, the Commission was less swayed by 
actors with significant resources than the Council and the Parliament. This 
does not mean, in my view, contrary to what Dür, Bernhagen, and Marshall 
(2019) argue, that businesses ‘lose’. It means that businesses are 
comparatively successful in shaping EU policy, even though they might not be 
able to shape the agenda of a DG that can be perceived as, if not hostile, at least 
not friendly.  
The GDPR did include important changes to the preceding Data Protection 
Directive that have a deterring effect on data maximisation, but I argue that 
this is mainly because DG Justice had aligned interests with privacy advocates. 
Nonetheless, the scope of powers awarded to the national regulators is 
testimony of the influence of national regulators and privacy advocates. 
Because the level of enforcement is considerably dependent on the national 
setting, the most important victories for the privacy advocates are, in my 
opinion, the introduction of ‘privacy by default’, as first promoted by the WP29 
and BEUC, the codification of the right to be forgotten and the right to data 
portability, and a stronger data minimisation principle. These were all, 
however, included in the Commission’s draft Regulation. While many of the 
provisions that privacy advocates supported were eventually included in the 
Commission’s draft, most were partly weakened in the final GDPR according 
to the Council’s wishes. This suggests that participating in the early stages of 
policy formulation is more important for cause groups than for large firms that 
can pursue their agenda and influence the Council’s amendments through 
national avenues of lobbying.  
My analysis of the legislative process shows that the MEPs were more 
inclined to accept the reasoning of lobbyists than the Commission’s officials 
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and that the Council’s draft included most suggestions made by free data 
lobbyists. This supports earlier research by Klüver (2013, p. 39) that the 
Council tends to listen to lobbyists from corporations with a strong presence 
in the member states. Lobbyists were perceivably able to water down the draft 
GDPR in the Parliament, especially prior to the Snowden revelations. If, as the 
evidence presented in chapter seven suggests, the Snowden revelations 
provided privacy activists a window of opportunity to counter the influence of 
industry lobbyists, this indicates not only that the legislative process in the EU 
is open for policy capture by industry lobbyists but also that the deliberative 
aspects of the early stages of the legislative process can be completely undone.  
While the final text did include suggestions made by the Parliament, a 
comparison of all amendments to the respective drafts of the EU institutions 
reveals that most amendments to the Commission’s text were, in fact, 
suggested by the Council. This matters not only because of the lack of insight 
into how lobbying takes place on the national level when EU legislation is 
drafted but also because the power relations between the Council and the 
Parliament are clearly tilted in favour of the former, at least in the case of the 
GDPR. Given that many significant changes were introduced by the Council, 
it shows that the Council does not appear to be a sub-optimal target for 
lobbyists, contrary to what is suggested in some of the literature (cf. Hayes-
Renshaw, 2009; Eising, 2007; Coen, 2007).  
Whether lobbyists primarily contacted the Council in the member states or 
when the Council was convening has not appeared in the documents used for 
this analysis; however, the Council’s overwhelming support for industry 
amendments indicates that the Council is not a sub-optimal target for 
lobbyists. Some of the Council’s amendments include exceptions to data 
subject rights, weakened procedural requirements, and advanced exceptions 
to public authorities.  
Many of these changes were highly reminiscent of lobbyists’ suggestions 
(see section 7.4). For example, the Council’s suggestions weakened the consent 
mechanism, restricted privacy organisations’ ability to act on behalf of data 
subjects and made it possible for data controllers to limit data portability 
requests with reference to intellectual property rights. While the individual 
positions of the member states were not included in the primary sources of 
this study, it should still be stressed that Lobbyplag (2016) had ranked the 
German, British, and Irish representatives’ draft amendments predominantly 
negative and that Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg had congratulated Irish 
Prime Minister Enda Kenny on Ireland’s position in the negotiations of the 
GDPR (Carroll, 2017). Moreover, freedom of information requests to the 
Dutch government revealed that the Dutch negotiators were overwhelmed 
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with lobbyists’ requests, and nearly all of the communication was from parties 
engaged in watering down data protection provisions. It is absolutely clear that 
the existence of influential publishers, telecommunications companies, and 
broadcasters in especially Germany and the UK had an impact on their 
respective government’s positions and that Ireland’s strategic position as 
home to the European headquarters of many Silicon Valley companies was 
decisive. 
Finally, following the arguments of intergovernmentalists that the EU’s 
legitimacy stems from its capacity to draft efficient policy, the GDPR must also 
be evaluated based on the Commission’s own ambition. The problems that the 
Commission identified based on its meetings with stakeholders were the lack 
of harmonisation, people’s perceived lack of control of their personal data, and 
the inconsistencies in personal data protection in the field of police and 
judicial cooperation. Because the purpose of the GDPR was mainly to address 
the first two problems, I will focus on them.  
The first problem was superficially dealt with by drafting a Regulation 
instead of a Directive. Regulations do not need to be transposed into national 
legislation, and evaluating whether member states interpret the same law 
consistently is easier rather than examining whether national laws and their 
enforcement uphold the spirit of a directive. From a supranational 
enforcement perspective, the benefits are unquestionable, but regulations 
undoubtedly encroach on the sovereignty of member states to draft laws which 
are consistent with their national legal tradition. In a policy domain such as 
data protection, where the transnational flow of data is a matter of fact, it can 
be argued that some degrees of sovereignty have already been lost. Following 
Slaughter’s (2005) work on the role of transnational networks, the increased 
cooperation of national regulators is a necessity for efficient enforcement 
action. While having a regulation without national derogations within this 
policy domain would be unfeasible, the Council’s added derogations poked 
several holes in what was supposed to harmonise legislation in the member 
states. 
One of the biggest differences between the final GDPR and the 
Commission’s proposal is evidently the broad range of exceptions available for 
services in the public interest. These are dependent on national exceptions and 
pave the way for data-driven bureaucratisation in the public sector and private 
suppliers of public services. Moreover, they enable researchers of artificial 
intelligence and automated decision-making to experiment freely. For these 
uses of data, informational self-determination is toothless, and bureaucratic 
proceduralism is heavily constrained. Few governments are willing to outlaw 
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privacy invasive practices that can potentially have a broader impact on 
employment, welfare, taxation, or security.  
This explains why data protection regulation and privacy cannot alone 
address issues connected with societal datafication. The GDPR challenges the 
big data paradigm in areas which are perceived as less innovative but does not 
profoundly challenge the role of data and automated decisions. Regulatory 
affordances provided for the development of artificial intelligence, such as 
facial recognition technology, are fundamentally different from the rules that 
limit online tracking. Even though the former may be used to inform the latter 
– for example, facial recognition in physical stores to identify subjects of 
online advertising – the degree of acceptability of data processing is ultimately 
decided by what is perceived as scientific and, by extension, innovative. The 
exceptions to Article 22 on automatic decision-making are especially 
informative in this regard, as it is blatantly obvious that industries most reliant 
on automatic processing, such as the financial and insurance industries, are 
exempt based on contractual necessity. 
Regarding the second problem, control of personal data, whether the 
GDPR has managed to curtail behavioural targeting which was cited as a key 
concern in the Commission’s 2010 Communication needs to be addressed. Did 
the EU succeed in drafting an efficient response to this perceived policy 
problem? In chapter two, I defined targeting power as the combination of 1) 
the collection of data from primary and secondary sources (tracking), 2) the 
search for patterns and inferences in the data (mining), 3) the association of 
these patterns with individuals (profiling), and 4) access to audiences. Based 
on the different applications in the GDPR, it can be concluded that the 
targeting power of advertising intermediaries that have little-to-no consumer 
facing activity has been somewhat limited because the collection of data is 
subject to purpose limitation and data minimisation principles, making 
transfers to third parties slightly more restricted. Facebook and Google, who 
have consumer facing interfaces, have embraced the consent-based approach, 
although the methods used to obtain consent can be criticised. Other 
advertising intermediaries are dependent on online publishers, whose 
different transparency policies and ways to verify consent have resulted in 
mixed results and questionable levels of compliance. Therefore, the GDPR’s 
potential rests partly on the shoulders of privacy activists such as Max Schrems 
or Privacy International who are willing to use the new data subject rights to 
encourage DPAs to enforce and ultimately sanction actors that engage in 
practices that could be categorised as noncompliant. 
However, owing to the structure of the online advertising ecosystem, 
advertising networks are in a strong position to place the burden of providing 
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a legal ground for processing on publishers. The biggest ad exchanges in the 
world are operated by Google, AT&T, Microsoft, and AOL that provide access 
to users on most of the world’s most visited websites. Facebook has its own ad 
exchange with access to over 2 billion users. Many publishers are financially 
dependent on ad exchanges for a significant portion of their income and this 
has consequences for data collection practices as well.  
In other words, the GDPR has not been able to challenge the ecosystem 
itself but has forced publishers dependent on it to be clearer about their 
advertising partnerships. If one ignores the economic ramifications, it would 
be simpler for publishers to revert to the old model of contextual advertising. 
However, owing to the rise of behavioural advertising and the targeting power 
of especially Google and Facebook, advertisers are not dependent on the reach 
of publishers, resulting in the diminishing demand for the advertising 
products of traditional publishers. The trust that publishers have built up with 
their readership is of secondary importance compared with the promises of 
microtargeted ads. Data protection regulation cannot efficiently regulate 
online behavioural advertising unless behavioural targeting is completely 
decoupled from access to services and content. The problem is that 
behavioural targeting can never be decoupled from the economic incentive to 
encourage users into consenting. Therefore, the solution on the table is for 
privacy activists to challenge whether consent has been given in a way which 
is consistent with the law. 
Given how the influence of organised interests has been established at 
different stages of the GDPR’s legislative process, I now analyse whether this 
also impacts the legitimacy of the EU’s data protection reform. As was outlined 
in chapter four, the inclusion of stakeholders in decision-making is a response 
to the EU’s democratic deficit. To demonstrate that interest representatives’ 
views were taken into consideration in the legislative process does not 
necessarily mean that the democratic legitimacy of the process is questionable. 
Instead, the assessment must be made with reference to how successful 
different interest representatives were in getting favourable policy 
applications in place and whether their influence was proportionate if one 
considers the goals with the data protection reform. 
8.2 THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EU’S DATA PROTECTION 
REFORM 
From a legitimacy perspective, the GDPR’s legislative process highlights 
several aspects connected to the question of democratic deficit. The discussion 
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in chapter four explored how the different aspects of legitimacy, input, output, 
and throughput interact with the notion of democratic decision-making. While 
sceptics such as Scharpf (1999) and Coen (2007) have been unconvinced by 
the efforts to make the legislative process more inclusive and thus more 
democratic, Schmidt (2013), Kohler-Koch (2010), and Klüver (2013) have 
been more optimistic.  
Before addressing whether stakeholder inclusion in policy processes can 
contribute to a higher degree of legitimacy, another aspect of the GDPR’s 
legislative process is worth examining. Following Scharpf’s (1999; see also 
Zahariadis, 2008) idea that input legitimacy emanates from a European policy 
discourse on privacy, how does one identify such a discourse, and how could 
it be translated to actual data protection regulation? One could argue that the 
two EU-wide Eurobarometer surveys on privacy and data protection (2011 and 
2015) were used to identify the building blocks of an EU-wide notion of privacy 
and data protection. In lack of a collective identity and an EU-wide policy 
discourse, the two surveys reconstructed the main opinions of the European 
constituency via a representative sample in each member state. While it is 
obvious that a survey cannot be equated with public discourse, representative 
samples can serve as a proxy for a ‘European mood’ (Zahariadis, 2008) or 
public sentiments (Campbell, 2004, pp. 96-98). 
The obvious problem with this notion of legitimacy is that the GDPR does 
not fully correspond to the answers given in the surveys. For example, a clear 
majority of the respondents believed consent should be required before 
personal information is collected and processed (European Commission, 
2015a, p. 59). A few replied affirmatively concerning personal information on 
the Internet. Approximately one in ten thought that consent should be 
required only for sensitive information. Only 5% replied ‘no’. While especially 
the Commission made some efforts to strengthen the consent mechanism, it 
has always been clear that several other legal bases for processing would be 
made available. Furthermore, the unpopularity of the ePrivacy Directive and 
its cookie notifications indicates that while people say that they want to control 
their personal information, they do not want to be informed of the intricacies 
of the online advertising economy but simply wish that controllers of personal 
information respect their privacy. Therefore, contrary to Utz and Krämer 
(2009), I would argue that the real privacy paradox is not that people’s views 
on privacy contrast their actions but that people believe they want control 
when in reality they just want their reasonable expectations of privacy to be 
fulfilled.  
Noting that this type of input only appeared to have a limited effect on the 
draft proposal, the idea of including stakeholders in the legislative process 
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needs to be connected to the other notions of legitimacy. To begin with, it is 
worth distinguishing between the two approaches to interest representative 
inclusion in the legislative process. First, are stakeholders included to 
represent populations to compensate for a lacking Europe-wide policy 
discourse (Scharpf, 1999) or to deliver a diversity of arguments in a 
deliberative process (Kohler-Koch, 2010; Quittkat & Kohler-Koch, 2013)? The 
legitimacy of the GDPR’s legislative process is completely dependent on 
whether one accepts the former or the latter notion of policy input. Schmidt’s 
(2013) concept of throughput legitimacy would be more inclined to accept the 
second view rather than the first.  
I will address the legitimacy of the GDPR by considering both notions of 
legitimacy, looking at the representativeness of interest groups as well as the 
diversity of arguments. On the outset, it is easy to concede to Scharpf’s critique 
of the EU’s lack of legitimacy when looking at the GDPR. The results from 
chapter six revealed that a majority of the participants to the public 
consultations represented private interests rather than the public interest, and 
in the first consultation, most of them did not even bother to dress up their 
arguments in more general terms or public interest frames. The later stages of 
the legislative process, outlined in chapter seven, were even more dominated 
by industry lobbyists because these had better means to access decision-
makers. 
The presence of industry lobbyists is especially problematic when actors 
that are primarily engaged in profit and data extraction from the EU have a 
very limited local presence but still seek to influence the contents of legislation. 
The public consultations showed that companies headquartered in the U.S. 
participated to a very high degree. Many of these companies have a European 
presence, and it would obviously not be possible to exclude them from the 
public consultations simply because of where their headquarters are based. 
Nevertheless, the lack of participation from many of the Eastern member 
states combined with the fact that the U.S.-based companies mainly seek to 
advance the flow of personal data from the EU leads to a situation wherein the 
suggested proposals that undermine the privacy rights of EU residents heavily 
outnumber the ones that are more focused on the protection of privacy.  
If the outstated goal with an updated piece of legislation is to counter the 
challenges associated with the globalisation of data flows and the risks 
involved (European Commission, 2010a), including the lobbyists that 
participate in these activities is questionable. Moreover, including 
stakeholders whose very activities one seeks to harmonise with the public 
interest is problematic (Bellamy, 2010). Their participation cannot be 
motivated by deliberative ideals but must instead be based on ideas of 
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representation: as these actors will be regulated by the new law, it is only 
reasonable that they should have a say in the process, regardless of how 
counterintuitive it is for the goals of the legislation.  
Nevertheless, how far should one enable such participation? Is the 
automotive industry fit to suggest amendments to regulation on petrol tax? 
Should actors that provide offshore letter-box companies be able to weigh in 
on tax reform? Are the corporations that benefit from the privatisation of 
healthcare the right actors to suggest how public procurements should be 
conducted? While it is reasonable to consult with affected parties to avoid 
completely unfeasible solutions, institutionalising their participation does not 
contribute to a higher level of legitimacy. 
Even if one accepts the view that interest representatives are granted access 
to the legislative process not because of their ability to represent large swaths 
of the population but because of their ability to bring forth interesting 
arguments and a diversity to the discussions (Kohler-Koch, 2010; Quittkat & 
Kohler-Koch, 2013), it begs the question of whether the actors engaged in the 
exploitation and export of personal data should be equally able to shape the 
contents of an instrument that has an outstated goal to enhance the protection 
of privacy as cause groups whose very missions are to advance fundamental 
rights. An obvious argument against this critique is that the free movement of 
data is also the stated goal of the original Data Protection Directive and 
subsequently the GDPR. However, the free movement of data was added to 
the title by the Council on recommendation by industry lobbyists (Bennett & 
Raab, 1997). This shows the importance of symbolic victories on the 
operational level, providing a framework for more concrete applications that 
do not seek to advance the protection of privacy rights but rather enable data 
processing and exchange.  
Nevertheless, as many policy researchers are keen to point out, access does 
not always correspond with influence (Dür & Mateo, 2012). If one looks not 
only at access and participation but also at the policy output, the results look 
slightly different. A comparison between the output of the interest 
representatives and the output of the EU institutions shows that both business 
networks and civil society organisations appear to have been quite successful. 
A closer look at the Commission’s proposed regulation and the Parliament’s 
and Council’s amendments to the same reveal that while civil society was 
clearly not as well represented as business interests in the consultations, their 
input seems to have been taken into account to a high degree. Therefore, the 
way DG Justice handled the input from interest representatives appears to be 
consistent with throughput legitimacy – regardless of the unevenness of 
participation, the policy output was quite balanced. 
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To some extent, civil society appears to have represented a supranational 
public interest that was also accepted by the EU legislature. As the respective 
membership bases of different cause groups are somewhat limited in scope, it 
can be deduced that their main contribution was deliberative and discursive 
rather than representative. Therefore, the unevenness of participation was 
counteracted by the quality of the policy proposals, at least to some degree. 
While it would be overconfident to argue that this is indicative of the 
deliberative function of the public consultations – I argue that no compromise 
can be reached with such incompatible interests – it does mitigate the effects 
of heavily one-sided lobbying.  
However, the examination of the legitimacy of a legislative process does not 
end with the Commission’s proposal. The role of outside influence is notably 
very different in the three EU institutions. This has consequences for the 
throughput aspect of legitimacy. While stakeholders can be formally included 
by the Commission, the later stages of the legislative process are rather 
unfettered by these procedural innovations to introduce more deliberation to 
the decision-making process.  
Upon closer analysis, it is more accurate to say that the lack of institutional 
inclusion of interest representatives in the later stages of the GDPR’s process 
proved to be more detrimental to its legitimacy. For example, how individual 
MEPs had copied extensively from lobbyists’ proposals was only possible to 
see through leaked proposals. These cases revealed that party adherence was 
highly indicative of the position an MEP might hold. Furthermore, the 
question of influence can be answered affirmatively on the individual level, but 
as a collective, the Parliament’s first reading can be perceived as overly 
supportive of neither industry interests nor privacy advocates but rather a mix 
of the two.  
The Parliament’s position was also affected by two factors: that the 
rapporteur, Jan-Philipp Albrecht, was an outspoken privacy activist and that 
the Snowden revelations surfaced at the time of drafting. This result is 
consistent with institutionalist arguments that both the role of policy 
entrepreneurs and windows of opportunity need to be considered (Peters, 
2012; Zahariadis, 1995, 2008; Kingdon, 2013). Nevertheless, it challenges 
Pierson’s (2000) and Mahoney’s (2000) notion that events early in the process 
would be more important than later events: the Snowden revelations came 
quite late in the process. Moreover, it appears that no window of opportunity 
was needed to water down the legislation, which would be consistent with 
earlier research on lobbying that stresses lack of salience as a contributing 
factor to business success (Dür, Marshall, & Bernhagen, 2019, p. 106; 
Culpepper, 2010; Rasmussen, 2015). From a legitimacy perspective, it is 
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unsatisfactory that balanced policy output is dependent on such pivotal 
windows of opportunity.  
While the lobbying of MEPs was made more transparent owing to the 
MEPs that actively leaked lobby position papers, it is blatantly obvious that 
the full force of lobbying that took place after the Commission had submitted 
its draft proposal has little to do with deliberation and a lot to do with the 
access goods that interest groups provide (Bouwen, 2002): money, policy 
expertise, and the support of politicians’ constituencies. Moreover, there is 
little-to-no public insight into how interest representatives engaged with the 
Council. 
The Council’s role is the most apparent challenge to the legislative process’s 
legitimacy. No lobby proposals provided to the Council were leaked to the 
public, but a closer examination of the Council’s positions revealed that its 
suggested amendments were highly reminiscent of the positions held by free 
data lobbyists – with some exceptions. Overall, very little information is 
available on the interactions of the ministers of the Council and lobbyists. 
Moreover, the Council’s draft contained a wide variety of exceptions and 
weakened safeguards with reference to national laws, largely undermining the 
effort of creating a unitary data protection framework across the EU.  
Therefore, whether the throughput legitimacy of the legislative process can 
be increased as long as the initiatives are restricted to the agenda-setting stage 
of policy-making is doubtful. Making access to EU politicians conditional on 
registering to the Transparency Register (2019) is an important step that has 
not yet materialised.  
Thus, it is important to not only document meetings with interest 
representatives but also make the actual policy proposals that they put forth 
accessible to the general public. Estimating to what extent lobbyists and 
advocates are successful in influencing decision-makers is only possible by 
comparing the input of interest representatives with the output of the EU 
institutions (cf. Dür, Bernhagen, & Marshall, 2019; Klüver, 2013).  
Although the methodological approach taken here, process tracing with the 
help of qualitative document analysis and automated text searches, has proven 
to be efficient for determining how concepts and frames find their way into the 
policy output of the EU institutions, it is possible that some connections go 
unnoticed. Furthermore, the approach is cumbersome and requires policy 
expertise – in other words, it does not scale, and applying it to evaluate the 
influence of all possible lobbyists in all possible policy domains is not realistic. 
This approach could perhaps be automated using calibrated antiplagiarism 
software, but as noted in chapter five, automated approaches are less apt at 
finding conceptual similarities and do not differentiate between meaningless 
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stylistic amendments and important changes. Nevertheless, regardless of the 
methodology one uses to assess influence, the informal open consultation 
procedure where interest representatives can provide open-ended solutions to 
their perceived policy problems is highly valuable from a transparency 
perspective, and it makes tracing the positions of interest representatives 
possible. 
8.3 DISCUSSION 
This purpose of this study has been to delve into the GDPR’s legislative process 
to gain deeper understanding of the politics of datafication and how the 
contents of data protection policy is shaped by the actors involved, external 
events, and the institutionalisation of stakeholder involvement in EU decision-
making. This study has both theoretically and empirically addressed the two 
research questions related to the (1) policy congruence between the 
applications and their ideational underpinnings put forth by interest 
representatives and the EU institutions and the (2) legitimacy of the legislative 
process and the influence of interest representatives.  
The contribution to the literature on EU studies can be summarised as 
follows. First, this study has proved that the interest group studies that exclude 
the examination of how national regulators influence regulatory proposals 
ignore a critical element of policy-making in the EU. Having a broader 
perspective that also includes public authorities is absolutely necessary. 
Slaughter’s (2005) emphasis on the role of regulators in transnational 
regulatory reform is a good starting point. Second, I have provided additional 
nuance for understanding the comparative successes of business networks and 
cause groups. I argue that cause groups are much more dependent on both a 
friendly DG and public salience than business groups. This is demonstrated by 
the relative success that privacy advocates had in introducing policy 
applications in the Commission’s proposal despite being visibly outnumbered 
in the public consultations. Moreover, the industry lobbyists were successful 
in watering down the GDPR in the Parliament prior to the Snowden 
revelations. The privacy proponents in the Parliament did not manage to turn 
the tide until then. While this confirms Dür, Marshall, and Bernhagen’s (2019) 
results that businesses tend to lose when an issue enjoys high salience, it also 
demonstrates that cause groups are much more dependent on salience than 
what Dür, Marshall, and Bernhagen seem to suggest, consistent with 
Culpepper’s (2010) approach to explaining influence.  
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Third, the party affiliation of the MEPs and the ministers in the Council is 
highly indicative of which type of lobbyists the politicians listen to. Politicians 
on the centre/right end of the spectrum are much more likely to be influenced 
by business networks than cause groups, at least in the f data protection policy 
domain.  
Fourth, as this study has suggested that the Council and the governments 
of member states are the most susceptible to the influence of free data 
lobbyists, attention should be devoted to examining how Internet policy 
lobbyists operate and engage with the national representations and whether 
increasing the transparency of this aspect of the EU’s legislative process would 
be possible. Future work should focus on these issues, and a natural 
continuation of this study would be to explore the composition of lobbying 
networks within the Internet policy domain. Using freedom of information 
requests, assessing the interactions between leading politicians and lobbyists 
within these countries would be possible.  
The practical implications for this dissertation are that further attention is 
devoted to the conversation on the transparency of the Council, that the 
studies on how national lobbying of Internet policy contributes to EU reform 
enrich the picture sketched here, and that my contribution highlights the 
urgent need for a compulsory Transparency Register.  
While I have demonstrated that the deliberative ideals of participatory 
democracy failed to materialise, it appears that the institutional inclusion of 
powerful actors in the early stages of the policy formulation process did not 
overly upset the balance of interests and disproportionally favour free data 
lobbyists. Rather, legitimacy issues emerged at later stages of the process. 
There are several explanations for this.  
First, the entrepreneurial role of data protection regulators needs to be 
considered. They steered the legislative process of the Data Protection 
Directive (Newman, 2008a, 2008b), and their opinions were taken into 
account to a high degree in the Commission’s draft GDPR – both collectively, 
as the WP29, and individually, as consulted parties in the 2002 review of the 
Data Protection Directive as well as individual contributors to the public 
consultations in 2009 and 2011. Second, the outstated agenda of DG Justice 
and Commissioner Reding was to advance the rights and interests of citizens 
related to the fundamental right of data protection. The outcome would have 
been very different had DG Internal Market or DG Connect been given the 
responsibility to draft the new proposal. Evidently, the fact that DG Justice 
provided the secretariat of the WP29 had an impact on this outcome. Finally, 
notwithstanding the superior resources of industry lobbyists, privacy 
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advocates with a presence in the EU could still participate in targeted 
consultations and were generally well received by the friendly Commission.  
Taking into consideration the disproportionate influence of the Council on 
the final GDPR and the Council’s tendency to promote free data lobbyists’ 
suggestions, the most worrisome is not the institutional inclusion of interest 
representatives in the agenda-setting stage but the lack of institutionalised 
access in the last steps of the process. By way of national representation, 
governments are to a certain extent perceived as legitimate from an input 
perspective; however, as Follesdal and Hix (2006) note, such a position does 
not adequately consider that governments are rarely elected because of their 
stance on EU issues – or if they are, as the Brexit negotiations have 
demonstrated, the political campaigns have little to do with the realities and 
consequences of EU policy. To alleviate this apparent lack of input legitimacy, 
more focus could be devoted towards achieving throughput legitimacy by 
making the Transparency Register mandatory. Moreover, the register should 
include a database on all submitted proposals by lobbyists and proper 
documentation on Council ministers’ meetings with lobbyists. 
Ultimately, the strong attempt to counter the negative effects of societal 
datafication that materialised in the Commission’s proposal was largely 
undone by the Council, although the Snowden revelations managed to at least 
shift the Parliament’s position and slightly improve their bargaining position. 
While the GDPR may in many respects be perceived as path-dependent of 
earlier data protection policy in the EU, it did not succeed in fundamentally 
upending privacy-invasive practices. Moreover, while expanding bureaucratic 
proceduralism compared with the Data Protection Directive can be 
instrumental in achieving incremental change, it does not appear to have 
caused a systematic overhaul of data handling practices. The lack of radical 
policy change, despite windows of opportunity, knowledgeable policy 
entrepreneurs in the form of DPAs, a friendly DG, and an even friendlier 
Parliamentary rapporteur, is telling. These factors did not lead to significantly 
stronger data protection, with a few exceptions: the extra-territorial 
application of EU data protection regulation, stronger sanctions, and more 
powers to regulators. Therefore, the lack of change cannot be attributed to lack 
of involvement of a wide degree of actors but the resistance represented by 
European governments and their propensity to align their position with those 
of business lobbyists.  
Looking at the broader societal context sheds light on why the Council 
would favour such an approach. In addition to testing the legitimacy claims 
for including interest representatives in the EU’s legislative process, the goal 
of this study has been to explore the role of paradigms in the discursive 
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intuitionalist tradition, aiming to demonstrate how they shape, structure, and 
constrain the available policy options.  
From the late 1980s onwards, surveillance scholars have highlighted how 
society has evolved from the panoptic diagram described by Foucault (1977) 
into a surveillance society focused on data collection (De Landa, 1991), 
profiling (Gandy, 1989), and prediction (Lyon, 1994; Andrejevic, 2012). The 
rationale has undoubtedly changed, where the psychological awareness of 
surveillance appears to be less important than the information one can mine 
from the data. One of the theoretical ambitions of this study has been to 
demonstrate that surveillance, big data, and the bureaucratisation of both 
private and public organisations are inherently interconnected and that their 
infrastructures overlap. While the concept of datafication is useful in 
describing the ways in which social relations are datafied and commodified 
and the uses of personal data are normalised (cf. van Dijck, 2014), I argue that 
the current technological landscape encapsulates a paradigm shift that is 
connected to the earlier aspirations to increase the bureaucratisation of 
societal institutions.  
The rationales are mutually supportive. Datafication is instrumental in 
explaining the online advertising economy and the surveillance innovation 
complex. However, the rationale for processing personal data is equally 
connected to a discourse most commonly associated with the resource 
efficiency that is integral for understanding the role of personal data in 
bureaucratic power and control (Weber, 1978; Dandeker, 1994). After all, the 
surveillant aspects of personalisation technologies and behavioural targeting 
are seen as inherent necessities for achieving the functional goals of relevancy, 
rationality, and efficiency, whereas the parties that engage in these practices 
argue that the information, and by extension the individual, is of no functional 
interest to the entity engaged in processing personal data. This is also why data 
protection regulation, although instrumental in providing people with the 
rights associated with data concerning them, will ultimately be insufficient in 
challenging the big data paradigm because other strong societal interests are 
at play. 
While, as I argue in chapter three, the development of privacy legislation is 
connected to countering the negative aspects of societal datafication, it is 
fundamentally reactive in nature. Technological change, not the gradual shifts 
in attitudes to privacy, has forced legislators to act. Notions of privacy have 
been quite stable the past few years (Pew Research Center, 2015a, 2015b, 
2016; European Commission, 2015a; Turow, 2003; Debatin, Lovejoy, Horn, & 
Hughes, 2009; Halbert & Larsson, 2015; Kennedy, Elgesem, & Miguel, 2015), 
yet the chasm between what is perceived as permissible uses of personal 
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information and what is actually being collected appears to only grow wider. 
Data protection legislation has not tried to fully reflect people’s notions of 
privacy owing to economic and security interests. The twin goal of data 
protection is a case in point. The fact that the twin goal also rests on ideas of 
deepening European integration means that not only does the right to privacy 
face significant obstacles in the form of innovation and security discourse but 
also that it is challenged by one of the core norms of the European project. 
Informational self-determination appears to be in line with what people 
want, but the policies exclusively focused on such an approach might not be 
efficient. Owing to the nature of personal data as a right rather than property, 
consent mechanisms alone will never be sufficient for the vast array of services 
that rely on the supply of at least some personal information. Taxation, welfare 
benefits, and health care cannot, by definition, rely on consent, but neither can 
telecommunications services. The idea of limiting certain types of personal 
data to specific contexts that are perceived as socially acceptable according to 
Nissenbaum’s (2010) contextual integrity framework is a fruitful starting 
point when looking at other legitimate grounds for processing. To some extent, 
such ‘appropriate information flows’ have been included in the GDPR by way 
of data minimisation and purpose limitation requirements, but the list of 
exceptions is long. For example, owing to the carte blanche given to scientific 
research, any pictures uploaded to cloud services, even private albums, could 
be used for training facial recognition algorithms. Moreover, in practice, 
controllers are heavily incentivised to solicit consent for their processing: once 
consent has been given, it is possible to go further than when one relies on the 
other legal grounds. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that software is increasingly 
connected to remote servers and consumer products are connected to the 
Internet to a high degree. Actions that previously took place locally are now 
processed in the cloud, which enables interception while the information is 
being communicated as well as access to the data being processed on remote 
servers. This not only raises security concerns for the public authorities that 
use cloud-powered software in their daily operations but also can have 
consequences for private individuals. Cloud services prompt a convenience 
dilemma because many of their functions are undoubtedly useful and 
disabling them will impair the functionality of the software. From the 
perspective of data protection regulation, data associated with such software 
use also trigger the ‘expanding gas’ issue raised by Ohm (2010) and other 
American privacy scholars, namely that the way personal data is defined in the 
GDPR will include all kinds of technical data, a concern voiced in the data 
protection public consultations by computer security firm Symantec. 
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Nevertheless, although a wider category of data types is regarded as personal 
data in contrast with how personally identifiable information is defined in the 
U.S., the GDPR simultaneously enables their use with reference to other legal 
grounds than consent.  
This leads back to one of the most fundamental observations of this study: 
addressing the issue of data protection by simply contrasting the ‘citizen 
rights’ with ‘business interests’ or the ‘public interest’ with ‘private interests’ 
is impossible. The same arguments for sharing information across borders are 
put forth by the UK Ministry of Justice and Acxiom; it is only the underlying 
goal that changes. Interests overlap even when purposes do not. Public and 
private bureaucracies share the same ambitions to collect, share, and process 
data, which undoubtedly resulted in weaker provisions in the final GDPR. A 
fundamental challenge to privacy legislation is that exceptions granted with 
one situation in mind apply more broadly than perhaps first intended. For 
example, the right to data portability is limited by intellectual property rights 
to avoid corporate espionage with the help of data subject rights, but it is much 
more likely that the exceptions can be used in other circumstances to prevent 
access to personal data. The same issue applies to the broad research exception 
in general. Therefore, the question of how the GDPR should be enforced will 
be of utmost importance, especially considering the increased powers of DPAs 
and the new EDPB. Their interpretation of data protection regulation will 
impact practical applications to a very high degree.  
In the first eight months of the GDPR’s entry into force, 95,000 complaints 
were lodged with the European regulators. 86  The outcomes of these 
complaints will not only determine the effectiveness of the GDPR but also 
reveal significant differences between national DPAs. This should be jointly 
assessed with an examination of how the EDPB operates and whether the EU 
member state power relations are translated into the power dynamics of the 
Board. Owing to their strategic positions within the online economy, special 
attention should be devoted to the DPAs in Ireland, Germany, France, and the 
UK. 
As I have demonstrated, the global dimensions of Internet policy lobbying 
materialised in practice in the GDPR’s legislative process, and there is little 
indication that it was an exception but rather a demonstration of how future 
regulatory proposals within this domain will be met with global interest. The 
lobbying surrounding the new ePrivacy Regulation is testimony to this. The 
Corporate Europe Observatory (2017) quoted a Parliamentary insider stating 
                                                  
86 The number was quoted in a Joint Statement by First Vice-President Timmermans, Vice-President 
Ansip, and Commissioners Jourová and Gabriel (European Commission, 2019). 
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that it was ‘one of the worst lobby campaigns I have ever seen’. By focusing on 
the GDPR’s legislative process, the ambition has been to demonstrate how 
Internet policy lobbying shapes regulation in practice, a conversation which 
has been more widespread within civil society than academia. Further 
attention needs to be devoted towards looking at how competition regulation 
impacts datafication, the role of discrimination regulation in examining how 
social or economic disadvantages overlap with data protection policy, and 
analysing whether the principles of accountability, fairness, and due process 
can withstand the efficiency arguments of datafication. 
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87 The topics are instructive and do not fully correspond to the categorisation in the full position paper 
tables in chapter 6. Some of the categories in this table are made up of several sectors. 
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